Sagar v. Oracle Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 November 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. PJM 10–3510.
• Citation: 914 F.Supp.2d 688
• Parties: Vidya SAGAR, Plaintiff, v. ORACLE CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

914 F.Supp.2d 688

Vidya SAGAR, Plaintiff,

v.ORACLE CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil No. PJM 10–3510.

United States District Court,

D. Maryland.

Nov. 27, 2012.

Vidya Sagar, Hyattsville, MD, pro se.

Michelle Bodley Radcliffe, Edward Lee Isler, Isler Dare Ray Radcliffe and Connolly PC, Vienna, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PETER J. MESSITTE, District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Vidya Sagar has sued his former employer Defendant Oracle Corporation (Oracle), alleging that his termination from employment violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq (ADEA). Oracle has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which Sagar opposes, and has filed his own Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Oracle's Motion and DENIES Sagar's Cross–Motion.

I.

In early 2005 Oracle acquired a corporation known as Peoplesoft. Sagar was an employee of Peoplesoft at the time of the acquisition. Following the acquisition, Oracle offered Sagar employment as a billable Consultant. At the time Sagar was 58 years old.

Sagar worked under several different managers at Oracle until December 2006, when he was assigned to a newly formed group at Oracle known as North American Strategic Accounts (NASA). Sagar continued on as a billable Consultant ¹ in the new group until December 2007 when Oracle dissolved the group. Around this same time Sagar was promoted to the status of billable Project Manager. After dissolution of the NASA group, Bradley Sachar, Senior Director of the Advanced Technology Services Group (ATS) at Oracle, offered Sagar a position within his group. Sagar accepted and transferred into the ATS group in December 2007. At the time Sagar was 60 years old.

During Sagar's employment with Oracle, as the national economy declined, Oracle found its business drastically reduced. Between June 2008 and November 2009, the company conducted six rounds of layoffs, affecting over 730 employees. When forced to choose people to terminate in the ATS group, Bradley Sachar decided to use each employee's “utilization rate” ² for the two preceding quarters as the determining factor. Since Sagar had the lowest utilization rates of all ATS group employees for the quarters measured (i.e., fourth quarter of FY2008 and first quarter of FY2009), on September 5, 2008, he was laid off.

The parties agree that prior to joining the ATS group Sagar was a billable employee expected to meet companywide utilization rate expectations. ³ During this time Sagar received generally favorable performance evaluations and had utilization rates within ranges acceptable to his supervisors. But Sagar also asserts that upon moving into the ATS group he was promoted from a billable Project Manager to Portfolio Manager, a non-billable position that had no minimum utilization rate expectations. Oracle denies this and claims that Sagar was only hired into the ATS group as a billable Project Manager and remained such until his termination.

In support of his assertion that he was a non-billable Portfolio Manager as of the time of his termination, Sagar offers anecdotal evidence which demonstrates that he performed certain tasks which would normally be done by a Portfolio Manager. While Oracle does not dispute this, it claims that Sagar was assigned this work in order to give him gainful activity during a period when he was unable to find billable work to meet his utilization rate expectations. Oracle asserts that Sagar at all times remained a billable employee; was continuously told to seek out billable work; and was continuously aware that the position of Portfolio Manager remained open and that the company was actively seeking someone other than Sagar to fill the position permanently. In other words, Oracle says Sagar knew that he was not a Portfolio Manager and knew that he was still expected to maintain minimum utilization rates. Oracle offers substantial evidence in support of this assertion including personnel records, performance evaluations and emails. Many of these bear Sagar's acknowledgment that he remained a billable employee, discussing his utilization rate expectations.

Apart from this, Sagar claims that he was chosen for termination because of his age, and that Sachar sought to have a “young” team. He points out that Michelle Probst, age 59, was terminated around the same time as he was. He also claims that he “heard rumors” around the office that Oracle always fires people about 60 years of age. In particular, he cites an incident where Sachar “looked him up and down,” allegedly to assess his overall health. Sagar claims that all of these events amount to proof that he was the victim of age discrimination.

Oracle denies that age had anything at all to do with Sagar's termination. It points out that Susan Curry, who is two years older than Sagar, was in fact retained by the ATS group and continues to work at Oracle to this day. Oracle also states that there were several legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Sagar. In general the company was suffering a severe decline in business and was forced to implement a reduction in force. As a result, there was not a large pipeline of work for employees like Sagar, who had the lowest utilization rates in the entire ATS group. Furthermore, during both of his last two assignments, Sagar received complaints from both customers and colleagues to the effect that he was difficult to work with. Oracle submits that these were the factors that led to the decision to terminate Sagar, not his age.

II.

A.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The court should “view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in [his] favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses' credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644–45 (4th Cir.2002). The court, however, must also abide by the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir.1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Summary judgment is appropriate where a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the elements essential to the party's claim and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. There must be sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and a “mere scintilla of proof ... will not suffice to prevent summary judgment.” Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir.2003). When both parties have moved for summary judgment, as is the case here, it does not “establish that there is no issue of fact and require judgment be granted to one side or another,” but rather each motion should be evaluated independently. World–Wide Rights Ltd. v. Combe Inc., 955 F.2d 242, 244 (4th Cir.1992) (quoting American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co., 354 F.2d 214 (4th Cir.1965)); see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir.2001); and Morales v. Quintel Entertainment, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2nd Cir.2001). This means that when the Court is reviewing Plaintiff's motion the facts are construed in the light most favorable to Defendant and vice versa.

A plaintiff proceeding pro se is held to a “ ‘less stringent’ ” standard than is a lawyer, and the court must construe his claims liberally, no matter how “ ‘inartfully pleaded.’ ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). Nonetheless, even a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from the requirement that his complaint contain more than mere “ ‘labels and conclusions' ” or “ ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of [a] cause of action.’ ” Walden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 Fed.Appx. 223, 224 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

B.

Sagar alleges age discrimination in violation of the ADEA.

Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee based on the employee's age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1985). The circumstances must suggest that, but for the employer's motive to discriminate on this basis, the employee would not have suffered the adverse action. Fink v. Western Elec. Co., 708 F.2d 909 (4th Cir.1983). As plaintiff, Sagar has the burden of establishing the defendant's discriminatory intent for all of the claims, a burden which can be met either by direct evidence of discriminatory animus ( Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir.1988); Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 233–34 (4th Cir.1991)), or through the indirect burden-shifting proof scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ( see also Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir.2004) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claims)). Because he has offered no direct evidence of discriminatory animus, Sagar's claims are properly analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Mer...