Sagan v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 25 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-2568,01-2568
• Citation: 342 F.3d 493
• Parties: Virginia SAGAN, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard Sagan, deceased; Virginia Sagan, in her individual capacity, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America; Algonac Fire Department; John Stier; Russ Seder; Jerry Doan; Joe Doan, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

342 F.3d 493

Virginia SAGAN, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard Sagan, deceased; Virginia Sagan, in her individual capacity, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America; Algonac Fire Department; John Stier; Russ Seder; Jerry Doan; Joe Doan, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-2568

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: June 13, 2003.

Decided and Filed: August 25, 2003 Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED: Andrew W. Mayoras, BARRON, ROSENBERG, MAYORAS & MAYORAS, Troy, Michigan, for Appellants.

Michelle T. Delemarre, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., Daniel P. Dalton, TOMKIW DALTON, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Andrew W. Mayoras, Ronald M. Barron, BARRON, ROSENBERG, MAYORAS & MAYORAS, Troy, Michigan, Gary E. Levitt, LAW OFFICES OF GARY E. LEVITT, Troy, Michigan, for Appellants.

Michelle T. Delemarre, Debra J. Kossow, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., Daniel P. Dalton, TOMKIW DALTON, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellees.

Before: KEITH, MOORE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge.

In this personal injury action, the Plaintiffs appeal a September 10, 2001 order granting Defendant United States' motion for summary judgment and dismissing without prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Algonac Fire Department, John Stier, Russ Seder, Jerry Doan, and Joe Doan. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment for the United States and REMAND the case for further proceedings, with the Plaintiffs' claims against the other Defendants reinstated.

I. BACKGROUND

On the night of August 30, 1997, Richard and Virginia Sagan took their boat to Little Muscamoot Bay near Algonac, Michigan. They intended to spend the night in the bay with their friends Greg Grizdowski and Karen Drobot. The Sagans tied their boat to Grizdowski's boat in shallow water. At around 11:30 p.m., after he had been drinking for several hours, Richard Sagan took off his clothes and dove head-first into the bay. His head struck the bottom of the bay, which was less than three feet deep at the point of Mr. Sagan's entry. His spinal column between the C4 and C5 levels was severed on impact.

Realizing that her husband was in trouble, Mrs. Sagan jumped into the water, lifted Mr. Sagan's head, and screamed that he was not breathing. Mrs. Sagan dragged Mr. Sagan toward the boat, yelling at her husband to wake up. Mrs. Sagan and Grizdowski tried unsuccessfully to lift Mr. Sagan onto Grizdowski's boat and then onto the Sagans' boat. Grizdowski performed mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on Mr. Sagan, who began to breathe and moan. Mr. Sagan's breathing was impeded by water in his lungs. He told Grizdowski that he had no sensation in his hands.

At 11:35 p.m., Mrs. Sagan used the radio on her boat to contact the Macomb County Sherriff's Department. At 12:15 a.m., the Algonac Fire Department arrived on the scene in a boat. Three minutes later, the United States Coast Guard arrived by boat and informed those present that a rescue helicopter was on its way and would take Mr. Sagan to the hospital. Mr. Sagan was secured to a backboard on the deck of the Algonac Fire and Rescue boat. According to Mrs. Sagan, Captain Joe Doan of the Algonac Fire Department insisted that Mr. Sagan immediately be taken to a hospital via an ambulance that was waiting a mile away from the boats.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Coast Guard seized control of the situation and prevented the Algonac Boat from leaving, demanding instead that they wait for a Coast Guard helicopter. Sometime after 1:00 a.m., the Coast Guard helicopter arrived on the scene.¹ Shortly after the helicopter arrived, it was determined that the backboard to which Mr. Sagan had been secured was incompatible with the device needed to lift him to the helicopter. The rescuers agreed that transferring Mr. Sagan to a compatible backboard would risk further injury, and that instead the Algonac Fire Department boat should transport Mr. Sagan to the waiting ambulance. Mr. Sagan was transferred to the ambulance at approximately 1:46 a.m.

Mr. Sagan became a quadriplegic as a result of his dive into shallow water. Within a month of his injury, he began to suffer from pneumonia, which his doctors attributed to the spinal injury's effects on his breathing, to his having inhaled water, and/or to his having suffered from hypothermia. He required complicated pulmonary care, including frequent suctioning, the use of albuterol, Atrovent and Serevent breathing treatments, and percussion and postural drainage therapy. He required assistance to perform most daily activities, including eating, bathing, and going to the bathroom. Mr. Sagan also had numerous respiratory problems, including impaired swallowing and ineffective airway clearance and tracheostomy. He was unable to breathe effectively without ventilator assistance.

On February 1, 1999, the Sagans sued the United States pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 740 et seq. Their complaint alleged that the United States Coast Guard failed to exercise due care while attempting to rescue Richard Sagan after he dove into shallow water, and that the Coast Guard's failure to exercise due care caused and/or exacerbated injuries to Mr. Sagan.

Richard Sagan died on August 9, 1999. According to the death certificate, the "immediate cause" of death was the quadriplegia from which Mr. Sagan had suffered for approximately two years, and the "underlying cause" was pneumonia.

On August 11, 2000, Plaintiff Virginia Sagan filed a Second Amended Complaint in which she alleged that Defendants Algonac Fire Department, John Stier, Russ Seder, Jerry Doan, and Joe Doan acted negligently toward Richard Sagan, and that their negligence proximately caused and/or exacerbated his injuries. These Defendants were all part of the effort to rescue Mr. Sagan but were not associated with the Coast Guard; hereinafter they will be called "the Algonac Defendants."

The parties conducted discovery. On September 15, 2000, the Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. A hearing was held on November 28, 2000, and the parties presented arguments in support of and in opposition to the motions.

In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 10, 2001, the district court granted Defendant United States' motion for summary judgment and dismissed without prejudice the claims against the Algonac Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Sagan v. United States, 157 F.Supp.2d 824 (E.D.Mich.2001). The district court found that the Plaintiffs had failed to present enough evidence that the United States proximately caused Mr. Sagan's injuries to survive summary judgment. The district court then held that because the claim against the United States was dismissed, the claims against the Algonac Defendants must also be dismissed, because those claims were before the district court based on supplemental jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal.² In it, they allege that the district court erred in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the United States' negligence proximately caused Richard Sagan's injuries. The Plaintiffs ask that their claims against all parties be reinstated and that the matter be remanded to the district court. They further request that on remand, the case be assigned to a different district court judge to preserve the appearance of justice.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir.2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The judge is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only where there is sufficient "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The central issue is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. Analysis

1. The Plaintiffs' Claim Against the United States

The Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA) "is the exclusive remedy against the United States for maritime torts.... In contrast to the Federal Tort Claims Act..., the SIAA does not incorporate state tort law, inasmuch as maritime tort law is federal law." Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 420 n. 13 (6th Cir.1998). The SIAA does not itself create a cause of action against the United States. See Good, 149 F.3d at 419. Rather, a plaintiff must show that the United States would be liable under maritime tort law for the same conduct.

The United States Coast Guard does not have an affirmative duty to rescue persons in distress. Federal law merely provides that the Coast Guard "shall" establish and operate rescue facilities and that it "may" render aid to protect persons and property at any time such facilities are available. See 14 U.S.C. § 88. However, once the Coast Guard undertakes a rescue operation, it must act with reasonable care. See Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707 (3d Cir.1982). Its actions are judged according to the so-called "Good Samaritan" doctrine. See id. at 713-14. Under this doctrine,...