Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Schweitzer

• Decision Date: 11 March 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:18-05059-CV-RK
• Citation: 372 F.Supp.3d 884
• Parties: SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Amanda Ruth SCHWEITZER, Jonah Schweitzer, Christy Owens, C.A., a Minor Child, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

372 F.Supp.3d 884

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

v.Amanda Ruth SCHWEITZER, Jonah Schweitzer, Christy Owens, C.A., a Minor Child, Defendants.

Case No. 3:18-05059-CV-RK

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Southwestern Division.

Signed March 11, 2019

Angela M. Higgins, Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Fleming, Kapke & Willerth, LLC, Lee's Summit, MO, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is an insurance coverage declaratory judgment action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Before the Court is the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Plaintiff Safeco Insurance Company of America ("Safeco"). (Doc. 22.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 23, 24, 25.) For the reasons below, the motion is GRANTED in part as to Defendants C.A. and Christy Owens. (Doc. 22). Safeco is further ordered to show cause why it's case against Defendants Amanda Schweitzer and Jonah Schweitzer should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Background

The relevant facts in this matter are undisputed. C.A. is a minor child who, through his mother Christy Owens ("Owens"), has a pending civil action for damages in state court against his middle school teacher, Amanda Schweitzer ("Amanda"), and Amanda's husband, Jonah Schweitzer ("Jonah"). C.A.'s civil action stems from the allegation that Amanda groomed and subsequently engaged in sexual intercourse with C.A. Amanda has been charged with crimes for her alleged sexual misconduct. Amanda and Jonah are insured under a Safeco homeowners' insurance policy. After Owens and C.A. made a demand on Safeco for payment of the policy proceeds, Safeco brought this declaratory judgment action naming as defendants: Amanda, Jonah, C.A., and Owens. In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Safeco requests for judgment to be entered in its favor by declaring that there is no coverage under the policy for C.A.'s claims against Amanda and Jonah.

To date, neither Amanda nor Jonah Schweitzer has appeared in this action. The Clerk of the Court previously entered defaults against Amanda and Jonah. (Docs. 14, 20.) However, Safeco has not submitted a motion for default judgment as to these defendants. Accordingly, the Court will address Safeco's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Defendants C.A. and Christy Owens only.

A. The Underlying State Civil Action

Analysis of the arguments at issue requires review of the petition filed by C.A. in state court (the "Petition"). C.A. sues Amanda for negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count I) and false imprisonment (Count II) and sues Jonah for negligence (Count III). The factual allegations which are common to all counts are as follows:

6. C.A. was a student at North Middle School during the 2016-17 school year.

7. During that same year, [Amanda] was an adult female teacher employed by the Joplin School District ("JSD") at North Middle School where she served as a teacher to C.A.

8. In early 2017, [Amanda] began grooming C.A. via social media and text message in violation of JSD policies.

9. On or about March 29, 2017, C.A. was late for the bus and subsequently missed school.

10. [Amanda] messaged C.A. when she noticed he was not at school.

11. [Amanda] subsequently drove to his home and picked him up without the consent of his mother.

12. While at her home, [Amanda] engaged in sexual intercourse with C.A.

13. As a result of the encounter, C.A. has sustained emotional injuries.

14. In addition, C.A. was forced to finish the semester off campus after the encounter with [Amanda] came to light. He subsequently transferred schools.

(Doc. 1-2 at 2.)

Each count sets out additional relevant allegations. In Count I, for negligent infliction of emotional distress against Amanda, the Petition alleges that Amanda breached a duty to C.A. "by engaging in sexual intercourse with the minor[, C.A]." (Doc. 1-2 at ¶ 18.) "By engaging in sex with C.A. at her home, it must have been foreseeable to [Amanda] that her conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing distress to him." (Id. at ¶ 20.) In Count II, for false imprisonment against Amanda, the Petition alleges that "[b]y falsely imprisoning C.A. at her home and subsequently engaging in sex with him there, it must have been foreseeable to [Amanda] that her conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing distress to the minor." (Id. at ¶ 26.)

Count III is the sole count against Jonah. In Count III, the Petition alleges that Jonah "knew, or should have known, of the proclivities of his wife to ‘groom’ young, male students and prey on them for sex." (Id. at ¶ 30.) The Petition further alleges that despite this knowledge, Jonah was negligent for:

a. Failing to warn others of his wife's dangerous proclivities;

b. Failing to timely call the police;

c. Failing to protect C.A., while he was at the home [Jonah] shared with [Amanda], from the foreseeable criminal conduct of [Amanda]; [and]

d. Failing to take reasonable measures to ensure [Amanda] would never be alone at home with a minor ....

(Doc. 1-2 at ¶ 31(a)-(d) ).

B. The Homeowner's Insurance Policy

Also necessary to the analysis is a review of the relevant definition and exclusion provisions in Safeco's policy issued to Amanda and Jonah.¹ The policy provides liability coverage for Amanda and Jonah "[i]f a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies[.]" (Doc. 1-3 at 26.) The policy defines "occurrence" to mean "an accident ... which results in: (1) bodily injury[.]" (Id. at 37.)

The policy contains the following three relevant exclusions. First, the policy excludes from coverage bodily injury:

which is expected or intended by any insured or which is the foreseeable result of an act or omission intended by any insured;

This exclusion applies even if:

(1) Such bodily injury ... is of a different kind or degree than expected or intended; or

(2) Such bodily injury ... is sustained by a different person, or persons, than expected or intended.

(Id. at 26.) Second, the policy excludes from coverage bodily injury "which results from violation of criminal law committed by, or with the knowledge or consent of any insured. This exclusion applies whether or not any insured is charged or convicted of a violation of criminal law[.]" (Id. at 27.) Third, the policy excludes from coverage bodily injury "arising out of physical or mental abuse, sexual molestation or sexual harassment." (Id. at 29.) The Court will refer to the three exclusions using Safeco's labels, respectively: (1) the expected/intended injury exclusion, (2) the violation of criminal law exclusion, and (3) the physical, mental, or sexual abuse exclusion.

Legal Standards

A. Judgment on the Pleadings Standard

"After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only when there is no dispute as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the same standard used to address a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) [.]" Ashley County v. Pfizer, Inc. , 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). "When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings (or a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ), the court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint as well as materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings." Porous Media Corp. , 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

B. Missouri Insurance Law

Because jurisdiction in this case is based on diversity, the Court applies state substantive law, and the parties do not dispute that Missouri law applies. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. v. SIG Pack, Inc. , 476 F.3d 594, 595 (8th Cir. 2007). Under Missouri law, the rules governing the interpretation of insurance policies are well settled. See Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schauf , 967 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Mo. banc. 1998). The Supreme Court of Missouri has given the following guidance for interpreting insurance policies:

The general rules for interpretation of other contracts apply to insurance contracts as well. The key is whether the contract language is ambiguous or unambiguous. When there is ambiguity in an insurance policy, the Court must interpret the policy in favor of the insured. However, where insurance policies are unambiguous, they will be enforced as written.

Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council , 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. banc. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The party seeking to establish coverage under the insurance policy has the burden of proving that the claim is covered by the policy. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. D.T.S. , 867 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Mo. App. 1993). The burden of proving coverage remains on the parties who are seeking coverage even though they are denominated as defendants in a declaratory judgment action. Id. "On the other hand, an insurance company seeking to avoid coverage by reason of a policy exclusion has the burden of proving the applicability of the exclusion." Id. ; Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neal , 992 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Mo. App. 1998) (insurance company relying on policy exclusion to deny coverage must prove the facts which make the exclusion applicable).

"Disputes arising from interpretations and application of insurance contracts are matters of law for the court where there are no underlying facts in dispute." Centermark Props. v. Home ndem. Co. , 897 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Mo. App. 1995). Because "[a]n insurance contract is designed to furnish protection[,] it will be interpreted to grant coverage rather than defeat it." Id. at 101. Accordingly, "[w]hen an...