Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Stuyvesant Insurance Company
Decision Date | 27 June 1962 |
Docket Number | No. C-150-G-61.,C-150-G-61. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Parties | SAFEWAY TRAILS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. The STUYVESANT INSURANCE COMPANY, Equity General Insurance Company, et al., Defendants. |
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Richard L. Wharton, Greensboro, N. C., and Charles B. McInnis and Richard R. Paradise, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs have filed suit for Declaratory Judgment and seek an adjudication of their rights in the policies of public liability insurance concerning 1) whether the plaintiffs and other members of the class are entitled to payment under certain agreements reinsuring plaintiffs' policies of public liability insurance, and 2) whether the plaintiffs are entitled to call upon the defendant reinsurers to undertake the defense and adjustment of existing claims and suits under the plaintiffs' policies of public liability insurance.
Plaintiffs, none of whom are residents of North Carolina, are business organizations (bus companies and truck lines), which purchased policies of liability insurance issued by Equity General Insurance Company (hereinafter called Equity General), a Florida corporation, through the T. B. Jones Insurance Service, Inc., Burlington, North Carolina, or Seaboard Underwriters, Inc., a subsidiary of Jones. Equity General was reinsured for certain percentages of the losses it might sustain on the policies issued to the plaintiffs with five companies ("quota share" agreements). Equity General was also reinsured by one company (Stuyvesant) for losses sustained by it (Equity General) in excess of $25,000.00 ("excess agreement"). All of these reinsuring companies are named as defendants in this action. All of these Reinsurance Agreements were negotiated, signed, and delivered outside the State of North Carolina. The Reinsurance Agreements were between Equity General and the reinsuring companies, and the plaintiffs were not parties to the agreements.
Thereafter, Equity General became insolvent, and in Florida, the state of its incorporation, a receiver was appointed by the Florida Court having jurisdiction. The receiver was directed to take possession of all of the assets of Equity General. Defendant reinsurers have been ordered by the Florida Court to make payments to the Florida receiver under the Reinsurance Agreements, which provide for payment to the receiver in the event of insolvency by Equity General.
Plaintiffs, who contend that since the insolvency of Equity General they have been forced to defend lawsuits and pay claims against them, have declined to present to the Florida receiver their claims under the policies issued by Equity General.
The plaintiffs have brought this suit seeking to have this Court declare that they may recover on the Reinsurance Agreements directly against the reinsurers. In so far as the motions now before this Court are concerned, the basic positions of the defendant reinsurers herein are that as to three of them they are not subject to service of process in North Carolina, and that as to all of the defendants the action should be dismissed because this Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, such jurisdiction being in the Florida Court.
None of the parties to this suit are residents of the State of North Carolina, except the defendant Charles F. Gold, as Ancillary Receiver for the State of North Carolina of Equity General Insurance Company. Two of the plaintiffs are licensed to do business in North Carolina.
The defendants, The Unity Fire and General Insurance Company (Unity), United States Liability Insurance Company (United States Liability), and Global Reinsurance Company (Global) are not licensed or authorized to do business in North Carolina, and had no agents and no offices or property therein.
The three other defendants The Stuyvesant Insurance Company (Stuyvesant), Preferred Insurance Company (Preferred), and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) are all licensed and authorized to do business in the State of North Carolina.
The plaintiffs have attempted to obtain service of process on all of the defendant reinsurers under the provisions of the General Statutes of North Carolina, G.S. § 58-153.1, the "Unauthorized Insurers Process Act." Since Stuyvesant, Preferred and Nationwide are licensed and authorized to do business in North Carolina, those reinsurers do not contest the service of process. However, it is contended that the defendants Unity, United States Liability and Global are not subject to service of process in the State of North Carolina.
In addition, all of the defendant reinsurers move to dismiss this suit on the ground that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
The Reinsurance Agreements (Treaties) between the reinsurers and Equity General involved in this litigation were negotiated in the State of New York through a reinsurance broker, Home and Overseas Offices, Ltd. of New York City.
All of the Reinsurance Agreements provide that they reinsure the original policies of Equity General written through T. B. Jones Insurance Service, Inc. of Burlington, North Carolina, or Jones' subsidiaries.
Jones sold policies of public liability insurance of Equity General to the plaintiffs and to others throughout the eastern part of the United States, collected the premiums, and transmitted the premiums to Equity General. Equity General then paid premiums as provided for in the Reinsurance Agreements to Home and Overseas in New York. Home and Overseas delivered the reinsurance premiums to the reinsurers from its offices in New York. However, Equity General did not pay a substantial amount of reinsurance premiums due the reinsurers.
Service of process was attempted in this action on defendants Unity, United States Liability, and Global by virtue of G.S. § 58-153.1, of the North Carolina "Unauthorized Insurers Process Act."1 The pertinent provisions of G.S. § 58-153.1 are as follows:
We think the plain language of the statute—note especially the italicized words and phrases—manifests that the primary purpose of the statute is to protect residents of this State, and to prevent the necessity of North Carolina residents from resorting to distant forums to assert rights under insurance policies. Here, none of the plaintiffs are residents of North Carolina2 and are not entitled to take advantage of the statute. Although the point has not been before a North Carolina court, an almost identical New York statute has been construed to be for the protection only of New York residents in suits based on policies delivered to them in New York. Clifton Products, Inc., v. American Universal Insurance Co., 169 F.Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.1959).
Plaintiffs point to a North Carolina decision, Suits v. Old Equity Life Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 483, 85 S.E.2d 602 (1955), which involved service under G.S. § 58-164(e) (1) (See footnote 1). This decision was prior to the enactment of G.S. § 58-153.1 and the present case. In Suits, plaintiff was a citizen and resident of North Carolina and was solicited through the mails at his home in North Carolina, and Suits paid the premiums by mailing them to the office of the foreign insurer. Other acts were done by the insurer in North Carolina. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the foreign insurer was transacting business within this State. The case is distinguishable, not only because Suits was a resident of North Carolina and paid his premiums from North Carolina, but because the...
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