Sagor v. Joseph Burnett Co.

• Decision Date: 04 February 1937
• Citation: 122 Conn. 447,190 A. 258
• Parties: SAGOR v. JOSEPH BURNETT CO.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

190 A. 258

122 Conn. 447

SAGOR v. JOSEPH BURNETT CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 4, 1937

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Ernest A. Inglis Judge.

Action by Joseph Sagor against the Joseph Burnett Company to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, which was tried to a jury. Verdict and judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Samuel M. Silver, of New Haven, for appellant.

Martin E. Gormley, of New Haven, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN JJ.

HINMAN, Judge.

The plaintiff, a boy ten years of age, riding a bicycle, with a companion on the handlebars, came into collision with an automobile driven by defendant's agent at a street intersection in New Haven, and was injured. The defendant claimed to have proved that the plaintiff in making a left-hand turn at the intersection failed to keep to the right of the center of the intersection and in so doing ran into the defendant's automobile causing his injuries. The trial court referred to the statute (General Statutes Cum.Supp.1935, § 636c) " which provides that when the operator of any vehicle - and that includes a bicycle - is making a left turn at the intersection of two public highways he must at all times keep his vehicle to the right of the center point of the intersection," and charged that " a violation of this statute *** is negligence in itself. Accordingly if you should find that the plaintiff did violate this statute then you must conclude that he was negligent in that particular, and if you conclude that he violated that statute or that he was negligent in any other particular and that such violation or such negligence was a substantial factor in producing his own injuries, then you have found that he was guilty of contributory negligence. ***" Just previously the court had called attention to the age of the plaintiff and had charged that his conduct so far as concerned his claimed negligence was to be measured by that which is reasonably to be expected of children of similar age, judgment, and experience. Marfyak v. New England Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 50, 179 A. 9. The plaintiff claims that the same test should be applied in determining whether violation of the statute by him would constitute negligence and assigns error in the failure to so charge specifically in that connection. Reading as a whole the charge as to contributory negligence, we consider it very likely that the jury may have been led thereby to apply the qualification as to age, judgment, and experience to the plaintiff's alleged conduct in violating the statute as well as to his conduct in other respects, and, if so, the plaintiff certainly would have no reason to complain.

That aside, however, we find no justification for the application of this qualification to the effect of violation of the statute as negligence per se. Frisbie v. Schinto, 120 Conn. 412, 415, 181 A. 535. Neither the statute nor any of our decisions under it suggest such an exception to its operation. The terms of the statute are clear and precise as to the course to be pursued by a vehicle in turning left in an intersection and which may be expected to be taken by others. Andrew v. White Bus Line Corp., 115 Conn. 464, 466, 161 A. 792; Murphy v. Way, 107 Conn. 633, 637, 141 A. 858. " It is the duty of the courts to apply it in accord with the intent expressed in the act, without limitation, or exception or extension." Washburn v. LaMay, 116 Conn. 576, 578, 165 A. 791, 792.

As we stated in Murphy v. Way, supra, 107 Conn 633, at page 638, 141 A. 858, the purposes of the statute would be subverted if the standards of conduct prescribed by it could be subjected to exceptions based upon the judgment of the individual user of the highway, and this consideration would be conspicuously applicable in the case of such a user whose capacity to exercise judgment was ...