Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Burton

Decision Date17 February 2023
Docket Number22-cv-00598 (SRN/DTS)
PartiesSafeco Insurance Company of Illinois, Plaintiff, v. Levi Richard Burton and Morgan McClurg, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Christian A. Preus and Jeffrey R. Mulder, Bassford Remele for Plaintiff.

Amber Stavig, Dudley and Smith, P.A., Katherine A. Brown Holmen Katherine Holmen, Francis J. Rondoni and Mikael Jeffrey Ingvaldson, Chestnut Cambronne, P.A., for Defendant.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois' (“Safeco”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 22]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Safeco's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This action stems from an incident between Defendants Levi Richard Burton and Morgan McClurg that occurred at The Armory, an event venue in downtown Minneapolis, on December 14, 2019. (Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶ 13.) The underlying facts are not in dispute.

A. The Incident at the Armory

On the evening in question, Defendants were separately attending a concert at The Armory. (Compl. ¶ 13; id., Ex. 4 (McClurg Compl.) ¶ 6, 8.) Around 10:00 p.m., Ms. McClurg became aware of a group of men who were “grossly intoxicated and causing trouble.” (McClurg Compl. ¶ 9.) Mr. Burton was part of this group. (Id. ¶ 16.) He and the other men began to focus on Ms. McClurg and her friends, threatening and pushing them. (Id. ¶ 10.)

Concerned that there would be “an altercation or violence” without The Armory's intervention, Ms. McClurg reported the group's behavior to a bartender. (Id. ¶ 11.) The bartender suggested that she speak with a security guard. (Id. ¶ 11-12.) Ms. McClurg then spoke with two different security guards, explaining the behavior, “the need for urgent intervention, and the fact that the drunk individuals appeared violent[.] (Id. ¶ 12-13.) The security guards apparently took no action in response to Ms. McClurg's warnings. (Id. ¶ 12-14.)

When Ms. McClurg returned to her friends, the intoxicated men initiated an “altercation and a fight.” (Id. ¶ 15.) During the fight, Mr. Burton punched Ms. McClurg in the face. (Id. ¶ 15-16.) Ms. McClurg suffered severe injuries to her jaw, face, and head as a result. (Id. ¶ 20.)

For these actions, Mr. Burton was charged with Third Degree Assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223. (Compl., Ex. 1 (Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty (“Plea Petition”)) at 1.) On December 9, 2020, Mr. Burton pleaded guilty to Disorderly Conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3). (Id.) In pleading guilty, Mr. Burton attested as follows:

I committed the following acts (state sufficient facts to establish a factual basis for all elements of the offense(s) to which the defendant is pleading guilty): While attending a concert at The Armory in Minneapolis, MN, I engaged in boisterous and noisy conduct the [sic] would tend to reasonably arouse alarm, anger or resentment in others. While doing so, I was attacked by an unknown person. I reflexively responded in what I reasonably believed was self-defense by taking a swing at my attacker. Unfortunately, that punch missed my attacker and instead, I struck an innocent bystander, M.M.

(Id.) Ms. McClurg is the “innocent bystander” identified as M.M. (Compl. ¶ 19.)

In addition to performing community service, Mr. Burton was ordered to pay restitution to Ms. McClurg in the amount of $2,386.50 as part of his sentence. (Compl., Ex. 2 (Sentence) at 1.)

B. Ms. McClurg's Lawsuit

On January 25, 2022, Ms. McClurg filed suit against Mr. Burton and The Armory in Hennepin County District Court. (Compl. ¶ 22; see generally McClurg Compl.) Ms. McClurg's Complaint states her belief that while “punching her in the face was not what Defendant Burton intended, although in his intoxicated state, whomever he was trying to strike was not the Plaintiff, but he nonetheless stuck [sic] the Plaintiff in the face with his fist.” (McClurg Compl. ¶ 16.) She alleges that Mr. Burton “engaged in disorderly conduct, and as a result of that, negligently injured the Plaintiff[.] (Id. ¶ 29.) Ms. McClurg thus asserts a cause of action for negligence against Mr. Burton, seeking damages for the injuries that resulted from his punch. (Id. ¶ 20-23, 28-30.)

C. The Policy

Mr. Burton held a Homeowners Policy (the “Policy”) with Safeco for the period of September 19, 2019 to September 19, 2020. (Compl. ¶ 29; Compl., Ex. 5 (Policy).) The Policy provides the following coverage under “Coverage E - Personal Liability”:

If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will:
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice even if the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or defend ends when the amount we pay for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our limit of liability.

(Policy at 14 (emphasis in original).) “Occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including exposure to conditions which results in: (1) bodily injury; or (2) property damage[.] (Id. at 25.) Pursuant to this provision, Safeco agreed to provide Mr. Burton with a defense against Ms. McClurg's lawsuit, subject to a reservation of rights to deny defense and indemnity insurance coverage. (Compl. ¶ 28.)

Under “Liability Losses We Do Not Cover,” the Policy contains two exclusions relevant here:

1. Coverage E - Personal Liability and Coverage F - Medical Payments to Others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage:
a. which is expected or intended by any insured or which is the foreseeable result of an act or omission by any insured;
This exclusion applies even if:
(1) such bodily injury or property damage is of a different kind or degree than expected or intended; or
(2) such bodily injury or property damage is sustained by a different person, or persons, than expected or intended . . . b. which results from violation of criminal law committed by, or with the knowledge or consent of any insured.
This exclusion applies whether or not any insured is charged or convicted of a violation of criminal law, or local or municipal ordinance.

(Policy at 14-15.)

D. This Lawsuit

Safeco filed this action against Defendants on March 8, 2022, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Policy does not require it to defend or indemnify Mr. Burton against Ms. McClurg's lawsuit. (Compl. ¶ 32-48.)

In Count I, Safeco seeks a declaration that Exclusion 1(b) (“criminal-acts exclusion”) excludes coverage for Ms. McClurg's injuries because Mr. Burton pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of disorderly conduct, and thus Safeco has no duty to defend or indemnify Mr. Burton. (Id. ¶ 32-39.) In Count II, Safeco seeks a similar declaration based on Exclusion 1(a) (“intentional-acts exclusion”). (Id. ¶ 40-42.) Finally, Count III seeks a declaration that Ms. McClurg's injuries were not caused by an “occurrence” as defined within the Policy, and therefore Safeco has no duty to defend or indemnify. (Id. ¶ 43-48.)

On August 18, 2022, Safeco filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 22]. Safeco moved only with respect to Count I, arguing that the criminal-acts exclusion bars coverage for Ms. McClurg's injuries as a matter of law. (See Pl.'s Mem. [Doc. No. 24] at 1.) Mr. Burton and Ms. McClurg oppose Safeco's Motion, arguing that questions of material fact as well as disagreements about the law preclude judgment on the pleadings. (See Burton Opp'n [Doc. No. 29]; McClurg Opp'n [Doc. No. 33].)[1]

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Safeco moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), for judgment on the pleadings as to the Policy's criminal-acts exclusion. Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate if, “accepting all facts pled by the nonmoving party as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party, the movant has clearly established that no material issue of fact remains and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. First Data Merch. Servs. Corp., 852 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2017). The Court ordinarily does not consider matters outside the pleadings on a motion under Rule 12(c). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Court may, however, “consider the pleadings themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits attached to the pleadings, and matters of public record.” Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)).

In addition, “because granting a Rule 12(c) motion ‘summarily extinguish[es] litigation at the threshold and foreclose[s] the opportunity for discovery and factual presentation,' courts must treat such motions with the ‘greatest of care.' Acosta v. Reliance Tr. Co., No. 17-cv-4540 (SRN/ECW), 2019 WL 3766379, at *7 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2019) (quoting Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC v. Hourani, 190 F.Supp.3d 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2016)).

III. DISCUSSION

Safeco argues that Mr. Burton's guilty plea to the criminal charge establishes, under the plain language of the criminal-acts exclusion, that the Policy excludes coverage for Ms. McClurg's injuries and that therefore Safeco has no responsibility to defend or indemnify Mr. Burton. (Pl.'s Mem. at 5-10; Pl.'s Reply [Doc. No. 34] at 2-9.) In response, Mr. Burton asserts that the evidence does not establish that he committed a criminal act, that the criminal-acts exclusion violates public policy as overbroad,...

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