Safety Motor Transit Corp. v. Cunningham

Decision Date21 September 1933
Citation171 S.E. 432
PartiesSAFETY MOTOR TRANSIT CORPORATION. v. CUNNINGHAM.
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied Nov. 25, 1933.

Error to Hustings Court of Roanoke.

Action by Sadie Cunningham against the Safety Motor Transit Corporation and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and named defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

See, also (Va.) 171 S. E. 104.

Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, EPES, HUDGINS, GREGORY, and BROWNING, JJ.

Woods, Chitwood, Coxe & Rogers, of Roanoke, for plaintiff in error.

Horace M. Fox and Worrell & Worrell, all of Roanoke, for defendant in error.

HUDGINS, Justice.

Plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment for $15,000, damages for personal injuries claimed to have been sustained as a result of a collision between a bus of defendant company, on which she was a passenger, and an automobile driven by defendant W. H. Scott. Safety Motor Transit Corporation and W. H. Scott, codefendants, sought and obtained separate writs of error to the same judgment. As the errors assigned are different, we have disposed of them in separate opinions.

Safety Motor Transit Corporation assigns only two errors: The refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict (1) because it was contrary to the law and the evidence, and (2) because the amount of the verdict was excessive.

Plaintiff Is here with a verdict in her favor; hence we must regard as established all material facts which the jury, as reasonable men, might have found from the evidence. Guided by this rule, the evidence which the jury might have believed may be stated thus:

The accident occurred at the intersection of Chapman avenue and Thirteenth street in the city of Roanoke. These streets are approximately thirty feet wide from curb to curb. Chapman avenue extends east and west and Thirteenth street north and south. West of Thirteenth street, Chapman avenue is further north than it is on the east side, making an offset of more than 50 per cent. of the width of the street. The angle of intersection is more acute than a right angle. If the center line of Chapman avenue were projected westwardly across Thirteenth street, it would intersect with the curb on Thirteenthstreet somewhat north of the north line of Chapman avenue west of this street This is apparent from the attached plat:

The bus, proceeding west on Chapman avenue, stopped before reaching the intersection for the purpose of letting off and taking on passengers. At this point plaintiff and a colored man got on. While the bus was standing still discharging or taking on passengers, W. II. Scott, proceeding in the same direction on Chapman avenue, passed to the left of the bus, traveling from 15 to 18 miles an hour. After passing the bus, and before reaching the intersection, he brought his automobile almost to a stop and turned to his right, north, along Thirteenth street. In the mean time, the driver of the bus had started forward and did not see Scott's car until it was just in front of him, when he immediately applied his emergency brakes and came to a sudden stop, the right end of his front bumper grazing the right rear bumper and fender of Scott's car. Both drivers got out of their machines and, when they saw that no damage had been done to either, proceeded on their respective routes.

Plaintiff testified that she had not taken her seat towards the rear of the bus before it moved forward. This threw her somewhat off balance, and while in this position the sudden stopping of the bus threw her to the floor. This fall caused or precipitated arthritis in the lower spine, thereby seriously impairing plaintiff's health, for which she sought damages in this action.

Defendant company contends that the bus driver, through no negligence en his part, was confronted by an emergency which made it necessary to stop suddenly in order to avoid a collision which might have resulted in more serious injury to plaintiff and other passengers on the bus. In defendant company's petition it is stated that this contention is based on uncontradicted evidence which establishes: (1) That Scott gave no signal or warning of his intention to make a right turn; (2) that he did not look to see whether the bus was closely approaching before "cutting" to the right after passing the bus on the left; and (3) that he suddenly turned to the right, without warning, not more than three feet in front of the moving bus.

The crucial question is: Are these statements supported by the evidence? An analysis; of all the testimony reveals two distinct versions of the accident. One is that given by the bus driver, and in some particulars corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses, which tends to support defendant company's contention; the other is that given by Scott, which is likewise corroborated in some particulars by other testimony. The latter version seems to have been accepted in part by the jury, as the verdict was against both defendants.

Not a single witness testified that Scott did not give the proper signal for the right-hand turn. The bus driver stated that he stopped his bus some eight or ten feet east of the intersection and three or four feet south of the north curb; that as he started the bus he looked to his left and Scott's car was not within his line of vision; that before he had gone more than six or eight feet Scott "whipped" right in front of the bus, probably running twelve to fifteen miles an hour; that he applied his emergency brakes and stopped his bus, but not before the left end of the front bumper scraped the right rear fender of Scott's car. He was asked: "Did you have any warning or any notice that the automobile was going to turn in front of you and going out 13th, north?" And answered: "No, sir, I did not, it all happened so quick." He further testified that at the time of the collision he was looking straight ahead and saw Scott's car for the first time as it turned two, perhaps three, feet in front of him. Under this version, if Scott had given the signal the bus driver probably would not, or could not, have seen it in time to avoid an emergency stop. The question quoted and the answer thereto is all the evidence in the record which tends to show whether or not Scott gave the signal for the turn. This bit of evidence is far from convincing, and all that can be said of it is that the bus driver did not see any signal given by Scott. This is not sufficient to establish that the signal was not given.

All the evidence clearly establishes that the bus driver, on seeing Scott's automobile, was suddenly confronted with an emergency and was compelled to act instantly in order to avoid a collision. The legal question involved is: Did the...

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21 cases
  • Rawle v. Mcilhenny
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 15, 1934
    ...342, and cases therein cited; Hogan Miller, 156 Va. 166, 157 S.E. 540; Lawson Darter, 157 Va. 284, 160 S.E. 74; Safety Motor Transit Corp. Cunningham, 161 Va. 356, 171 S.E. 432; Wade Peebles, 162 Va. 479, 174 S.E. 769; the following cases in which it set aside the verdict as being excessive......
  • Rawle v. Mcllhenny
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 15, 1934
    ...cases therein cited; Hogan v. Miller, 156 Va. 166, 157 S. E. 540; Lawson v. Darter, 157 Va. 284, 160 S. E. 74; Safety Motor Transit Corp. v. Cunningham, 161 Va. 356, 171 S. E. 432; Wade v. Peebles (Va.) 174 S. E. 769; the following cases in which it set aside the verdict as being excessive,......
  • Planters Nat. Bank v. E.G. Heflin Co.
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • March 12, 1936
    ...by evidence which it might have believed. Duncan State Highway Commission, 142 Va. 135, 128 S.E. 546; Safety Motor Transit Corporation Cunningham, 161 Va. 356, 171 S.E. 432; Wright 162 Va. 510, 174 S.E. 766; Margiotta Aycock, 162 Va. 557, 174 S.E. 831. What is the evidence which supports or......
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    • U.S. District Court — District of Maine
    • August 4, 1971
    ...follow from the tortious act. Watford v. Morse, 202 Va. 605, 608, 118 S. E.2d 681, 683 (1961); Safety Motor Transit Corp. v. Cunningham, 161 Va. 356, 366, 171 S.E. 432, 435 (1933); Virginia Ry. and Power Co. v. Hubbard, 120 Va. 664, 668-669, 91 S.E. 618, 619 (1917); cf. Raven Red Ash Coal C......
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