Sage Info. Servs. & Roger W. Hurlbert v. Suhr

• Decision Date: 17 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2–13–0708.,2–13–0708.
• Citation: 381 Ill.Dec. 156,10 N.E.3d 241,2014 IL App (2d) 130708
• Parties: SAGE INFORMATION SERVICES and Roger W. Hurlbert, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. Brenda M. SUHR, In Her Official Capacity as Winnebago County Chief Deputy Supervisor of Assessments and Department Freedom of Information Act Officer, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2014 IL App (2d) 130708
10 N.E.3d 241
381 Ill.Dec. 156

SAGE INFORMATION SERVICES and Roger W. Hurlbert, Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
Brenda M. SUHR, In Her Official Capacity as Winnebago County Chief Deputy Supervisor of Assessments and Department Freedom of Information Act Officer, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2–13–0708.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
Second District.

April 14, 2014.
Rehearing Denied June 17, 2014.

[10 N.E.3d 242]

Joseph P. Bruscato, State‘s Attorney, of Rockford (Charlotte A. LeClercq and David J. Kurlinkus, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.

Donald M. Craven and Esther J. Seitz, both of Donald M. Craven, P.C., of Springfield, for appellees.

OPINION
Justice McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Brenda M. Suhr, Winnebago County chief deputy supervisor of assessments and department Freedom of Information Act officer, appeals a judgment that (1) ordered her to provide to plaintiffs, Sage Information Services and Roger W. Hurlbert, electronic records that plaintiffs requested under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2012)) and (2) awarded plaintiffs attorney fees and costs. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in basing the permissible charges for the records on section 6 of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/6 (West 2012)) and not on section 9–20 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9–20 (West 2012)). Defendant recognizes that the trial court's judgment was based on Sage Information Services v. Humm, 2012 IL App (5th) 110580, 364 Ill.Dec. 986, 977 N.E.2d 895, but she argues that Humm was decided wrongly. We affirm.

¶ 2 By a letter dated October 12, 2012, plaintiffs requested from defendant “a copy, on CD or similar electronic media, of the current real property assessment record file for the entire county, together with an electronic copy of the sales file.” Citing Humm, the request stated that, under section 6(a) of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/6(a) (West 2012)), defendant could charge no more than the cost of the disc.

¶ 3 On November 5, 2012, defendant responded that, to obtain the records, plaintiffs would have to pay $6,290.45 (five cents per parcel). Defendant relied on section 9–20 of the Property Tax Code, which allows a supervisor of assessments to charge a “reasonable fee” (35 ILCS 200/9–20 (West 2012)) for copying and providing records. She informed plaintiffs that section 9–20, and not the FOIA, governed the request.

¶ 4 On December 12, 2012, plaintiffs filed their complaint to compel defendant to release the requested information in the requested form, at a charge of no more than the actual cost of production. The complaint also sought attorney fees and costs.

¶ 5 Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment (see 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(a) (West 2012)). On June 12, 2012, the trial court granted the motion and entered a judgment requiring defendant to produce the requested records in electronic format within 30 days and awarding plaintiffs attorney fees and costs. The court explained that it was bound by Humm, under which section 6(a) of the FOIA limited defendant to charging no more than the cost of purchasing the recording medium.

[10 N.E.3d 243]

The court stayed the award of fees and costs, but not the order to produce the records, pending the resolution of an appeal. On July 10, 2012, defendant filed a notice of appeal and a motion to reconsider the partial denial of the motion to stay. On August 8, 2012, the trial court granted the motion to reconsider and stayed the production order pending our resolution of the appeal.

¶ 6 Initially, this court dismissed the appeal, on the basis that a pending motion to reconsider made the notice of appeal premature. Defendant petitioned for a rehearing. We now vacate the dismissal, agreeing with defendant that, because the motion to reconsider addressed a matter that was collateral to the judgment, the notice of appeal was not premature. See General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill.2d 163, 173–74, 351 Ill.Dec. 308, 950 N.E.2d 1136 (2011). Further, the motion has now been resolved, so that, in any event, there would be no bar to our jurisdiction. See In re Marriage of Knoerr, 377 Ill.App.3d 1042, 1049–50, 316 Ill.Dec. 665, 879 N.E.2d 1053 (2007). We turn to the merits of the appeal.

¶ 7 We review de novo the grant of summary judgment. Matsuda v. Cook County Employees' & Officers' Annuity & Benefit Fund, 178 Ill.2d 360, 364, 227 Ill.Dec. 384, 687 N.E.2d 866 (1997). Issues of statutory construction, such as are raised here, are appropriate for resolution by summary judgment, as they raise questions of law subject to de novo review. Id. In construing statutes, our ultimate goal is to effectuate the legislative intent, and we start with the statutory language itself. Id. at 365, 227 Ill.Dec. 384, 687 N.E.2d 866.

¶ 8 Here, the parties disagree on which statute governs what defendant may charge plaintiffs for providing electronic records. Defendant invokes section 9–20 of the Property Tax Code:

“In all counties, all property record cards maintained by a township assessor, multi-township assessor, or chief county assessment officer shall be public records, and shall be available for public inspection during business hours, subject to reasonable rules and regulations of the custodian of the records. Upon request and payment of such reasonable fee established by the custodian, a copy or printout shall be provided to any person.

Property record cards may be established and maintained on electronic equipment or microfiche, and that system may be the exclusive record of property information.” (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 200/9–20 (West 2012).

Defendant relies primarily on the language we have emphasized.

¶ 9 Plaintiffs counter that section 6(a) of the FOIA limits any charge to the cost of purchasing the recording medium. They reason that section 6(a) makes section 9–20...