Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Hanna

• Citation: 150 A. 870,159 Md. 452
• Decision Date: 24 June 1930
• Docket Number: 52.
• Parties: SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. OF BALTIMORE ET AL. v. HANNA.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

150 A. 870

159 Md. 452

SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. OF BALTIMORE ET AL. v. HANNA.

No. 52.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 24, 1930

Appeal from Orphans' Court of Baltimore City; Harry C. Gaither William M. Dunn and Philip L. Sykes, Judges.

Caveat proceedings by William Hooper Hanna against the Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore and another, executors of the last will and testament of Charles Fleetwood Hanna, deceased. From an order of the orphans' court directing that issue as to mental incapacity and undue influence in execution of will be sent to court of law for trial by jury, the respondents appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and PATTISON, URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT DIGGES, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

Randolph Barton, Jr., and Robert B. M. Barton, both of Baltimore (F Fulton Bramble, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

George Arnold Frick, of Baltimore (Charles F. Harley, of Baltimore on the brief), for appellee.

DIGGES J.

On August 9, 1929, William H. Hanna filed in the orphans' court of Baltimore city a caveat to the will of his deceased father, Charles F. Hanna, attacking the legal execution thereof and alleging mental incapacity and undue influence. The prayer of the petition is that the appellants be required to answer, that the order of the orphans' court previously passed admitting the will to probate be annulled and set aside, and that letters testamentary theretofore granted to the appellants be revoked. The appellants filed an answer to the petition, alleging that the execution of the will was in accordance with the requirements of the law, and denied mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the making of the will, or that said will was procured by undue influence. The answer further alleged that subsequent to the granting of letters testamentary to the appellants, proceedings were instituted in the circuit court of Baltimore city entitled "Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore, executor, etc., v. Leila E. Hanna, executrix, etc.," for the construction of the will of Charles F. Hanna, and other purposes as recited in the bill; that the appellee was one of the parties to said proceeding and had actual knowledge thereof; that as a result of said proceedings the circuit court of Baltimore city on October 7, 1927, passed a decree therein; that by said decree the court construed the will with reference to certain provisions thereof affecting the appellee, and directed that certain payments be made by the executor; that in pursuance of said decree, many of the payments therein directed, and especially those affecting the appellee, have been made by the appellants; that in view of said proceedings, and of the action heretofore taken thereunder, the appellee is not entitled to sustain the petition and caveat filed by him against the will and codicil of Charles F. Hanna. By a replication filed the appellee joined issue on the matters alleged in the answer, so far as the answer denied or avoided the allegations of the petition and caveat; and alleged that the appellee was out of the state of Maryland during the pendency of the proceedings in the circuit court for Baltimore city, and for several months after the termination of same; that he had no knowledge or information concerning the proceedings until several months after the termination thereof. He further alleged that the validity vel non of the will of Charles F. Hanna was not passed upon in said proceedings; denied the jurisdiction of the circuit court to pass upon the issues raised by the caveat; alleged that he has personally received no payments by the trustee made under the decree of the circuit court, or in any way out of the estate of Charles F. Hanna, and that if any payments were made to anybody out of said estate in any way affecting him, they were made against his will and without his assent or consent. The orphans' court by its order of March 4, 1930, adjudged and decreed that the appellee was not precluded from caveating the will of his deceased father, and directed that the issues requested be sent to the Baltimore city court to be tried by jury. The appeal to this court followed.

The appellee filed in this court a motion to dismiss the appeal, which will be first disposed of. The ground upon which this motion is based is that the order of the orphans' court appealed from was not a final order or decree, or in the nature of a final order or decree, and that therefore the appeal was prematurely taken. We are of the opinion that that position cannot be sustained. The order here appealed from determined the proper parties to the caveat proceeding, determined the issues to be tried, and directed that they be sent to a court of law. No tribunal other than this court has jurisdiction to review such an order of the orphans' court. In no appeal from the result of a trial, in a court of law, of the issues transmitted from the orphans' court could this question be here reviewed. It could form no part of the record in the lower court. In Langhirt v. Hicks, 153 Md. 31, 137 A. 482, 483, the finding of the orphans' court, from which an appeal was taken, was that: "The caveatrix 'is not estopped or barred from prosecuting said caveat, and that she is entitled to have the issues of fact raised by her said caveat and the answer thereto, as to the validity and genuineness of the alleged last will and testament of Margaretha Langhirt, deceased, sent to a court of law to be determined by a jury.' " In dismissing the appeal this court said: "It is not from a final order, or, indeed, from any effective order. No doubt, another order would have followed, sending issues to a court of law. From such an order an appeal would lie. The order passed was nothing more, in effect, than the opinion of the court. Newell v. Dundalk Co., 149 Md. 182, 131 A. 148."

The appeal on its merits raises a single question, and that one of law, it being whether or not the facts contained in the record, all undisputed, present a situation which estops the appellee from caveating the will of his father. The facts, as we have said, are undisputed, and those vital to the decision of this case are substantially as follows: The will of Charles F. Hanna was executed on May 20, 1920, and a codicil thereto on February 20, 1924. He died on August 11, 1926. The will and codicil were probated, without contest, on August 18, 1926, and letters testamentary were granted to the appellants. The testator left surviving him two sons and three daughters as his only heirs at law. The will made provision for each of these, at considerable length and in language not altogether clear or free from ambiguity. It also contained provisions which were apparently in conflict. Shortly after the probate of the will, a bill was filed in the circuit court of Baltimore city by the Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore, one of the executors of the will against Leila E. Hanna, the other executor, Leila E. Hanna individually, and the other children of the deceased, with their respective husbands and wives. Robert Albert and William C. Briddell were also made defendants, they having previously secured attachments on judgments against the appellee, laid in the hands of the executors and trustees, seeking to subject the interest of the appellee to the payment of these judgments. The bill recited the provisions of the will, and prayed that the court assume jurisdiction, construe the will, appoint a trustee or trustees to administer any trust that the court might find to be created by the will, and that the administration of the estate be thereafter conducted and completed under the supervision of that court. All of the defendants were adults, and all were personally summoned to ...