Saffron v. Wilson

Decision Date14 August 1979
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 74-0079.
PartiesEdward SAFFRON, Plaintiff, v. Jerry V. WILSON et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ralph J. Temple, Warren Kaplan, Paul Zevnik, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Royce Lamberth, R. Craig Lawrence, Asst. U. S. Attys., John J. Buckley, Jr., Terrence O'Donnell, Leonard Bren, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., Myles Ambrose, James G. Ryan, Leslie Nicholson, Washington, D. C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

OBERDORFER, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This case arose from the removal from sidewalks adjacent to the White House and the subsequent arrest in Lafayette Park on Inaugural Day 1973 of Edward Saffron, who was there as a pedestrian peacefully carrying a sign bearing a political-religious message similar to one he had carried in front of the White House on an almost daily basis over the previous four years. Plaintiff seeks damages against the District of Columbia, a number of officers and officials of the United States Park Service and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police, and agents and officers of the United States Secret Service. He also prays for injunctive and declaratory relief against the official defendants — heads of the Park Police, Metropolitan Police and Secret Service because they allegedly violated his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiff claims defendants violated those rights by interrupting his sign-carrying on Inaugural Day, by arresting him and by failing to establish a constitutionally-valid plan to regulate expressive conduct on Inaugural Day 1973. Plaintiff claims defendants threaten to violate those rights on future Inaugural Days because they have failed to adopt any such plan for future Inaugural Days.

All defendants have moved to dismiss and for summary judgment on all issues; plaintiff filed dispositive motions against only a few defendants on several issues. To facilitate the progress of this litigation, the Court entered a number of orders resolving most of the pending dispositive motions prior to the issuance of this memorandum. In its orders of January 5 and 9, 1979, the Court granted summary judgment (1) for the eight individual Secret Service officers Rundle, Burke, Town, Jones, Shanahan, Evans, McLeod and Lau, based upon their statute of limitations defense; (2) for individual Park Police defendants Wright, Dickenson, Beye, Hill, Lindsey, Herbert, Brady, Niedringhaus and Burdick (para. 2) and Wells (para. 4), based upon immunity; and (3) for the District of Columbia defendants Wilson, Mann and McKnight, also based upon immunity. As to one party, the Court vacated its earlier order and (4) granted the motion to dismiss on behalf of decedent Arthur Lamb, named as a Park Police defendant. The Court reserved the issue of the liability of the District of Columbia, having requested further briefing in its order of January 5, 1979.

After further consideration of the statements of material facts and the replies thereto, and other statements and the arguments and admissions of counsel on the record in the context of pre-trial conference on January 9, 1979, conducted pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 16, the Court concluded that there were no material issues of fact to be tried and requested the parties to file statements of proposed facts to which they agreed and facts to which they did not agree; order of February 2, 1979. After consideration of the briefs on that issue, as well as plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal as to Mann, McKnight and Wilson, and the able oral arguments of counsel for the several parties, the Court concluded that no material issues of fact existed which barred entry of summary judgment for the District of Columbia on the issue of liability in damages. In its order of April 27, 1979, the Court summarized its actions subsequent to its January orders and resolved remaining outstanding motions. It (5) extended its findings of immunity, granting summary judgment for defendant Rowley, and (6) granted summary judgment for the District of Columbia on the issue of its liability in damages. Finally the Court (7) entered summary judgment for plaintiff on the issue of his entitlement to equitable or declaratory relief against the District of Columbia and against official defendants Knight, Wells and Jefferson in their capacities as heads of the Secret Service, the Park Police and the Metropolitan Police respectively.

This memorandum builds upon the joint findings submitted by the parties and sets forth the conclusions of law which underlay the Court's earlier rulings. Leaving for separate treatment matters relating solely to the defenses of immunity and the statute of limitations, Part I of the memorandum embodies general findings of fact, setting the background for the memorandum by identifying the parties (Part A), explaining the so-called Quaker Action notice system (Part B), and the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act and regulations (Part C), setting forth plaintiff's compliance with the Quaker Action procedures (Part D), defendants' planning for the 1973 Inaugural (Part E), the facts relating to plaintiff's removal and arrest (Part F), and planning with respect to the 1977 and future Inaugurals (Part G).

Part II sets out the conclusions of law relating to jurisdiction and mootness (Part A) and, in the remaining sections, conclusions relating to the official defendants' liability and the remedy to which plaintiff is entitled. Because of the differing roles of the parties, liability is best analyzed by recognizing four somewhat overlapping bases for liability: (i) plaintiff's removal from the White House sidewalk; (ii) the events in Lafayette Park, including plaintiff's arrest; (iii) failure to promulgate a plan for the regulation of expressive conduct on Inaugural Day prior to Inaugural Day 1973 and (iv) failure subsequent to that day. Part B analyzes defendants' liability for plaintiff's removal from the White House sidewalk and for the failure to promulgate a plan at the time and subsequently; Part C deals with liability for plaintiff's arrest in Lafayette Park; Part D deals with the question of the District of Columbia's liability in damages for plaintiff's removal and arrest and for its role in the failure to promulgate a plan. Part E considers the propriety of the injunctive relief sought; the specific relief to which the Court concludes plaintiff is entitled is set out in Part F.

Part III embodies findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the immunity defense of the Park Police and District of Columbia individual defendants. Finally, Part IV sets forth findings and conclusions as to the statute of limitations defense of the individual Secret Service defendants. The Court reserves for separate treatment issues relating to the course and conduct of this litigation and the motions for sanctions, having concluded that such issues are not material to the Court's judgment as to defendants' substantive liability and the remedy to which plaintiff is entitled.

I. FINDINGS OF FACTS WITH RESPECT TO DEFENDANTS' VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. The Parties

1. Plaintiff Edward Saffron is a resident of the District of Columbia (Saffron dep. at 3).

2. The District of Columbia is a municipal corporation and is the constituted government of the District of Columbia.

3. Defendant Jerry L. Wells is the Chief of the United States Park Police; he is sued in both individual and official capacities.

4. Defendant H. Stuart Knight has been Director of the United States Secret Service since November 1973 and is sued in his official capacity only.

5. Defendant Burtell Jefferson is the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department and is sued in his official capacity only.

6. On Inaugural Day 1973, defendant Jerry Wilson was Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department; he is sued individually.

7. On Inaugural Day 1973, defendant Russel E. Dickenson was Director of the National Parks Program.

8. On Inaugural Day 1973, defendant Grant Wright was Chief of the United States Park Police.

9. On Inaugural Day 1973, defendant Alfred Beye was Deputy Chief of the Park Service.

10. Defendant Arthur Lamb, now deceased, was, on Inaugural Day 1973, Chief and Acting Chief of the Division of Special Events of the National Park Service.

11. On Inaugural Day 1973, defendant James J. Rowley was Director of the United States Secret Service; he is sued individually.

12. Defendants Hill, Lindsey, Herbert, Brady, Niedringhaus and Burdick were on Inaugural Day 1973 officers of the Park Police. Defendants Hill, Lindsey and Herbert had supervisory authority over the other officers.

13. Defendant Stephen Mann was a Metropolitan Police Officer on Inaugural Day 1973; defendant Jerry McKnight was Officer Mann's immediate supervisor and was present when Mann arrested plaintiff. (Mann dep. at 11-12; McKnight dep. at 12; Ans. of def. Wilson to Interrogs., ¶ 1, June 16, 1976; Ans. of def. District of Columbia to Interrogs., ¶ 1, June 14, 1976).

14. The Metropolitan Police Department is responsible for enforcing the laws and ordinances of the District of Columbia in the city and has secondary responsibility in the areas of national parkland.

15. The United States Park Police is a sub-agency of the Department of the Interior and is responsible for enforcing Department of Interior regulations governing demonstrations on national parkland, including the White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park. (36 C.F.R. §§ 50.1, 50.19 (1978)).

16. As pertinent to this case, the United States Secret Service has no particular geographical area of jurisdiction. The Service has responsibility for the protection of the President and other designated domestic and foreign officials. (18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1976)).

B. The Quaker Action Notice System

17. In 1966, the Secretary of the Interior promulgated regulations requiring "an...

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    ...That separate regulatory set-aside is not at issue in this case and plaintiff has made no such concession.8 See also Saffron v. Wilson, 481 F.Supp. 228, 235 (D.D.C.1979) (“The Inaugural parade in 1973 was an event organized, financed and staged by a private organization called the 1973 Inau......
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