Safeco Ins. Co. v. Seck

• Decision Date: 20 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 2-91-0449,2-91-0449
• Citation: Safeco Ins. Co. v. Seck, 225 Ill.App.3d 397, 587 N.E.2d 1251, 167 Ill.Dec. 636 (Ill. App. 1992)
• Parties: , 167 Ill.Dec. 636 SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Francis SECK et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1251

587 N.E.2d 1251

225 Ill.App.3d 397, 167 Ill.Dec. 636

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Francis SECK et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 2-91-0449.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

Feb. 20, 1992.

William J. Floriano (argued), Kurt G. Berakek, Fraterrigo, Best & Beranek, James F. Best, for Safeco Ins. Co.

Robert M. Buege (argued), May & Buege, Ltd., Waukegan, Ronald E. Brandt (argued), Brandt & Cox, P.C., Lake Villa, Querry & Harrow Ltd., Waukegan, for Francis & Marie Seck.

Justice McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises out of a declaratory judgment action brought by plaintiff, Safeco Insurance Company, in order to determine its rights and obligations in a personal injury lawsuit filed by Marie Seck against her husband, Francis Seck. Plaintiff disputes the order of the circuit court of Lake County granting defendants' motions for summary judgment declaring that Safeco Insurance Company owed Francis Seck duties of defense and indemnification up to the policy liability limit of $300,000. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied. Plaintiff denies that these duties are owed to defendant because the insurance policy contained a family exclusion clause. We reverse.

On August 19, 1988, Francis Seck and his wife, Marie Seck, were involved in an automobile accident. Marie subsequently filed a personal injury action against Francis. Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a finding that a family exclusion clause in Francis' insurance policy excluded coverage for damages sought by Marie. The trial court rejected plaintiff's argument and found that the family exclusion in plaintiff's insurance contract was void because it was contrary to Illinois public policy as expressed by the legislative abrogation of interspousal immunity in the Illinois Rights of Married Women Act (the Married Women Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 40, par. 1001). Thus, the court held that plaintiff owed Francis duties of defense and indemnification up to the $300,000 liability limit of the insurance policy.

The central issue presented for review is whether the abrogation of interspousal tort immunity invalidates the family exclusion clause in plaintiff's automobile insurance policy. The facts of this case are not in dispute. We are asked to address a legal question involving the construction of a provision of an insurance contract in relation to State law. Therefore, our determination may be made on review independent of the trial court's judgment. Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Linak (1991), 208 Ill.App.3d 892, 895, 153 Ill.Dec. 680, 567 N.E.2d 638.

Plaintiff issued an automobile liability insurance policy to Francis Seck in November 1977. This policy was renewed in May 1988. It contained a single limit liability coverage of $300,000 per accident. The policy issued to defendant contained the following coverage exclusion:

"EXCLUSIONS: This policy does not apply under the Liability Section:

* * * * * *

(d) to any person for bodily injury to anyone related to that person by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of the same household. This includes a ward or foster child."

The trial court reasoned that this exclusion was void as against public policy in light of the Married Women Act, which explicitly abrogated interspousal tort immunity effective January 1, 1988 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 40, par. 1001). The court further found that the trend of the law has been to find family exclusions in liability policies to be void as against various other public policies.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court should not have invalidated the family exclusion clause in Francis Seck's insurance policy because: (1) family exclusion clauses have been upheld in Illinois and other jurisdictions; (2) principles of statutory construction and interpretation dictate that the exclusion clause is not affected by the Married Women Act; (3) the family exclusion clause does not violate the public policies inherent in the Illinois financial responsibility act (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 7-100 et seq.); (4) the family exclusion clause does not violate public policies inherent in the Illinois mandatory insurance statute; and (5) invalidation of the family exclusion clause impairs vested contractual rights. Defendants address these same issues in support of their position that the court below did not err. We will also address these issues with the exception that we do not find it necessary to examine the laws of jurisdictions outside of Illinois in order to resolve this dispute, nor do we find it necessary to discuss matters of vested contractual rights in light of our holding on the remaining dispositive issues.

Illinois' courts have traditionally upheld the validity of automobile insurance provisions containing a family exclusion clause. (Severs v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 89 Ill.2d 515, 61 Ill.Dec. 137, 434 N.E.2d 290; Allen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1991), 214 Ill.App.3d 729, 158 Ill.Dec. 261, 574 N.E.2d 55; Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Green (1985), 139 Ill.App.3d 147, 93 Ill.Dec. 656, 487 N.E.2d 100; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Palmer (1984), 123 Ill.App.3d 674, 78 Ill.Dec. 951, 463 N.E.2d 129; Banner Insurance Co. v. Avella (1970), 128 ill.app.2d 471, 262 N.E.2d 791.) The purpose of an exclusionary clause is to avoid the possibility of collusive claims in a close, overly friendly and intimate relationship between family members. (Banner, 128 Ill.App.2d at 475, 262 N.E.2d 791.) A clear and unambiguous family exclusion clause will be applied as written unless it contravenes public policy. (Severs, 89 Ill.2d at 521, 61 Ill.Dec. 137, 434 N.E.2d 290.) It is generally held that, "in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, automobile liability policy provisions excluding household and family members from coverage are valid and effective." Severs, 89 Ill.2d at 521, 61 Ill.Dec. 137, 434 N.E.2d 290.

The only explicit statutory limitation of family exclusion clauses is section 143.01 of the Illinois Insurance Code, which provides that a family exclusion clause is inapplicable when a third party acquires a right of contribution against a family member of the injured person or when the insured's vehicle was driven by a person who was not in the insured's household. (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 73, par. 755.01.) The question before us today is whether the abrogation of interspousal immunity is an expression of public policy which further limits the applicability of family exclusion clauses.

We believe this question is answered by examining the plain language of the Married Women Act. Nevertheless we begin with a brief historical overview in order to show that our holding is not contrary to the general policy underlying the abrogation of interspousal immunity.

At common law, spouses could not sue one another because they were considered to be a single entity. (Clark v. Clark (1892), 49 Ill.App. 163.) In 1861, an act was passed entitled "An Act to protect married women in their separate property." (1861 Ill.Laws 143 (§ 1).) The intent of the Act was to protect the property of a married woman, by removing such property from the control of her husband and making her a single woman with regard to such property. (Emerson v. Clayton (1863), 32 Ill. 493.) The Emerson court went on to state that the commencement and prosecution of suits for the recovery of property could be brought by a married woman against her husband. Emerson, 32 Ill. at 498.

In subsequent years, the legislature enlarged the powers and relations of husband and wife, and the courts followed suit. "The Husband and Wife Act of 1874 for the first time established the general right of the married woman to sue and be sued." (Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 40, par. 1001, Historical & Practice Notes, at 180 (Smith-Hurd 1980).) In Thomas v. Mueller (1883), 106 Ill. 36, our supreme court stated that it was manifest from the 1874 act that the legislature intended to empower spouses to contract with each other and sue one another on such contracts as if they were not married. (Thomas, 106 Ill. at 42.) In Snell v. Snell (1888), 123 Ill. 403, 409, 14 N.E. 684, the court explained how the laws cited above served to place married women "upon a common footing with married men in respect to all property rights, including the means to acquire, protect and dispose of the same."

Until 1953, however, there was no clear or conclusive determination of whether a married woman could sue her husband for torts inflicted by him upon her. Then, in Brandt v. Keller (1952), 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729, our supreme court held that under the Married Women Act of 1874, a married woman could maintain an action for damages against her husband for personal injuries caused by his wilful and wanton misconduct. (Brandt, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729.) In Brandt, a wife sued her estranged husband for personal injuries she received as a result of his negligent handling of the automobile in which they were driving. The court examined the development of legal rights since common law and determined that the legislature in 1874 intended to expand the rights of a married woman to sue her husband in tort. (Brandt, 413 Ill. at 513, 109 N.E.2d 729.) In reaching its decision, the court dismissed policy arguments that conjugal peace would be disrupted by a tort suit arguing that, "when one spouse assails another or brings suit, there is not much domestic tranquility left to disrupt." (Brandt, 413 Ill. at 511, 109 N.E.2d 729.) The court also dismissed arguments that the "potentiality of collusion, or of the perversion of the administration of justice" was any greater in a suit between spouses than between any other parties. (Brandt, 413 Ill. at 511, 109 N.E.2d 729.) Most importantly, the court noted the following:

"Nor does the fact that an insurance company may be the real defendant in interest in...