Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Freeman

Decision Date07 September 1965
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 1800-62,1971-62.
Citation244 F. Supp. 779
PartiesSAFEWAY STORES, INC., Plaintiff, v. Orville L. FREEMAN, Secretary of Agriculture, Defendant. The GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO., Inc., Plaintiff, v. Orville L. FREEMAN, Secretary of Agriculture, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Arthur B. Hanson, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff Safeway Stores, Inc.

Denis G. McInerney, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.

Joseph M. Hannon and Gil Zimmerman, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., for defendant.

HOLTZOFF, District Judge.

These two cases present the question whether two chains of grocery stores are to be considered "packers" within the meaning of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 159, 7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. Each of the two plaintiffs operates a large number of retail grocery stores located in various States. At each of the stores various food products are sold, such as vegetables, staple groceries, as well as meats and meat products in various forms. It is claimed by the Department of Agriculture that because of some of its activities, the two chains are subject to regulation and are required to perform obligations imposed by the Packers and Stockyards Act.

The term "packer" for the purposes of this Act is defined as follows:

"The term `packer' means any person engaged in the business (a) of buying livestock in commerce for purposes of slaughter, (b) of manufacturing or preparing meats or meat food products for sale or shipment in commerce, or (c) of manufacturing or preparing livestock products for sale or shipment in commerce, or (d) of marketing meats, meat food products, livestock products, dairy products, poultry, poultry products, or eggs, in commerce; but no person engaged in such business of manufacturing or preparing livestock products or in such marketing business shall be considered a packer unless — (1) such person is also engaged in any business referred to in clause (a) or (b) of this section."

The remaining provisions of this section, which are found in Section 191 of 7 U.S.C., are immaterial to this discussion.

The Department of Agriculture, claiming that the two plaintiffs are packers within the Act, made a formal demand that they file reports with the Department pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary in accordance with the power granted to him by statute. Thereupon, each of the plaintiffs brought an action against the Secretary for a declaratory judgment, seeking an adjudication that it is not a packer. Another Judge of this Court has held that the action lies and may be maintained. Accordingly, cross motions were made by the parties for summary judgment and the case is now before the Court on these motions.

The facts are not in dispute. Most of them appear in affidavits that are not contradicted. Some additional facts were conceded formally at the oral argument, leaving no material issue of fact for determination by a trial.

The two plaintiffs purchase large quantities of meat from slaughterhouses. Eventually this meat finds its lodging place in one of the retail stores of the chain. Between the time that the meat leaves the slaughterhouse and its arrival at its final resting place in the retail store, much of the meat, although not all, is delivered to a central warehouse or plant maintained by the chain. Certain operations in the way of preparing the meat for retail consumption are performed at these plants and warehouses, and thereafter these meat products are distributed among the retail stores. It may be repeated, as heretofore stated that these stores are located in various States. Consequently interstate commerce is involved in the transportation of the meats from the warehouse or plant to the stores and, therefore, these transactions may be said to be in commerce, as defined in Section 183 of 7 United States Code.

It is argued in behalf of the plaintiffs that when Congress enacted the Packers and Stockyards Act, its attention was directed primarily to the large packing houses and slaughterhouses located principally in Chicago, as well as several other big cities, and that its intention was to regulate only slaughterers and wholesalers. As a matter of fact counsel for the plaintiffs are no doubt correct in urging that the aim of Congress was pointed primarily against big slaughterhouses and meat packing concerns located principally in Chicago. It does not follow, however, that the Act must be limited to slaughterers and wholesalers. The word "wholesaler" is not found in the definition of "packer" contained in the statute.

When the Act was enacted the large chains of grocery stores were not in existence to the...

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4 cases
  • U.S. v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 687
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • May 20, 1982
    ...of the other activities of a corporation from the reach of the Federal Trade Commission." Id. at 605. See also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Freeman, 244 F.Supp. 779, 781 (D.D.C.1965) (supermarket chain held subject to USDA jurisdiction under the Packers and Stockyards Act only to the extent that......
  • Bunting v. Perdue, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
    • June 14, 1985
    ...whether or not they were directly related to the slaughter, processing, and marketing of livestock. 5 See also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Freeman, 244 F.Supp. 779 (D.D.C.1965), aff'd, 369 F.2d 952 (D.C.Cir.1966), in which it was held that the Act included those activities of the two grocery st......
  • St. Paul Fire & Marine v. Idaho Bank & Trust
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Idaho
    • March 10, 1989
    ...interpret Section 191 have tended to construe its terms broadly. Plaintiff, in support of this contention, cites Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Freeman, 244 F.Supp. 779 (D.C.1965), aff'd, 369 F.2d 952 (D.C.Cir.1966). Safeway Stores, however, is not on In Safeway Stores, two large grocery stores ma......
  • Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Freeman
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • October 6, 1966
    ...motions for summary judgment the District Court granted the motions of the Secretary and denied those of appellants. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Freeman, 244 F.Supp. 779. Their appeals from the ensuing orders of the District Court have been consolidated in this Appellants are nationwide busines......

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