Sadloski v. Town of Manchester, 15166

• Decision Date: 26 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15166,15166
• Citation: 668 A.2d 1314,235 Conn. 637
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Elizabeth SADLOSKI et al. v. TOWN OF MANCHESTER et al.

Page 1314

668 A.2d 1314

235 Conn. 637

Elizabeth SADLOSKI et al. v. TOWN OF MANCHESTER et al.

No. 15166.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 21, 1995.

Decided Dec. 26, 1995.

Kathleen Eldergill, for the appellant (plaintiff Virginia Celinski).

Bourke G. Spellacy, with whom were William J. Shea, Jennifer A. Osowiecki and, on the brief, Karen P. Blado, for the appellees (defendants).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.

BORDEN, Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff has established taxpayer standing to challenge the validity of a real property tax abatement provision based solely on the existence of the abatement provision, irrespective of other tax consequences of the real estate development project to which the abatement provision relates. The plaintiff, ¹ Virginia Celinski, appeals ² from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, the town of Manchester (town), Homart Manchester Investment Company, and The Mall at Buckland Hills Partnership (partnership), in which it concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish taxpayer standing. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly: (1) admitted into evidence portions of a certain deposition; and (2) determined that the plaintiff had not established taxpayer standing. ³ In addition, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, O'Neill, J., improperly dismissed the action as to two of the original plaintiffs, Joyce R. Senkbeil and Adele Katkauskas. We affirm the substance of the judgment of the trial court, but modify it as to its form.

This is the second time that we have considered this case. See Sadloski v. Manchester, 228 Conn. 79, 634 A.2d 888 (1993). Both appeals arise out of a complaint filed in 1988, in which the plaintiff claimed that the town's tax assessment agreement with the partnership was invalid. ⁴ At trial, after the plaintiff had presented her evidence and rested, the defendants moved for a judgment of dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 302, ⁵ claiming that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case. ⁶ The trial court, Aurigemma, J., granted the motion, and rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action for failure to make out a prima facie case. Assuming the plaintiff had established standing, the court held that she had failed to make out a prima facie case on the invalidity of the tax assessment agreement. Sadloski v. Manchester, supra, at 82, 634 A.2d 888.

Only the plaintiff; see footnote 1; appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 4023. Without reaching the merits of the plaintiff's appeal, we determined that "[t]he trial court in this case should not have considered the merits of the plaintiff's case without having first made a finding about whether she had standing and, consequently, whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction." Sadloski v. Manchester, supra, 228 Conn. at 84, 634 A.2d 888. Because the record was insufficient to determine whether the plaintiff had proved standing to raise her claims, we remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to resolve that issue. Id., at 85, 634 A.2d 888.

On remand, the defendants again moved for judgment, claiming that the plaintiff had not proven standing and, in the alternative, that even if the court found that the plaintiff had proven standing, she had failed to make out a prima facie case with regard to her substantive claims. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish her taxpayer standing because she had produced no evidence that her taxes would increase as a result of the agreement between the town and the partnership. ⁷ The court rendered judgment for the defendants, and this appeal followed.

The relevant facts are undisputed. The subject of the underlying action is an agreement between the town and the partnership entered into in February, 1988. The agreement concerns a 380 acre site, 115 acres of which, at the time of the agreement, were owned and to be developed by the partnership. ⁸ Under the agreement, the partnership was obligated to construct and install traffic, water and sewer improvements that would serve the entire site, at an estimated cost of $15 million. Additionally, the partnership agreed to dedicate to the town, in fee simple, any real property owned by the partnership upon or under which the improvements would be constructed or installed. Pursuant to the agreement, the assessment of the 115 acre parcel was fixed on the town tax list at $7 million for a period no longer than seven years. ⁹ Furthermore, the trial court found that, without the construction of the mall and the improvements on the 115 acre parcel, the tax assessment on that parcel was $309,650.

At trial, the plaintiff testified that she believed that her local taxes had increased as a result of the agreement. This opinion was based on her assumption that "when one large subsidized grant is allowed ... the rest of the taxpayers will all have to pick up the portion that isn't being paid by them." She also presented Richard D. Pomp, a professor of tax law at the University of Connecticut School of Law, who testified that "if the agreement were declared invalid, all other things being equal, the town of Manchester would receive a maximum increase in property tax revenue of $9.5 million."

The trial court found, however, that the plaintiff had not proven that her taxes would increase as a result of the agreement. In this connection, the court also found that "the assessed value of the property in question before the execution of the Agreement was tens of millions of dollars less than that value after the execution of the Agreement."

I

We first consider the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss as to Senkbeil and Katkauskas. The plaintiff claims that Senkbeil and Katkauskas have standing based on certain purported environmental impacts of the development in question. We decline to address this claim because the plaintiff has no standing to assert the rights of Senkbeil and Katkauskas, and they have never appealed the dismissal. ¹⁰

It is clear from Sadloski v. Manchester, supra, 228 Conn. at 81 n. 4, 634 A.2d 888, that Senkbeil and Katkauskas did not appeal at that stage of the proceedings. It is also clear from the record in this appeal that Senkbeil and Katkauskas are not appellants. The plaintiff's appeal form names only herself as the plaintiff by whom the appeal is being filed. The plaintiff's docketing statement names only herself as the plaintiff-appellant, and describes Senkbeil and Katkauskas as former plaintiffs who may have a legal interest in the cause on appeal. Finally, the plaintiff's brief names only herself as the appellant.

Plaintiffs are not fungible, even if they are represented by the same attorney and have similar interests. The general rule is that one party has no standing to raise another's rights. See State v. Williams, 206 Conn. 203, 207, 536 A.2d 583 (1988); Delio v. Earth Garden Florist, Inc., 28 Conn.App. 73, 78, 609 A.2d 1057 (1992). The plaintiff cannot assert the appellate rights of parties who have never done so themselves.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a portion of the deposition of Boyce Spinelli, the director of finance for the town, which she claims was hearsay. We disagree.

After the plaintiff had presented her final witness, she offered into evidence portions of Spinelli's deposition pursuant to Practice Book § 248(1)(c). ¹¹ The court overruled the defendants' objection, and admitted the offered portion of the deposition into evidence. The court stated that, pursuant to Practice Book § 248(1)(e), ¹² the defendants could "put in those portions [of the deposition] necessary to present a fair picture of the testimony." In response, the defendants offered the complete deposition, which the court allowed "for the sake of speeding up the proceedings." The plaintiff objected to the entire deposition being admitted as a plaintiff's exhibit because she had not offered it. The court agreed, and marked it as a defendants' exhibit.

Section 248(1)(e) is an expression of the general evidentiary principle that, within the discretion of the trial court, evidence must be put in its proper context to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice, but beyond this, a party should not be compelled to include inadmissible or prejudicial evidence in her offer. See Somers v. LeVasseur, 230 Conn. 560, 565-66, 645 A.2d 993 (1994); State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 13-14, 509 A.2d 493 (1986); Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 141, 491 A.2d 389 (1985); State v. Glenn, 194 Conn. 483, 498-99, 481 A.2d 741 (1984); Glucksman v. Walters, 38 Conn.App. 140, 151-52, 659 A.2d 1217 (1995); C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed.1988) § 3.2.3.

Thus, the issue is whether the balance of Spinelli's deposition comes fairly within this principle. In this connection, the plaintiff has failed to point to any particular portion of the exhibit that she claims went beyond the scope of this principle. As the appellant, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing an erroneous evidentiary ruling by the trial court. Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 232 Conn. 223, 239, 654 A.2d 342 (1995); State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 403, 497 A.2d 956 (1985). The plaintiff asserts that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the additional portion of Spinelli's deposition because it was hearsay, but she fails to address the actual basis for its admissibility. Thus, because she has failed to meet this burden, we have no reason to reject the trial court's ruling.

Even if the court's ruling were held improper, however, the plaintiff has failed to show any resulting harm. " 'It is a fundamental...