Sadowski v. Bush
| Decision Date | 19 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 02-1766(RJL).,CIV. 02-1766(RJL). |
| Citation | 293 F.Supp.2d 15 |
| Parties | Joseph A.F. SADOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. George W. BUSH, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Joseph A. F. Sadowski, Plaintiff, pro se, Hicksville, NY.
Oliver W. McDaniel, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Dist. of Columbia, Washington, DC, for George W. Bush, Tommy G. Thompson, John D. Ashcroft.
The plaintiff, a citizen of the United States who lost two relatives in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, brings this suit, pro se, against George W. Bush, President of the United States, Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, Head of the U.S. Department of Justice. He alleges in his complaint that the defendants, "violated their oath of office and has [sic] warred against the Constitution of the United States, therefore, violating the rights of the people costing tax payers billions of dollars each year, wherefore, placing the citizens of the United States in a situation that the citizens must pay higher taxes for this discretion not to address the issue of illegal aliens and have them deported." (capitalization removed). See Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 1.
The plaintiff asks this Court to declare that: (1) the language a person speaks cannot be equated to the person's national origin under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; (2) choosing to speak or use English is not national origin discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; (3) the defendants have violated the Administrative Procedures, Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness, Regulatory Flexibility and Paperwork Reduction Acts; and (4) the defendants have violated the plaintiff's rights in an arbitrary, capricious, unjustified, and unreasonable manner. The plaintiff also asks this Court to enjoin the defendants from: (1) enforcing or implementing Executive Order 13166, and (2) enforcing any interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights act of 1964, as amended, which equates language and national origin. In addition, the plaintiff made a subsequent filing entitled "Notice of Emergency Motion for the Removal of George W. Bush as Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and/or Secure Our Borders" in which he asks this Court to: (1) issue an order to close the borders between the United States and Mexico, and (2) issue an order to have the borders secured by troops and/or for federal agencies to enforce the laws which have been enacted. Finally, on March 21, 2003, the plaintiff filed a so-called motion for a "Temporary Restraining Order" asking that the defendants be enjoined from (1) taking further steps in reference to declaring war until the borders of the United States are closed, (2) taking steps in the war against Iraq until suspected terrorists are removed from within the borders of the United States, and (3) signing any laws or granting any policies as to alleged violations of aiding and abetting known felons within of the Immigration Act until this case is heard.
Before the Court is a motion by the defendants seeking to dismiss all of the claims for lack of jurisdiction because the questions presented are nonjusticiable political questions, because the plaintiff lacks standing, and because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, the Court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss as to each action filed with the Court.
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Dist. of Columbia Retirement Bd. v. United States, 657 F.Supp. 428, 431 (D.D.C.1987). In evaluating whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, the court must accept all of the complaint's well-pled factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90, overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The court need not, however, accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations. E.g., Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990). Moreover, the court need not limit itself to the allegations of the complaint. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.Cir.1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). Rather, the court, where necessary, may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts along with the court's resolution of disputed facts to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the case. Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992).
The court cannot grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Thus in evaluating the defendants' motion the court will assume the truth of all of the factual allegations set forth in the plaintiff's complaint. See Doe v. United States Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1102 (D.C.Cir.1985), and will construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979).
The plaintiff in this matter proceeds pro se. A pro se complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.2000) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). Although a court will read a pro se plaintiff's complaint liberally, a pro se plaintiff must present a claim on which the court can grant relief. Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
Both the plaintiff's constitutional claims (e.g., violations of Articles I, II, IV, and VI, as well as of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) and his statutory claims stem from the same factual allegations— that the defendants have allowed illegal immigrants into the United States and have not fully enforced the immigration laws.
This claim necessarily implicates questions of immigration policy or allegations that the defendants have failed to enforce certain immigration laws. The claims that implicate general immigration policy include the allegations that: (1) the defendants have violated 8 U.S.C. § 1324 by offering services to illegal aliens and by allowing children of illegal aliens to be considered citizens, thereby "encouraging" or "inducing" aliens to enter the United States illegally, and (2) the defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1983 by not making illegal aliens pay taxes and allowing illegal aliens to receive medical treatment and educational services, thereby depriving plaintiff of equal protection and his civil rights.1 The defendants contend that because the plaintiff lacks standing to bring both the statutory and constitutional claims and because both sets of claims pose nonjusticiable political questions, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The Court agrees.
In order to establish standing, the plaintiff must show three things. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The injury must be legally cognizable, meaning there has been an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized to the plaintiff and that the injury was actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Id. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's alleged conduct. Id. Third, the injury should be able to be redressed through the relief requested. Id.
As to the first requirement, the plaintiff has failed to allege any personal injury that he has suffered, actual or imminent as a result of the alleged failure of the defendants to enforce the immigration laws. Although he points to general harms caused by the Administration's immigration policies, the plaintiffs has failed to show how they have specifically injured him. Merely alleging that he lives in an area affected by illegal immigration is not enough to show standing. See Federation for American Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno, 93 F.3d 897, 901 (D.C.Cir.1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119, 117 S.Ct. 2510, 138 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1997) [hereinafter "FAIR"].2
As to the second requirement, the plaintiff has additionally failed to allege any causal connection between the defendant's alleged failure to enforce the immigration laws and any harm to him. Under Art. III, § 2 of the Constitution federal courts have jurisdiction only over cases and controversies. The plaintiff has not alleged that he has been specifically injured by the presence of illegal aliens. Thus, the Court lacks standing as to these claims.
Even if the plaintiff had standing, his constitutional claims largely relating to existing immigration policy and enforcement of immigration laws would have to be dismissed because they present nonjustifiable political questions. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
Deciding and implementing immigration policy has been textually committed to the political branches, and there exists no judicially manageable standards to decide how best to implement immigration laws. See, e.g., Padavan v. U.S., 82 F.3d 23, 27 (2nd Cir.1996); New Jersey v. U.S., 91 F.3d 463,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Day v. Sebelius
...as violation of federal immigration law), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119, 117 S.Ct. 2510, 138 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1997); Sadowski v. Bush, 293 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C.2003) (individual lacks standing to challenge government's failure to fully enforce immigration laws and to allow illegal immigrants into......
-
Juliana v. United States
...dictator Augusto Pinochet in power was a foreign policy decision textually committed to the Executive Branch); Sadowski v. Bush , 293 F.Supp.2d 15, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (decision to go to war in Afghanistan was not justiciable, "primarily because war powers have been explicitly committed to ......
-
Peterson v. U.S.
...CYO v. Chertoff, No. 07–1307, 2007 WL 2344995, at *8, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62732, at *22 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 16, 2007); Sadowski v. Bush, 293 F.Supp.2d 15, 19 (D.D.C.2003). Moreover, the claim is entirely derivative of Peterson's other (dismissed) claims, in that it would require a showing that......
-
Peterson v. USA
...CYO v. Chertoff, No. 07-1307, 2007 WL 2344995, at *8, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62732, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007); Sadowski v. Bush, 293 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 2003). Moreover, the claim is entirely derivative of Peterson's other (dismissed) claims, in that it would require a showing ......