Sailors' Union of the Pacific v. Hammond Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 07 October 1907
• Docket Number: 1,400.
• Citation: 156 F. 450
• Parties: SAILORS' UNION OF THE PACIFIC et al. v. HAMMOND LUMBER CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

156 F. 450

SAILORS' UNION OF THE PACIFIC et al. v. HAMMOND LUMBER CO.

No. 1,400.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

October 7, 1907

A labor union, engaged in a dispute with employing lumber company that interfered with operation of railroad serving lumber company, by picketing highway crossworking for another, is an unlawful interference with a property right, and may under well-established equitable principles be restrained by injunction.

'The appeal in this case is from an interlocutory order granting an injunction pendente lite. The appellee brought a bill in equity, in which it alleged that it is a New Jersey corporation engaged in the lumber business and in carrying passengers and freight to and from various ports in California, using for that purpose three sea-going vessels that in June, 1906, the appellants conspired and threatened to prevent, and to continue to prevent, the appellee's vessels from leaving the port of San Francisco with crews of its watchmen and guards, and, in pursuance of such conspiracy, they endeavored forcibly to remove one of the appellee's employes, and pinioned and imprisoned another of its employes, and committed many other acts of violence and unlawful interference with the business of the appellee that the acts and doings of the appellants have become widely known, and the appellants threaten to repeat and continue such acts and prevent the vessels of the appellee from leaving the port, and from carrying passengers, and to interfere with and prevent the appellee from continuing its business; that such acts do interfere with the business of the appellee and its vessels, and if they are permitted to continue, the appellee will suffer irreparable damage, in that crews cannot be secured to man its vessels, nor can freight be secured to load its vessels; that the appellants are insolvent and without money or property sufficient to pay the damage sustained; that the appellee has already suffered through the acts complained of, in a sum exceeding $10,000; that an attempt to recover damages at law would require a multiplicity of suits; that, unless the acts of the appellants are restrained, the business of the appellee and its vessels will be totally destroyed; and that the appellee has no adequate remedy at law. The bill was supported by numerous affidavits showing that on or about June 1, 1906, the Sailors' Union of the Pacific demanded of the San Francisco shipowners a wage increase of $5 per month in all steam schooners, which was refused; that thereupon the unions struck; that the appellants created an executive committee known as the 'Strike Committee,' composed of seven members of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, two members of the Pacific Coast Marine Firemen's Union, and two members of the Marine Cooks' and Stewards' Association; that between 50 and 60 vessels were involved in the strike; that the said committee bought a launch and hired another, both launches being manned by members of the three unions and used as picket boats; and that the water front was also picketed by strikers. The affidavits showed specific acts of violence committed by the unions on the dates of June 5th, June 17th, June 27th, June 30th, July 3d, July 4th, and July 11th; that at these various dates men on the launches forcibly boarded vessels in the harbor, made threats of bodily injury to the officers in charge, terrorized passengers, to whom they used profane, insulting, and obscene language, committed brutal assaults upon crews, firemen, cooks, and stewards, and committed other acts, showing that they were in the active prosecution of an unlawful plan to interfere with, harass, annoy, and prevent the operation of the vessels and destroy the business and property of every nonunion shipowner in the port of San Francisco, for the purpose of coercing them into yielding to their demands.

W. H. Hutton, for appellants.

Henry Ach, J. W. Dorsey, and Chas. Page, for appellee.

Before GILBERT, Circuit Judge, and DE HAVEN and HUNT, District Judges.

GILBERT Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

It is contended that the restraining order issued on July 13, 1906, was wrongfully issued, for the reason that no bond therefor was filed. The application for the restraining order was made on July 9, 1906, and a bond bearing that date had been prepared for that purpose. The court, instead of granting the order on that date, made an order to show cause on July 13th, and on that day granted a temporary restraining order, directed that the application for an injunction pendente lite be heard at a future date, and ordered that the temporary restraining order issue on the execution and filing by the appellee of a bond in the sum of $1,000 to be approved by the clerk. Immediately thereafter, and on July 13th, the sureties on the bond which bore the date of July 9th justified thereto before the clerk, and the clerk approved the bond and filed the same. Subsequently, on August 8, 1906, the court granted an injunction pendente lite upon the execution of a bond, and on the same day the requisite bond was filed by the appellee in compliance with the order of the court. The appeal is taken from the order of the court so made on August 8, 1906. The bond was valid, notwithstanding that its date was four days prior to the date when it was filed. The date of a bond is not an essential part of it. The instrument takes effect from the time of its filing. Williams v. McConico, 27 Ala. 572; Jenkins v. Hay, 28 Md. 547. Counsel for the appellants cites the decision of this court in Tyler Min. Co. v. Last Chance Min. Co., 90 F. 15, 32 C.C.A. 498, in which it was held that the liability of a surety cannot be extended by implication beyond the expressed terms of his contract. But in that case the bond had been given to procure a restraining order enjoining the defendants in the suit from working a certain portion of a mine and from removing or appropriating ore previously taken therefrom. A subsequent order was made, which continued such restraining order in force, but modified and changed it by permitting the working of the mine and the disposition of the ore taken therefrom under regulations prescribed by the court. It was held that the sureties could not be held liable for damages accruing to the defendants under the modified order. There is no such question in the present case. The sureties on the bond in this case justified thereon on the very day on which the order was made, and the bond was filed upon that date and approved by the clerk. It thereby became the bond upon which the order was granted, and it was from that date the valid obligation of the sureties.

It is contended that the issuance of the restraining order and the injunction were in excess of the court's jurisdiction and that, although there are decisions of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States which sustain such jurisdiction, the use of the writ of injunction for the purposes sought in the bill in the present case has not been...