Sahara Coal Co. v. Fitts
Decision Date | 08 November 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93-4005,93-4005 |
Citation | 39 F.3d 781 |
Parties | SAHARA COAL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. John B. FITTS and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department of Labor, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
John G. Paleudis (argued), Hanlon, Duff, Paleudis & Estadt, St. Clairsville, OH, for Sahara Coal Co.
John H. Secaras, Sol. Gen., Dept. of Labor, Chicago, IL, Donald S. Shire, Sol. Gen., Michael J. Denney, Steven D. Breeskin, Matthew P. Levin, Jeffrey S. Goldberg (argued), U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of Sol., Washington, DC, for Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs.
Suzanne J. Levitt, Sandra M. Fogel (argued), S.I.U. Legal Clinic, Carbondale, IL, for John B. Fitts.
Lisa L. Lahrman, Benefits Review Bd., Executive Counsel, Clerk of the Bd., Washington, DC, for Benefits Review Bd.
Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.
A coal company asks us to set aside an award of benefits under the black-lung law, 30 U.S.C. Secs. 901 et seq. Fitts, the claimant, was a miner for 19 years, and also a heavy smoker. The record before the administrative law judge consisted of reports by three physicians, Drs. Rao, Houser, and Tuteur, plus x-rays and other test results on which the physicians had relied. Rao and Houser concluded that Fitts had pneumoconiosis, Tuteur that he did not. Rao and Houser rested their conclusion, in part anyway, on x-rays that they interpreted as positive for pneumoconiosis. Later, more experienced radiologists ("B-readers") interpreted the x-rays as negative for pneumoconiosis. Despite this, the administrative law judge found that Fitts had the disease, because "While Dr. Tuteur's report is both adequately documented and well reasoned, his opinion is outweighed by the opinions of Drs. Rao and Houser, despite the subsequent negative x-ray interpretations." End of analysis.
This will not do. Administrative agencies when engaged in factfinding and law-applying are required to proceed in accordance with the elementary principles of rational truth-seeking; and the adjudication of black-lung cases is not exempt from this requirement. Peabody Coal Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 178, 182 (7th Cir.1992). One such principle is that the tribunal shall not base its decision on a mechanical nose count of witnesses. Adkins v. Director, 958 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir.1992); cf. Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, 484 U.S. 135, 149 n. 23, 108 S.Ct. 427, 435 n. 23, 98 L.Ed.2d 450 (1987). That procedure has been discredited for centuries. In modern conditions its only effect would be to multiply the number of witnesses. When as is normal in these cases the same x-ray is read by a number of different physicians, who note their interpretation but do not give reasons, the balance of opinions is entitled to some though not controlling weight. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Battram, 7 F.3d 1273, 1277-78 (7th Cir.1993). It is difficult to see what alternative the administrative law judge would have. But we were astonished to find the Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor, which reviewed the administrative law judge's award of benefits to Mr. Fitts, citing "numerical superiority" not of x-ray readings but of witnesses as a reason for affirmance. So far as appears from the passage we quoted from the administrative law judge's opinion, it was on the basis of that same principle of "numerical superiority" that he decided that Rao's and Houser's reports, despite their flaws, outweighed Tuteur's, though the administrative law judge identified no flaw in Tuteur's report.
Of course the fact that Rao and Houser each relied on a questionable piece of evidence--an x-ray they thought positive for pneumoconiosis but more experienced x-ray readers thought negative--did not by itself invalidate their conclusions. When a witness relies for his conclusion on facts A, B, and C, and fact A is knocked out, it does not follow that his conclusion must change. It may be that his conclusion would be unchanged as long as two out of the three facts, or even just one of the three facts, were true. If this is plain there is no need to ask him to reconsider in light of the altered premise (not-A in place of A ); but if it is not plain, then one must ask him to reconsider. See Thorn v. Itmann Coal Co., 3 F.3d 713, 718 (4th Cir.1993).
No one reading either Rao's or Houser's report of...
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