Sage Land & Imp. Co. v. Ripley
Decision Date | 03 January 1912 |
Docket Number | 2,166. |
Citation | 192 F. 785 |
Parties | SAGE LAND & IMPROVEMENT CO. v. RIPLEY. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
De Vere Hall (Benton Hanchett, of counsel), for appellant.
W. S Humphrey (Sharpe & Handy and Humphrey & Grant, on the brief) for appellee.
Before WARRINGTON, Circuit Judge, and McCALL and SANFORD, District judges.
This case is here upon an appeal from the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Michigan. The bill was filed by Lucien V. Ripley, appellee (hereinafter referred to as the complainant), against the Sage Land & Improvement Company, appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant). The complainant is a citizen of the state of Michigan, and the defendant is a corporation and a citizen of the state of New York. A demurrer was interposed to the bill which was by the Circuit Court overruled. An answer was filed by the defendant. After proof was taken, the case was heard, resulting in a decree for the complainant. The defendant appealed, and assigns errors.
We shall first dispose of the questions raised on the demurrer. The demurrer and answer were filed at the same time; and, if in their scope and effect each does not involve the whole bill, still each so far involves and overlaps the same portions of the bill as to amount to a waiver and overruling of the demurrer by the answer in spite of the disclaimer made in respect of the latter. The rule of decision in this behalf is too familiar to justify stating in detail the reasons why we think the various decisions cited by the learned counsel for defendant are distinguishable from the present case. Some of the decisions stating the general rule, which we regard as applicable here, are Droste v. Hall (N.J. Ch.) 29 A. 437; Adams v. Howard (C.C.) 9 Fed. 347, per Blatchford while Circuit Judge; Strang v. Richmond, P. & C.R. Co. (C.C.A. 4th Cir.) 101 F. 511, 514, 41 C.C.A. 474; Bryant Bros. Co. v. Robinson (C.C.A.5th Cir.) 149 F. 321, 329, 79 C.C.A. 259; Crescent City, etc., Co. v. Butchers', etc., Co. (C.C.) 12 F. 225; McDermott v. Blois, 1 R.M.Charlt. (Ga.) 281.
Moreover, the contention that the legal representative of the deceased Sage is an indispensable party is answered by the facts: (1) That the bill does not show that any such legal representative was ever appointed, and so does not in that respect present a question for demurrer; and (2) the bill discloses facts showing that the deceased Sage was originally invested with the title to the land in dispute in trust for himself and Ripley, and that subsequently the land was conveyed by Sage at his instance and with the consent of Ripley, to the appellant, subject to the trust and to the rights and liabilities of the parties interested in the land, under circumstances fairly charging appellant with the assumption of all liabilities growing out of the trust, and substituting the appellant in the place and stead of Sage in his relation with Ripley regarding the lands. It follows, we think, that no one representing the deceased Sage or in any wise liable for his acts, other than appellant, is an indispensable or even a proper party defendant touching any object of the present suit; for the case thus presented by the pleadings places the deceased Sage in the same relation to the trust property as that which he would have occupied had he possessed no interest in the land except that of a naked trustee, and surely this result of averments is not open to demurrer. McBride v. McIntyre, 91 Mich. 406, 408, 409, 51 N.W. 1113; Ryan v. O'Connor, 41 Ohio St. 368, 372; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Kindred (C.C.) 14 F. 77, 81; Laidly v. Huntington, 121 U.S. 179, 181, 7 Sup.Ct. 855, 30 L.Ed. 883; Harding v. Olson, 76 Ill.App. 475, affirmed 177 Ill. 298, 52 N.E. 482.
Regarding the claim that the court below was bound sua sponte at a later stage of the cause to take notice of the absence of the indispensable party mentioned, it is enough to say, as will more fully appear later, that the evidence reveals the fact that, although the deceased Sage was originally invested with the legal title to the land, yet, from that time to the time of his conveyance of the trust property to appellant, he acted for and in the interest of a copartnership composed of himself and his sons and conducted under the name of H. W. Sage & Co.; and that, when he sought and secured the consent of Ripley to convey the trust property to appellant, he did so in the interest and for the benefit of the copartnership. Apart from the effect of the answer upon the demurrer, and considering the claim that under statutes of the state of Michigan there was need of averment that the trust in question was created in writing, the fact that there is nothing in the bill to indicate that it was not so created ought alone to be a sufficient answer. Lamb v. Starr, Deady, 350, 14 Fed.Cas. 1024; Green v. Wagon Road Co. (C.C.) 23 F. 67, 70.
But it is averred that the trust was created by letters passing between the deceased Sage and Ripley, and this is enough. Loring v. Palmer, 118 U.S. 321, 6 Sup.Ct. 1073, 30 L.Ed. 211; Renz v. Stoll, 94 Mich. 377, 54 N.W. 276, 34 Am.St.Rep. 358. Without discussing the subject of the demurrer further, we hold that it was properly overruled.
The character of the decree to be entered in this case turns upon the proper construction of a letter, which comprises the contract between the parties, and is as follows:
H. W. Sage.'
It appears from this letter that it was written in response to complainant's letter to Henry W. Sage, of November 29, 1880, and that the letter of November 29th was destroyed some years later, and after the death of H. W. Sage, by one of his sons. Complainant not having kept a copy of it, neither the original nor copy is produced. H. W. Sage died in 1897.
The complainant was examined as a witness in his own behalf, and was asked to state the subject-matter of his letter to H. W. Sage of November 29th. Over the objection of the defendant, the witness answered, in so far as it is material to quote here:
And again the witness was asked:
* * *
The admission of this evidence is assigned as error. The objection is based upon the ground that such...
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