Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones

• Decision Date: 03 December 2021
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 46961,47245
• Parties: SAFARIS UNLIMITED, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mike Von JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

501 P.3d 334

SAFARIS UNLIMITED, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Mike Von JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 46961

47245

Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, September 2021 Term.

Opinion filed: December 3, 2021

Benoit, Alexander, Mollerup & Danielson, PLLC, Twin Falls, for Appellant. Michael D. Danielson argued.

Stover, Gadd & Associates, PLLC, Twin Falls, for Respondent. David W. Gadd argued.

ZAHN, Justice.

Mike Von Jones ("Jones") appeals the denial of his motion to set aside a sheriff's sale and the award of attorney fees to Safaris Unlimited LLC ("Safaris") under Idaho Code section 12-120(5). Jones argues that: (1) the district court erred by concluding Jones's monetary tender to the clerk of the court did not preclude Safaris from claiming ownership of Jones's pending lawsuit; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to set aside the sheriff's sale; and (3) the district court erred in awarding costs and fees pursuant to section 12-120(5) for actions taken after Jones’ tender to the clerk. We affirm the district court's orders.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is the third time this Court has considered this case, which involves a contract dispute between Jones and Safaris. On the first appeal we reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a valid contract between Jones and Safaris.

Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Jones (Safaris I ), 158 Idaho 846, 850, 353 P.3d 1080, 1084 (2015).

Following remand, a jury found that there was an enforceable contract between Jones and Safaris and that Jones breached the contract. The jury awarded Safaris $26,040.00. On February 24, 2017, Jones filed a notice of appeal. The district court subsequently granted Safaris’ motion for attorney fees and entered an amended judgment against Jones for $122,984.82.

On June 2, 2017, Safaris petitioned for and obtained a writ of execution requiring the sheriff to execute upon Jones's personal and real property, including a pending lawsuit against Jeremy Sligar and Overtime Garage, LLC (the "Sligar Lawsuit").¹ Prior to the sheriff's sale, Safaris and Sligar entered into a Conditional Settlement Agreement and Release, which provided in relevant part:

At the sale of Jones's rights to the Lawsuit, Safari [sic] shall credit bid up to an amount at the discretion of Safaris. Sligar and Overtime Garage agree not to bid toward the purchase of Jones's rights to the Lawsuit, either through themselves or through a third party, and not to encourage any third parties to bid toward the purchase of Jones's rights.

....

Sligar and Overtime Garage shall pay Safaris the sum of One Hundred Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($100,000.00) ... within thirty (30) days of Safari's [sic] acquisition of Jones's rights to the Lawsuit.

At the sheriff's sale on June 17, 2017, Safaris—the only bidder present—bought the lawsuit for $2,500.00 via a credit bid. Although Jones received notice of the sheriff's sale, neither Jones nor his representative attended. Jones did, however, file a motion to set aside the sheriff's sale of the Sligar Lawsuit, which the district court granted on August 11. On September 1, 2017, Safaris cross-appealed the district court's order setting aside the sheriff's sale.

On December 18, 2017, Safaris executed on additional personal property of Jones. The sale returned $8,300.00. On December 28, 2017, while both Jones's and Safaris’ appeals were pending, Jones tendered a $119,238.04 check to the clerk of the court pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1115, in an attempt to satisfy the remainder of the amended judgment.

In the second appeal this Court affirmed the district court's orders appealed by Jones, vacated the district court's order setting aside the sheriff's sale, and remanded the case. Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Jones (Safaris II ), 163 Idaho 874, 888, 421 P.3d 205, 219 (2018). We held that the district court abused its discretion by setting aside the sheriff's sale without first making a sufficient finding as to the approximate value of the Sligar Lawsuit. Id. at 886, 421 P.3d at 217. We also ordered Jones to pay Safaris’ attorney fees in the amount of $12,579.45. Id.

Following remand, Safaris filed a motion for release of the $119,238.04 tendered by Jones. The district court granted Safaris’ motion for release of funds and determined that the deposited funds were sufficient to satisfy the amended judgment.² However, the district court found that the deposited funds exceeded the amount owed by $2,500.00 because Jones's tender did not account for Safaris’ credit bid to purchase the Sligar Lawsuit. Jones again filed a motion to set aside the sheriff's sale.

On March 5, 2019, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Jones's motion to vacate the sheriff's sale and later issued an order denying the motion. The district court concluded that Jones failed to establish both a gross inadequacy of consideration and very slight additional circumstances, as required by this Court in Safaris II . The district court held that Jones had not demonstrated a gross inadequacy of consideration because he failed to establish the litigation's approximate value. Similarly, Jones failed to show very slight additional circumstances because he could not point to any procedural irregularities "pertaining to either the notice or conduct of the sale." After denying Jones's motion to vacate the sheriff's sale, the district court ordered the clerk of the court to release the remaining $2,500.00 from the tender back to Jones or his attorneys. Jones timely appealed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether Jones's tender to the clerk of the court pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1115 rendered Safaris’ cross-appeal in Safaris II moot?

2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Jones's motion to set aside the sheriff's sale?

3. Whether the district court erred in awarding costs and fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(5) for actions taken after Jones tendered payment pursuant to section 10-1115 ?

4. Whether Safaris is entitled to an award of its attorney fees and costs on appeal?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have recognized that when a trial court considers a motion to set aside a sheriff's sale, "[e]ach case depends largely on its own peculiar facts; and whether the circumstances, coupled with inadequacy of price, are sufficient to warrant setting aside the sale is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court." Puckett v. Bergmann , 167 Idaho 403, 406–07, 470 P.3d 1212, 1215–16 (2020) (quoting Phillips v. Blazier-Henry , 154 Idaho 724, 727, 302 P.3d 349, 352 (2013) ). Thus, when reviewing a ruling on a motion to set aside a sheriff's sale, this Court reviews the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court did not abuse its discretion if it "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with relevant legal standards; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Safaris II , 163 Idaho at 884, 421 P.3d at 215 (citation omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The law of the case doctrine bars Jones's attempt to litigate the mootness of Safaris’ cross-appeal in Safaris II .

Jones argues that as of December 28, 2017, when he tendered funds pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1115, he: (1) had no further obligations under the amended judgment and (2) owned the Sligar Lawsuit because the district court had initially granted his motion to set aside the sheriff's sale. Therefore, he asserts that when he tendered funds to the clerk of the court, Safaris’ claim for ownership of the Sligar Lawsuit became moot because Jones's tender satisfied the amended judgment and made Safaris whole. Safaris responds that it elected not to immediately claim the funds in 2017 because doing so would have prejudiced its cross-appeal while allowing Jones to pursue his appeal. Safaris argues that the deposit of funds pursuant to section 10-1115 did not moot its pending appeal, but instead gave it the option to either accept the tender and dismiss its appeal, or decline the tender and proceed with its appeal. Before we address the merits of this issue, however, we must address Safaris’ arguments that Jones should be judicially estopped from raising it, or in the alternative, that Jones waived the argument by failing to raise it during proceedings in Safaris II .

1. The judicial estoppel doctrine is not applicable.

Safaris argues that because Jones never raised a mootness argument during the proceedings in Safaris II , he should be judicially estopped from making such an argument in this appeal. Jones argues that judicial estoppel should be applied to prevent Safaris from claiming an interest in the Sligar lawsuit because it took inconsistent positions when it refrained from accepting his tender until after this Court issued its decision in Safaris II . We conclude neither party has established that judicial estoppel should be applied in this case.

"Judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible with the first." McCallister v. Dixon , 154 Idaho 891, 894, 303 P.3d 578, 581 (2013). Judicial estoppel is intended "to protect ‘the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of the judicial proceeding.’ " Id. (quoting A & J Const. Co. v. Wood , 141 Idaho 682, 685, 116 P.3d 12, 15 (2005) ). The United States Supreme Court has highlighted several factors to inform a court on whether to apply judicial estoppel in a particular case: (1) whether a party's later position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier position, (2) whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept the party's earlier position, "so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a...