SAIF Corp. v. Sumner (In re Sumner)

• Decision Date: 21 July 2021
• Docket Number: A171463
• Citation: 495 P.3d 205,313 Or.App. 434
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the COMPENSATION OF Cassandra SUMNER, Claimant. SAIF Corporation and Cooper Hollow Residential Services, Petitioners, v. Cassandra Sumner, Respondent.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

313 Or.App. 434

495 P.3d 205

In the MATTER OF the COMPENSATION OF Cassandra SUMNER, Claimant.

SAIF Corporation and Cooper Hollow Residential Services, Petitioners,

v.Cassandra Sumner, Respondent.

A171463

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and submitted November 18, 2020.

July 21, 2021

Beth Cupani, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners.

R. Adian Martin, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.

Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and Sercombe, Senior Judge.

ARMSTRONG, P. J.

SAIF Corporation and employer Cooper Hollow Residential Services seek review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board, contending that the board erred in determining that claimant's injury arose out of and occurred during course and scope of her employment. We conclude that the board did not err and therefore affirm.

Employer manages homes for disabled adults. Claimant works as a program manager for employer, managing two homes in Monmouth, Oregon. Her duties include scheduling and coordinating staffing, training staff, budgeting, and ensuring compliance with state and federal law. Claimant's two homes in Monmouth are located about a mile apart, and claimant drives between them. Claimant's normal work hours are from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, but she is on call for emergencies or licensing visits or inspections, leading to overtime hours. Claimant is allowed to "flex" her hours, meaning that she can take time off with permission if she has previously worked overtime.

On the day of her injury, claimant had permission to use flex time to have the day off for some holiday shopping. But that morning, claimant received a text from her supervisor asking her to come to employer's main office in Dallas to help wrap gifts for employer's holiday party. Claimant agreed and spent about an hour at the Dallas office wrapping gifts. Claimant's supervisor also came to the office while claimant was there, then drove to McMinnville to check on a residence. He intended to then drive to West Salem to buy some pizzas for the holiday party.

After wrapping gifts, claimant left the office to resume her errands. While en route to Salem, claimant received a cellphone call from a coworker asking if she could meet the supervisor in Rickreall on her way to Salem and give him petty cash for the pizzas. Claimant agreed, but, because she had already left Dallas, she decided not to return to the office for petty cash and planned instead to give the supervisor her own cash for the pizzas and then seek reimbursement. The board found that the practice of using one's own cash to purchase work necessities was not encouraged by employer but also was not forbidden, and claimant often spent personal funds on residents’ needs and then requested reimbursement.

The accident occurred when claimant was driving east of Dallas on Ellendale Road toward Rickreall and Salem. Before the exit to Rickreall, a utility vehicle merged onto Ellendale Road from Fir Villa Road and struck claimant's car on the passenger side, pushing it into a third vehicle. Claimant suffered a low back injury as a result of the accident and filed a claim, which SAIF denied on the ground that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of claimant's employment. Claimant requested a hearing.

An injury is compensable if it "arise[s] out of" and occurs "in the course of employment." ORS 656.005(7)(a). The "arising out of" prong requires a causal link between the worker's injury and his or her employment. Krushwitz v. McDonald's Restaurants , 323 Or. 520, 525-26, 919 P.2d 465 (1996) ; Norpac Foods, Inc. v. Gilmore , 318 Or. 363, 366, 867 P.2d 1373 (1994). The "in the course of" prong concerns the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. Krushwitz , 323 Or. at 526, 919 P.2d 465 ; Norpac , 318 Or. at 366, 867 P.2d 1373. The two prongs are parts of a single "work-connection" inquiry, that is, whether the relationship between the injury and the employment is sufficient that the injury should be compensable. Krushwitz , 323 Or. at 526, 919 P.2d 465 ; Norpac , 318 Or. at 366, 867 P.2d 1373. Both prongs must be satisfied to some degree, and neither is dispositive. Krushwitz , 323 Or. at 531, 919 P.2d 465 ; Norpac , 318 Or. at 366, 867 P.2d 1373. The work-connection test may be satisfied if the factors supporting one prong of the statutory test are minimal while the factors supporting the other prong are substantial. Krushwitz , 323 Or. at 531, 919 P.2d 465 (citing Phil A. Livesley Co. v. Russ , 296 Or. 25, 28, 672 P.2d 337 (1983) ). Together, the "arising out of" and "in the course of" prongs provide an analytical tool for determining whether the causal connection between the injury and the employment is sufficient to warrant compensation.

Andrews v. Tektronix, Inc ., 323 Or. 154, 161-62, 915 P.2d 972 (1996).

An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld SAIF's denial of claimant's claim, but the board reversed the ALJ's order. In determining that claimant's injury arose out of and occurred in the course of her employment, the board cited claimant's on-call status. The board found that claimant's work duties were not limited to her regular working hours and included completing special tasks or errands for employer. The board also found that, in assisting a coworker, claimant was complying with employer's encouragement that an employee be a "team player." Thus, although claimant was not scheduled to work on the date of injury and had not been directed by employer to bring money to her supervisor, the board concluded that claimant was within the reasonable bounds of her employment at the time of the injury, that claimant's work exposed her to the risk of being injured during an errand, and that the injury arose out of and in the course of claimant's employment.

SAIF and employer seek judicial review, contending that the board erred. We review the board's conclusion that claimant's injury arose out of and was within the course and scope of her employment for legal error. ORS 183.482(8) ; Compton v. SAIF Corp ., 195 Or. App. 329, 333, 97 P.3d 669, rev. den. , 337 Or. 669, 104 P.3d 601 (2004). We review the board's findings for substantial evidence and substantial reason. ORS 656.298(7) ; ORS 183.482(8)(c).

To determine whether an injury occurs "in the course of" employment, the court determines if the time, place, and circumstances of the injury justify connecting the injury to the employment. Robinson v. Nabisco, Inc., 331 Or. 178, 186, 11 P.3d 1286 (2000). An injury takes place in the course of employment if it occurs "while the worker reasonably is fulfilling the duties of the employment or is doing something reasonably incidental to it." Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Hayes , 325 Or. 592, 598, 943 P.2d 197 (1997).

SAIF contends that claimant was not in the course of her employment at the time of the accident, because she was on a personal errand and not working or at a place where she was expected to be at the time of the injury.

Claimant responds that, in...