Sage v. Sage., 1166.

Decision Date05 October 1948
Docket NumberNo. 1166.,1166.
Citation61 A.2d 557
PartiesSAGE v. SAGE.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Windham County Court; Charles B. Adams, Presiding Judge.

Divorce action by Ruth D. Sage against Merton W. Sage. A contempt proceeding which was pending against Merton W. Sage was heard at the same time. Ruth D. Sage was granted a divorce, and Merton W. Sage was adjudged guilty of contempt, and he brings exceptions.

Decree affirmed.

Asa S. Bloomer, of Rutland, for plaintiff.

Edwards & Bigelow, of Bellows Falls, for defendant.

Before MOULTON, C. J., and SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT, and JEFFORDS, JJ.

STURTEVANT, Justice.

This is a petition for divorce brought by Ruth D. Sage against Merton W. Sage. At the time of the trial below, contempt proceedings were pending against the petitionee for failure to comply with an order for the payment of temporary alimony issued in these proceedings and, by agreement of the parties, that matter was heard together with the petition. The petitioner relied upon the ground of refusal and neglect to support. A divorce was granted to her on that ground and the petitionee was found guilty of contempt and was committed to jail. The petitionee brings the case here on exceptions to the granting of the divorce and also on the adjudication that he is guilty of contempt.

The petitioner did not request findings of fact to be made and filed and for that reason no findings are before us except such as are to be inferred in support of the decree. The petitionee's brief first presents his claim that no evidence was introduced sufficient to justify the granting of a divorce on the grounds of refusal and neglect to support. P.L.3116, as amended by No. 43 of the Acts of 1941, states the causes for which a divorce may be granted. In so far as here material, it is therein provided that a divorce may be granted on grounds set forth in paragraph V, section 1 of that act which states as follows:

‘* * * V. Refusal to support. On petition of the wife when the husband has sufficient pecuniary or physical ability to provide suitable maintenance for her and, without cause, persistently refuses or neglects so to do; * * *’

From the evidence presented, as shown by the transcript, the court could reasonably find the following facts.

This is the second marriage between these parties. They were first married to each other in 1937. That marriage was dissolved in 1943 when the wife obtained a divorce on the grounds of intolerable severity. Their present marriage took place in 1944. After that marriage, they resided in the town of Rockingham living together as man and wife until about May 20, 1946, at which time the petitioner instituted these proceedings. After the bringing of this petition they continued to reside in their home place there, but not as man and wife, until July 15, 1946, when the petitioner went to the home of her parents in West Fairlee, Vt., taking their three children with her. Their oldest child was born March 10, 1938, the next one, February 14, 1939, their third one, July 13, 1940, and their youngest child was born February 15, 1947, sometime after they had separated. For some time after this marriage the petitionee was employed by Jones & Lamson at a wage of $50 per week. During all times here material he has been strong and able bodied. In January, 1946, he stopped giving the petitioner money for food and clothes. This made it necessary for the petitioner to obtain work away from their home and she continued this outside work until the close of that school year. During the period from January to May 20, 1946, the date on which these proceedings were instituted, the petitioner repeatedly asked the petitionee for money with which to purchase needed food and clothes for herself and their children. These requests were all refused except on two occasions he gave to her a small amount of money, but not sufficient to meet her needs. During this period, he brought in a few groceries but the amount was insufficient to meet the reasonable needs of her and the children. The money earned by her was used for family expenses during this period, but was not sufficient to fully supply the family needs. The petitioner's parents aided in supplying necessaries for the family and on one occasion the town of Rockingham furnished a half cord of wood. After the petitioner and the children went to the home of her parents in West Fairlee, they received aid from that town, from the State and from her parents, although there was an order for the payment of temporary alimony by the petitionee in force at that time but he did not comply with the terms of the order. After the petitioner left the house in Rockingham where the parties had resided, the court changed the order giving the petitionee the right to rent the premises and thus aid in producing money to meet the alimony payments. The petitionee allowed some one to occupy the place rent free. At the time of the hearing, he was in arrears more than $400 in his alimony payments. For some time before the trial, he had been staying at his mother's home where he received no wages. He persisted in his refusal to give the petitioner money for suitable support and maintenance during the period from January, 1946, to May 20, of that year and continued so to do after the petitioner instituted these proceedings in disregard of the terms of the order directing him to make specified weekly payments for the support of the...

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6 cases
  • Cartmell's Estate, In re, 22
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • January 7, 1958
    ...made so none are before us except such as are to be inferred in support of the judgment. We therefore look to the transcript. Sage v. Sage, 115 Vt. 364, 61 A.2d 557. All of the attorneys present, except the attorney representing the appellants concurred in their statements at the second con......
  • Davis v. Davis, 145-69
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • June 2, 1970
    ...order dismissing the libel the material fact which formed the basis for its action. This also applies in a divorce decree. Sage v. Sage, 115 Vt. 364, 367, 61 A.2d 557. It will also be presumed on appeal, the contrary not appearing, that all the evidence was considered by the trial court wit......
  • Gerdel v. Gerdel, 104-73
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1973
    ...the court, in dicta, assumed that residence in a particular county is a requisite for bringing a divorce action. In Sage v. Sage, 115 Vt. 364, 368, 61 A.2d 557 (1948), the court pointed out the divorce action would not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction even though the parties had since ......
  • Morse v. Morse
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • April 4, 1967
    ...County after the bringing of the divorce petition did not remove the jurisdiction of the Washington County Court. Sage v. Sage, 115 Vt. 364, 368, 61 A.2d 557. Libellee takes nothing by this exception. While we have considered the question raised by the libellee, we need not have done so. Th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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