Sadler v. Sadler

Decision Date09 December 1981
Docket NumberNo. 4-681A43,4-681A43
Citation428 N.E.2d 1305
PartiesDamon R. SADLER, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. Arlean F. SADLER, Appellee (Respondent Below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Campbell, Kyle & Proffitt, Carmel, for appellant.

MILLER, Presiding Judge.

Damon R. Sadler appeals from the distribution of property in a dissolution action claiming the trial court erred in awarding the wife, Arlean F. Sadler, a portion of his military retirement benefits. We find the trial court erred in awarding property in excess of the marital assets, which award was based in part on an improper distribution of Damon's future interest in retirement benefits. We therefore reverse the trial court's distribution.

FACTS

The Sadlers were married on May 5, 1952 and petitioned for a dissolution of their marriage on April 18, 1980. The trial court dissolved the marriage after a hearing on the petition on August 27, 1980. The evidence at the dissolution proceeding revealed Damon retired from the United States Air Force in May of 1971 after 30 years of service. He began receiving approximately $900 per month in retirement benefits at that time. In 1980, after adjustments for increases in the cost of living, Damon was receiving $1,200 per month in benefits after taxes. According to a certified public accountant who testified at the hearing, Damon's "present interest" in retirement benefits equaled $114,161 based on a computation utilizing 15.6 years as Damon's life expectancy. Both parties testified, however, that Damon's benefits would cease upon his death.

The evidence also revealed the parties had accumulated several assets during the marriage including two automobiles, a mobile home, personal property and household furnishings, and the marital residence in Kokomo, Indiana. Two children were born to the parties during their marriage, both of whom were emancipated at the time of the hearing. Although there was no evidence indicating whether Damon was gainfully employed, Arlean was a telephone operator for Indiana Bell with a take-home pay of approximately $200 per week. There was no evidence indicating Arlean was either partly or totally incapacitated.

After the hearing, the trial court took the matter of property distribution under advisement. On January 6, 1981 the trial court allocated the parties' property as follows To Damon :

1. 1975 Pinto valued at $2,000

2. Mobile Home valued at $1,600

3. Life Insurance (no cash value)

4. Personal property now in his possession (unspecified value)

5. Future military benefits valued at $114,100 over remaining life expectancy of 15.6 years. 1

To Arlean :

1. 1978 Oldsmobile valued at $2,100

2. Indiana Bell Credit Union Account valued at $5

3. Personal and household goods now in her possession valued at $3,030

4. The real estate in Kokomo, Indiana appraised at $34,500 subject to a mortgage of $11,500 leaving $23,000 in equity

5. $10,400 payable by Damon at the rate of $400 per month for 26 months.

Excluding Damon's retirement income, the parties' marital assets totaled $31,735. Since Arlean was awarded $38,535, her award exceeded the total marital assets by approximately $6,800 if the benefits were not subject to distribution. The present controversy, therefore, centers on the propriety of including Damon's retirement benefits in the marital property for purposes of distribution.

DECISION

We first note that Arlean has not favored this Court with a brief on appeal. Damon may therefore prevail by making a prima facie showing of reversible error. D.H. v. J.H., (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 286.

In the instant case, Damon argues primarily that the trial court's excessive award to Arlean was a product of erroneously including his military retirement pay in the marital assets. Although we initially note the court's order does not expressly tie the cash award to Damon's benefits, the memorandum accompanying the order strongly suggests such a connection. Specifically, the court found Arlean had a "present interest in (Damon's) retirement benefit of $28,500 ...," and sought to award Arlean her alleged interest through a combination of property and cash. This memorandum, however, does not constitute special findings of fact binding on the trial court, and, therefore any theory supported by the evidence may be considered by this Court in affirming the judgment. Malo v. Gilman, (1978) Ind.App., 379 N.E.2d 554. Nevertheless, we may refer to the memorandum to determine the meaning and effect of the lower court's judgment. Id.

Although it appears the trial court attempted to award Arlean an interest in Damon's benefits, we must confess our inability to find any evidence in the record indicating Arlean had a "present interest" in Damon's retirement pay. When the order for property distribution was made in this cause, the trial court was empowered to divide the parties' property acquired, either jointly or individually, before the filing of the petition for dissolution. Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-11. Assets acquired after the parties' final separation were not subject to division. Irwin v. Irwin, (1980) Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 317.

Moreover, "property" subject to distribution included "all the assets of either party or both parties, including a present right to withdraw pension or retirement benefits." Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-2(d), as added by Acts 1980, P.L. 180 § 1, effective September 1, 1980. This language manifested legislative approval and adoption of prior case law requiring a "present vested interest" in property before subjecting it to distribution....

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17 cases
  • Hunter v. Hunter
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • October 27, 1986
    ...such assets did not constitute a present vested interest and are therefore properly excluded from distribution. Sadler v. Sadler (1981), Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 1305; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Tallent (1983), Ind.App., 445 N.E.2d 990. The Indiana Legislature has now expressly provided......
  • Grant v. Grant, 55835
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • August 9, 1984
    ...military pension not to be divisible marital property include: Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269 Ark. 523, 601 S.W.2d 873 (1980); Sadler v. Sadler, 428 N.E.2d 1305 (Ind.App.1981); Savage v. Savage, 176 Ind.App. 89, 374 N.E.2d 536 (1978); Light v. Light, 599 S.W.2d 476 (Ky.App.1980); Howard v. Howard,......
  • Luedke v. Luedke
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • April 1, 1985
    ...supported by the evidence may be considered by this court in affirming the judgment of the trial court on this issue. Sadler v. Sadler (1981), Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 1305. Shari's petition for dissolution of marriage was filed on January 6, 1982, which therefore constitutes the date of "final......
  • Hann v. Hann, 43A04-9503-CV-77
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • September 20, 1995
    ...Savage v. Savage (1978), 176 Ind.App. 89, 374 N.E.2d 536; Hiscox v. Hiscox (1979), 179 Ind.App. 378, 385 N.E.2d 1166; Sadler v. Sadler (1981), Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 1305. The most recent affirmation of this long-standing principle was announced in Mullins v. Matlock (1994), Ind.App., 638 N.E......
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