Sadler v. Sadler
| Decision Date | 28 February 1928 |
| Citation | Sadler v. Sadler, 107 Conn. 409, 140 A. 639 (Conn. 1928) |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | SADLER v. SADLER ET AL. |
Case Reserved from Superior Court, Fairfield County; John Richards Booth, Judge.
Suit for construction of the will of Anna S. Sadler, late of Bridgeport, deceased, by William E. Sadler, against William R. Sadler and others. Reserved on agreed statement of facts for advice of Supreme Court of Errors. Questions 2 and 3 answered.
Gaza H Mika, of Bridgeport, for plaintiff.
Clifford B. Wilson, of Bridgeport, for defendant Alice Sullivan.
Paul Goldberg, of Bridgeport, for defendants William Richard Sadler and others.
Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.
The testatrix, Anna S. Sadler, was the wife of Joseph Sadler, and married after April 20, 1877. Joseph died June 22, 1893, intestate, and possessed of real and personal estate in Bridgeport, and on June 17, 1895, his widow was appointed administratrix, and qualified as such. The only real estate of Joseph consisted of an undivided one-half interest in a certain tract of land made up of three parcels, the entire tract being bounded north on Willard street, east on land of St. Stephens Realty Corporation, south on land now or formerly of L. & C. Verrilli, and west on Hallett street. The other undivided one-half interest was then, and until her decease, owned by the testatrix.
On September 16, 1905, a certificate of descent was issued by the court of probate certifying that the one-half interest of Joseph Sadler had passed to the widow, Anna S. Sadler, and the two children, Annie and William, and by these designations were intended Anna J. (Sadler) Sullivan and William E. Sadler. This gave one-sixth undivided interest to each, and left the title in the name of the testatrix (owning four-sixths) and of the said children (each owning one-sixth).
The will of Anna S. Sadler was executed January 27, 1916, and she added a codicil March 23, 1916. She died September 8, 1922, possessed of the said above-described interest. The will was probated September 15, 1922, and, the executor named in the will having resigned, an administrator c. t. a. was appointed and qualified, who filed his final account September 29, 1923.
The testatrix left as her sole surviving children the said William E. Sadler and Anna J. Sullivan. The children of the former are William R. Sadler, Francis J. Sadler, and Raymond L. Sadler, and the only child of the latter is Alice Sullivan. All the above-named parties were in being on the death of the testatrix.
The fourth clause of the will of the testatrix reads:
The will provided that the residuum of the estate should be divided equally between the testatrix's children, William E. Sadler and Anna J. Sullivan, and the court of probate on October 23, 1923, issued a certificate of devise certifying that, under the will of Anna J. Sadler, there was devised to Anna J. Sullivan and William E. Sadler an undivided one-half interest in the two-thirds interest of the testatrix in the above described premises.
The only questions submitted for our advice which are in a form admitting of a categorical answer are:
" Did the defendants, William Richard Sadler, Francis Joseph Sadler, Raymond Leo Sadler, the children of William E. Sadler, and Alice Sullivan, the child of Anna J. Sadler, acquire under paragraph four of the will of Anna S. Sadler, any interest in the real estate which said Anna S. Sadler inherited from the estate of Joseph Sadler and of which she died possessed?"
And, " If so, what interest did they acquire?"
It is the claim of these defendants that under the will of their grandmother they receive this one-sixth interest which she had received from her husband, in the following proportions: One thirty-sixth to each of the three children of William E. Sadler and one-twelfth to the child of Anna J. Sullivan.
The plaintiff reaches the conclusion that nothing passes under paragraph 4 of the will, and that it is wholly inoperative and void, for the reason that the entire real estate received from the estate of her husband had been received and the estate finally settled eleven years before the testatrix drew her will, so that there was then no real estate standing in the name of the estate, the estate was not in course of settlement, and she received no interest thereunder. Such a conclusion rendering a provision of a will nugatory and making a part of the estate intestate or throwing it into the residuum is to be avoided, if legally possible. Pease v. Cornell, 84 Conn. 391, 395, 80 A. 86; Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 522, 89 A. 205, Ann.Cas. 1917B, 112; Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 277, 93 A. 535.
It is very clear that, at the time she drew this will, she did not know exactly what her interest was, or where the legal title stood, or whether it might come to her later. In attempting to ascertain her intention, we are justified, therefore, in concluding that she was laboring under the mistaken belief that this interest had not yet been placed in her name. That she was uncertain how the title stood is evident from the statement inserted at this point in her will, viz., that her husband's estate was still in course of settlement. This, in itself, furnished strong evidence that either her recollection or her knowledge of legal matters was at fault. A careful attempt to guard against any mistake in this regard is indicated by the additional provision in which she also referred to " any interest which I may acquire in the future."
We know, and she knew, that the only interest in real estate which her husband had was the one-half interest in this tract in which she also held an interest. We think there can be no reasonable doubt, therefore, that the interest which she had in mind was in this particular property, and we consider the description in the words she used in connection with the conceded facts is amply sufficient to identify it. Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490, 83 A. 636, Ann.Cas. 1913C, 542.
The situation compels this conclusion; indeed, with the facts which are before us, the clause can mean nothing else. Her uncertainty as to the extent of her interest and her obvious belief that the legal title had not then been put in her name are sufficiently apparent from the language which she uses and the uncertainty and misconception as to the state of the record title are, moreover, perfectly natural. We would not be warranted in ascribing to her the knowledge of the laws of descent and familiarity with legal and probate procedure which we would ascribe to a trained lawyer. Reason and common sense are not to be excluded from consideration in ascertaining the intent of a testatrix under these circumstances; nor does this conclusion bring us into the realm of conjecture. The intent is " discerned from the words of the will itself as applied to the subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances." 2 Schouler, Wills (6th Ed.) p. 859; Mosle v. Goodrich, 94 Conn. 426, 109 A. 166. Nor is this intent an " unexpressed intent" or a mere assumption as to what the testatrix wished to say, but did not say. ...
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