Safeco Ins. Companies v. Meyering
| Decision Date | 23 August 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 50496-2,50496-2 |
| Citation | 687 P.2d 195,102 Wn.2d 385 |
| Parties | SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANIES, Appellant, v. Carolyn G. MEYERING and Employment Security, Department of the State of Washington, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Perkins, Coie, Stone, Olsen & Williams, John Aslin, Russell L. Perisho, Seattle, for appellant.
Kenneth Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Margaret Gaffney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondents.
The appellant/employer, Safeco Insurance Companies (Safeco), appeals the administrative determination by the respondent, the Department of Employment Security (the Department), awarding unemployment benefits to the employee/claimant Carolyn G. Meyering. The trial court affirmed the Commissioner's decision; we reverse.
On September 10, 1980 Meyering, an employee of Safeco, submitted her letter of resignation to her supervisors, informing them that she was quitting and giving them 2 weeks notice. Her reason for tendering her resignation was that she had become very frustrated with her job after her job duties were changed to include policy amendments. The change required personal training and Meyering felt that she could not take instructions from her assigned trainer because he didn't know what he was doing, and despite her complaints, management refused to remedy the problem.
That same afternoon Safeco informed Meyering that she would not have to work through the 2-week notice period but that she would receive her pay for the 2 weeks. Safeco made this decision because Meyering was unhappy in her job, her trainer was uncomfortable with her, and this made the atmosphere in the office tense. Additionally, however, Safeco was happy with Meyering's work, had no intention of letting her go and only let Meyering go because she tendered her resignation.
After Meyering left Safeco's employ, she applied for, and was awarded, unemployment compensation by the Department because although she intended to "voluntarily quit" she had actually been "discharged" by Safeco. Safeco appealed this decision to the Department's appeal tribunal, arguing that Meyering had not been discharged but had voluntarily quit.
After a hearing, the examiner concluded as matter of law that Meyering had been discharged. The examiner stated that the Commissioner, relying on In re William E.F. Powell, King County Cause 470877, (February 14, 1955),
has long held that when an individual gives notice of an intent to quit in the future and that separation date is accelerated by the employer, the separation becomes a discharge and is adjudicated under the provisions of RCW 50.20.060. See In re Wilson, Comm.Dec. 839 (1970).
Conclusion of law 1.
Applying the provisions of RCW 50.20.060, the examiner concluded that Meyering was not discharged for misconduct, and therefore, was not disqualified from receiving benefits.
However, the examiner went on to state:
5. The Tribunal is of the opinion that it makes neither legal nor common sense to blindly follow the Powell case, supra, a Superior Court Decision which states no reasoning to support its conclusions .... We feel that the better approach would be to look at the entire situation which led to the claimant's separation from employment.
Did the claimant acquiesce to leaving the employment sooner; was the claimant paid the amount he/she would have earned had he/she been allowed to work through the notice period; would the claimant have been separated by the employer, had she/her [sic] not given notice of his/her intent to quit? Why was the claimant not allowed to work through the notice period? Did the employer's action actually change the basic reason for separation? What was the primary cause of the claimant's separation from employment? Would the claimant have been disqualified for receiving benefit[s] had he/she worked through the notice period?
6. In this case, we believe that the primary reason for the claimant's separation from her employment was her decision to voluntarily leave her employment. If we look beyond the Powell case, supra, we would apply the provisions of RCW 50.20.050.
The examiner concluded that "[i]f ... [she] could apply the provisions of RCW 50.20.050, ... [she] would conclude that ... [Meyering] did not have good cause for leaving her position" and, therefore, would not be eligible for benefits. Nonetheless, the examiner sustained the Department's award of benefits because she was constrained by the Commissioner's prior determinations.
Safeco appealed this determination to the Commissioner of the Department of Employment Security. The Commissioner, through his delegate, affirmed the decision of the appeal tribunal that Meyering's separation was a discharge and thus properly analyzed under RCW 50.20.060; explicitly adopting only the appeal tribunal's findings of fact, and portions of the conclusions of law. The Commissioner, however, did not address the appeal examiner's conclusions concerning the applicability of RCW 50.20.050. The Commissioner's decision was affirmed by the King County Superior Court. The Court of Appeals certified the case to this court, and we accepted review.
The Employment Security Act, RCW Title 50, sets aside unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. RCW 50.01.010. In general, to accomplish this end, the act provides for the payment of unemployment benefits to unemployed individuals unless a claimant is disqualified from receiving such benefits. Two qualification provisions, RCW 50.20.050 and RCW 50.20.060, are at issue in this case. Each section dictates whether an individual claimant is or is not disqualified from receiving benefits in a given case. However, both sections will not apply to the same set of facts.
RCW 50.20.050(1) states that an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits if he or she left work voluntarily without good cause. Thus, if a worker "voluntarily quits" her job, she will be denied benefits unless she has "good cause" for quitting. RCW 50.20.060(1) states that an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits if he or she is discharged for misconduct. Thus, if a person is "discharged" by her employer, she will be eligible for benefits unless she was terminated for "misconduct". A fortiori, how the job separation is initially characterized, either voluntary quit or discharge, will trigger which statutory section, and, which analytical inquiry, will appropriately apply to the facts at issue.
The Commissioner determined that this factual situation amounted to a discharge by Safeco and, therefore, RCW 50.20.060 applied. Conversely, Safeco argues that Meyering voluntarily quit and, therefore, RCW 50.20.050 is the proper section to apply to these facts.
This case is governed by the administrative procedure act and more specifically, RCW 34.04.130(6) which reads:
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the public policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious.
The Department argues that its conclusion that Meyering was "discharged" by Safeco is a conclusion of fact and, therefore, reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard of RCW 34.04.130(6)(e). See Franklin Cy. Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash.2d 317, 324, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106, 103 S.Ct. 730, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983).
We do not agree. The Commissioner's determination is a conclusion of law and, thus, reviewable under the "error of law" standard of RCW 34.04.130(6)(d). See generally Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 239 (1955-56). This standard calls for "de novo" judicial review of the administrative decisions and allows the reviewing court to essentially substitute its judgment for that of the administrative determination, though substantial weight is accorded the agency's view. Franklin Cy., 97 Wash.2d at 325, 646 P.2d 113.
Initially, there are no factual issues in this case as neither party appealed the tribunal's findings of fact. The determination that these established facts amount to a discharge is a conclusion of law because that conclusion determines the legal rights of the parties insofar as which statutory provision applies to the factual situation at issue; RCW 50.20.060 as opposed to RCW 50.20.050. Thus, the Commissioner's determination that these established facts amount to a "discharge" is not independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect. Leschi Imp. Coun. v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 84 Wash.2d 271, 285, 525 P.2d 774 (1974).
Moreover, in this case the principal dispute surrounds the meanings of the statutory terms "left work voluntarily", RCW 50.20.050, and "discharged", RCW 50.20.060. These terms as used in the statutory subsections, are legal terms. Whether an individual case falls under one section as opposed to the other depends upon the facts of the case. After the facts are established, as they are in this case, the ultimate conclusion is a conclusion of law. Leschi, at 293, 525 P.2d 774, see also Rasmussen v. Department of Empl. Sec., 98 Wash.2d 846, 658 P.2d 1240 (1983). Thus, the error of law standard applies and the reviewing court is entitled to make a de novo review of the record independent of the agency's actions. Rasmussen, at 850, 658 P.2d 1240.
The Department argues that even under the de novo review standard, this court should defer to the agency's interpretation. First,...
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