Safety Ins. Co. v. Marlette Homes, Inc.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-12012-FDS |
| Decision Date | 03 December 2021 |
| Parties | SAFETY INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of WALTER NEAS, Plaintiff, v. MARLETTE HOMES, INC. and CMH MANUFACTURING, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is a lawsuit arising from a fire that occurred in a manufactured home. Plaintiff Safety Insurance Company, as subrogee of Walter Neas, alleges that defendants Marlette Homes, Inc. and CMH Manufacturing, Inc., were negligent and breached the warranty of merchantability because an allegedly faulty electrical connection started a fire in the home. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.
Defendant CMH has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's claims are foreclosed by the Massachusetts statute of repose, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B, or alternatively, that plaintiff has failed to put forth sufficient facts concerning the origins of the fire. Because the statute of repose applies to the claims, the motion will be granted.
The following facts are stated as set forth in the record and are undisputed except as noted.
Pine Hill Estates is a manufactured-home park in Raynham, Massachusetts. Pine Hill Estates, Inc., is the management company that operates the park. It collects rent, pays the park's bills, maintains common areas, and keeps the streets in repair. (Bumila Dep. at 15, ECF No. 35-5). Residents of Pine Hill Estates lease a plot of land and then purchase a manufactured home to put on the property. (Id. at 15). Those purchases are made through June Sales, LLC, which is a retailer of manufactured homes for Pine Hill Estates. (Id. at 17). June Sales purchases the structure from CMH, which then adapts one of its model homes in accordance with any customized features requested by the purchaser. (Weldy Dep. at 122-24, ECF No. 35-4; Bumila Dep. at 46-47).
The homes are manufactured at CMH's facility in Lewistown, Pennsylvania. Prior to leaving the facility, the structure is inspected to ensure it meets the National Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards and complies with other regulations promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. (Weldy Dep. at 145, 148-49; Bumila Dep. 75-76).
The structure at issue in this matter was manufactured and shipped in two sections. When such a structure arrives on site from the factory, construction is nearly complete-all plumbing and electrical wiring is installed and the interior trim is finished. (Bumila Dep. at 31). All that remains is for subcontractors hired by June Sales to join the pieces of the structure together and connect the utilities; June Sales finishes the driveway and landscaping. (Id. at 30). The residents then occupy the new home as owners of the structure and leaseholders of the underlying property. (Id. at 15).
In 2004, Walter Neas purchased a home through June Sales known as a “Marlette Schult Smart Buy II Sectional, Model No. 6828-316, ” which he customized in a variety of different ways. (Ex. 3 at 1-2, ECF No. 35-3). Among other things, he picked the flooring, the appliances, and the slope of the roof. (Id.). He chose a home designed to be suitable for New England weather, with a roof capable of withstanding 30 pounds of snow per square foot and thermal insulation sufficient to withstand low temperatures. (See id.).
CMH then manufactured the home according to the requested specifications and shipped it in two pieces to Pine Hill Estates. (Id. at 4; Bumila Dep. at 26-31). The two pieces were then joined together by subcontractors into a completed building. At some point thereafter, Walter and his wife Angela took up residence in their new home. (Ex. 6 at 4, ECF No. 35-6).
On August 17, 2016, a fire occurred at the Neas's home. (Ex. 7 at 2, ECF No. 35-7). The Raynham Fire Department responded to the incident; notes from the day of the fire indicated that the fire was unintentional and identified “electrical wiring” as the “equipment involved in ignition.” (Id. at 4). Peter Bumila, the president of Pine Hill Estates and the manager of June Sales, also visited the home on the day of the fire. (Bumila Dep. at 64). He reported that the structure had “heavy smoke damage” and that there was charred wood underneath it at the “source of the electrical problem” and “source of the fire.” (Id. at 64-65). He noted charring near an electrical connector located along the wall where the two segments of the structure were joined during installation. (Id. at 65-66).
The connectors complete the electrical circuits, allowing for power to flow between the two halves of the building. (See Weldy Dep. at 50-55). Each half of a connector is installed by stripping insulation from the end of a conductor cable, separating the conductor wires within that cable, pressing each wire into an assigned slot in one half of a plastic assembly, and then sealing the assembly covers together. (Ex. 13, ECF No. 37-2; Weldy Dep. at 61-63; Morse Report at 16-18, ECF No. 35-9).[1] The mating end of that sealed plastic assembly connects with the other half of the connector, which is assembled in the same fashion. (Morse Report at 16). The connector halves were installed by members of defendant's electrical team at the factory so that the two halves could be easily connected by the on-site contractors. (See Weldy Dep. at 57-64; Bumila Dep. at 87-88).
Experts for both Safety Insurance Company and CMH agree that the fire originated at the electrical connector. (See Williams Report at 31, ECF No. 35-8; Morse Dep. at 57-58, ECF No. 37-1). However, they disagree as to the fire's cause. CMH's expert opines that the connector overheated at the point of connection between the two halves of the device. (Morse Report at 21). His report states that “[t]he specific mechanism that caused the overheating of the subject connector is undetermined.” (Id. at 22). Safety Insurance's expert opines that the fire originated in one of the connector halves due to “physical damage . . . during factory assembly.” (Williams Report at 33).
After the fire, in accordance with the insurance policy, Safety Insurance paid for the damages to the structure and personal property. (Compl. ¶ 11). It then brought this action as a subrogee of Walter Neas.
On August 19, 2019, Safety Insurance filed this action in Massachusetts Superior Court. On September 25, 2019, defendant CMH removed the action to this Court, alleging diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The complaint alleges that CMH was negligent in the manufacture of the electrical connection device and the wiring of the home. The complaint also alleges that CMH breached its warranty of merchantability. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-43).[2]
On May 10, 2021, CMH moved for summary judgment on all counts.
The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)). Summary judgment shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue is “one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most flattering to the nonmovant, would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either party.” Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court indulges all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993). When “a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party may not simply “rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, ” but instead must “present affirmative evidence.” Id. at 256-57.
CMH has moved for summary judgment on two grounds. First, it asserts that, as a designer and builder of manufactured homes, it is protected by the Massachusetts statute of repose, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B. That statute forecloses tort claims brought more than six years after the completion of an improvement to real property. Second, it argues that Safety Insurance has failed to present sufficient evidence that CMH's alleged negligence caused the fire.
Safety Insurance contends that the statute of repose does not apply because defendant did not engage in the type of design or construction activity protected by the statute. It also contends that it has presented sufficient evidence from which to infer that the faulty electrical connector made by CMH ignited the fire.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that as a matter of law the statute of repose applies and is dispositive of both claims.
Massachusetts has enacted a statute of repose for tort actions arising from improvements to real property. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260 § 2B. The statute provides that an action alleging “deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction, or general administration of an improvement to real property” is subject to a six-year limitations period. Id.[3] That period begins to run upon “the opening of the improvement to use” or “substantial completion of the improvement and the taking of possession for...
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