Saginaw Gen. Hosp. v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.
| Decision Date | 05 March 1935 |
| Docket Number | No. 51.,51. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | SAGINAW GENERAL HOSPITAL v. OCEAN ACCIDENT & GUARANTEE CORPORATION, Limited. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit in assumpsit by Saginaw General Hospital against the Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation, Limited, having its principal place of business in London, England. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.Appeal from Circuit Court, Saginaw County; William H. Martin, judge.
Argued before the Entire Bench.
H. Monroe Stanton, of Saginaw, for appellant.
Cook & Cook, of Saginaw, for appellee.
This is a suit in assumpsit in which plaintiff seeks recovery for services rendered to a Mr. Ed. Steelman. This man was injured while in the employ of the Saginaw Prospecting Company, which carried industrial accident insurance with the defendant, Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation, Limited. Plaintiff in a nonjury trial had judgment, and defendant, first having obtained leave, has appealed.
A Mr. McClure, as an investigator and adjuster for defendant, made an investigation for the purpose of ascertaining Mr. Steelman's condition and whether it resulted from an industrial accident. He found Mr. Steelman's condition serious and directed his personal physician, Dr. Yntema, as the latter testified, to send the patient to a hospital for the purpose of ‘determining the nature and extent of the patient's condition and to do what we thought was necessary.’ Thereupon the doctor arranged with the plaintiff for Steelman's admission to the hospital. Plaintiff's hospital records were received in evidence. From these it appears that plaintiff was advised at the time Mr. Steelman was received as a patient he was by occupation an ‘oil field man’ and that the case was a compensation case for which the Saginaw Prospecting Company was to pay. Fern Deurr was a general clerk and bookkeeper for plaintiff at the time Steelman became a hospital patient. It was with her that Dr. Yntema made his arrangement before Mr. Steelman entered the hospital, and she testified that she knew it was an insurance or compensation case and ‘that the Compensation Law provides that hospital bills will not be paid after ninety days after the accident.’
It is plaintiff's theory that defendant became legally obligated to pay for the hospitalization of Steelman because of the arrangement made for his admission to the hospital through Dr. Yntema under the direction of defendant's adjuster, McClure. In this connection it should be noted that the undisputed testimony is that McClure's authority to arrange for the hospitalization of an insured's injured employee was limited to the 90-day period immediately following the accident. Also that incident to an application for compensation by Steelman a claim for hospitalization by plaintiff for the statutory 90-day period (2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8420) was submitted and allowed in the amount of $256.50. This item was paid by defendant to plaintiff. Steelman was injured December 19, 1929; he entered the hospital January 22, 1930; and was discharged April 27, 1930. The total charge for services rendered was $618.90. Deducting the amount awarded in the compensation proceedings, the unpaid balance is $362.40. There is testimony that of this latter item $131.50 is for services rendered during the first 90-day period after the accident and which was not recovered in the award made.
In cases wherein an employer or the insurer carrying the industrial risk contracts for hospitalization for an injured employee, recovery therefor may be had in assumpsit. Hodgen v. Bitely, 239 Mich. 516, 215 N. W. 37. But entirely apart from either express or implied contractual liability therefor, the employer has the statutory liability during the first 90 days after the injury of furnishing to the injured employee reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services and medicines when needed. 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8420.
Plaintiff submitted its claim for services rendered during the first 90 days and received an award therefor in the amount of $256.50. That was an adjudication by which plaintiff is bound. Plaintiff would nullify the defense of res judicata as to this portion of its claim by urging that plaintiff was not a party to the compensation proceedings. Technically this may be true, but it is not controlling. In so far as the compensation proceedings involved a hearing and determination of plaintiff's claim for hospitalization during the first 90-day period, it was a proceeding prosecuted for and in behalf of plaintiff. Munson v. Christie, 270 Mich. 94, 258 N. W. 415 (January 7, 1935). And having accepted and retained payment of the amount awarded, plaintiff cannot now be heard to disavow the adjudication. As to sevices rendered during the 90-day period the award of $256.50 was a final adjudication by which plaintiff is bound. American Life Ins. Co. v. Balmer, 238 Mich. 580, 214 N. W. 208;Besonen v. Campbell, 243 Mich. 209, 220 N. W. 301.
It follows that the most for which recovery could be had by plaintiff in assumpsit would be for services rendered after the expiration of the first 90-day period. Under plaintiff's testimony this would be $230.90. Plaintiff asserts its...
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