Sain v. Burt

Decision Date30 September 2016
Docket NumberCivil No. 2:13-CV-10824
PartiesDUANE SAIN, Petitioner, v. S.L. BURT, Respondent
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING THE MOTION FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND GRANTING PETITIONER LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Duane Sain, ("Petitioner"), confined at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder, M.C.L.A. 750.316(1)(a).

For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

I. Background

A jury convicted Petitioner in Wayne County Circuit Court. Petitioner was tried jointly with co-defendant Mark DeWitt Yancey.

On May 20, 2009, Brandon Williams was shot and killed near Stout Street and Wadsworth Avenue in Detroit. (Tr. 2/25/10, pp. 125-26). Michael Porter testified that he, Daniel Hines or "Travon" Williams, and a man identified only as "C.J." were together at this location earlier that day. An argument broke out around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. between a group of young men from Vaughn Street and another group of men from Stout Street concerning stolen narcotics. Porter knew Petitioner as "D.J." and his co-defendant as "Monte"; they were from the gang on Vaughn Street. Hines and C.J. were part of the group from Stout Street. Hines and C.J. got into an argument with Petitioner and Yancey. The argument broke up when someone started shooting a gun in the air. (Tr. 2/25/10, 158-166; Tr. 03/1/10, pp. 24-25, 27).

Porter returned to Stout Street after dark, where he met up with C.J., Williams, and Hines. At approximately 11:20 p.m., the men were walking down Stout Street when the second shooting occurred. Porter testified that Petitioner and Yancey pulled up in Petitioner's burgundy Chevy Caprice. Porter testified that he recognized the car because the front passenger side was damaged and the hood was black. Porter saw Petitioner drive that car before. The car approached slowly and passed under a streetlight; Porter saw Petitioner driving. Yancey was in the front passenger seat, holding a black Luger handgun. Porter ran when Yancey started shooting. Porter heard someone in the car shout "Black Pointe," the name associated with the gang on Vaughn Street. Porter observed Hines running ahead of him. Williams stated "I'm hit," and held his chest. Williams made it to Wadsworth before falling. Hines and Porter tried to help Williams and also called 911. The ambulance and police arrived. Williams was taken to the hospital. (Tr. 2/25/10, pp. 169-75, 178-90, 196-97).

Mr. Hines also testified that there had been an argument over stolen drugs on StoutStreet earlier that day that ended with gunshots. (Tr. 3/1/10, pp. 63, 66-68, 95-96). Later that night, Hines was walking with Williams, Porter, and C.J. near Wadsworth and Stout when he noticed a brown Chevy Caprice approach them from behind and speed up. Hines heard eight or nine gunshots. The car did not have its headlights on. Hines believed the streetlight, which blinked on and off, was off at that point. Hines did not see who was driving, but the gunshots came from the front passenger side. (Tr. 3/1/10, 61-63, 66-71, 76-78, 95-96, 105). Hines testified that Porter and C.J. ran ahead of him and Williams. Hines saw Williams fall. Hines and Porter attempted to help Williams. (Id., pp. 80-82, 106-107).

Detroit police investigated the crime scene. Officer Robert Skender testified that the gunshots came from the east on Stout Street. (Tr. 2/25/10, 144). Officer Skender indicated that the streets were lit but that it was it was dark outside along Wadsworth. Officer Skender testified that the light was poor at the corner of Stout and Wadsworth Streets and he had to use a flashlight. (Id., pp. 150-52). Police found 16 .9-millimeter bullet shell casings, a red baseball cap, a bullet impact mark on a house nearby, a T-shirt, and a cellular telephone. The bullet casings were from three different manufacturers and were found all along the curb on Stout Street between Wadsworth and Plymouth. (Tr. 3/1/10, pp. 135-138, 140-143). Detroit Police Officer Michael Martell believed there was a street light near where the shell casings were recovered. (Id., pp. 149-50). The Michigan State Police Department firearms expert determined that the casings came from two different guns. (Tr. 3/2/10, pp. 16-17, 28-29).

Porter did not initially contact the police because he was nervous, but he identified the shooter and driver to his mother. (Tr. 2/25/10, pp. 192, 195; Tr. 3/1/10, 39). Porter eventually met with the police on June 6, 2009. Porter gave a statement and identified Petitioner and Yancey in photographic lineups. (Tr. 2/25/10, pp. 192-94, 200; Tr. 3/1/10, pp. 8-10; 39; Tr. 3/2/10, pp. 36, 78-79). Police also located the brownish burgundy Caprice with a black hood and front end damage. (Tr. 3/2/10, pp. 46-47).

Detroit Police Sergeant Gary Diaz located Hines in September 2009. Hines initially denied being a witness to the shooting until he was shown Porter's statement. (Tr. 3/1/10, p. 110; Tr. 3/2/10, pp. 37-38). Diaz then took a statement from Hines; Diaz did not include anything in the written statement that Hines did not tell him. Hines told Diaz that he saw Petitioner's Caprice. (Tr. 3/2/10, p. 39-40). Hines testified that he saw Petitioner drive the Caprice on a prior occasion before the shooting, but saw others drive the car. (Tr. 3/1/10, pp. 82, 85-86, 94, 120-121). Hines felt pressured to identify the car. (Id., p. 99). Hines did not see who was driving or shooting on that day. (Id., p. 86). Hines told Diaz that he did not want to come to court and testify. (Id., p. 112).

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. People v. Sain, No. 297268, 2011 WL 3518212 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2011); lv. den. 490 Mich. 973, 806 N.W. 2d 327 (2011).

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was held in abeyance so that Petitioner could return to the state courts to exhaust additional claims. Sain v. Romanowski, No. 2:13-CV-10824, 2013 WL 1176072 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2013).

Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment, which was denied. People v. Sain, No. 09-024170-FC (Third Circ.Ct. Mar. 11, 2014). The Michigan appellate courts denied Petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Sain, No. 323497 (Mich.Ct.App. Nov. 14, 2014); lv. den. 498 Mich. 883, 869 N.W.2d 578 (2015).

On December 15, 2015, this Court granted Petitioner's motion to lift the stay and to amend his petition. Petitioner seeks habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) the trial judge committed reversible error in admitting hearsay evidence under the residual hearsay rule; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) insufficient evidence; (4) improper jury verdict form; (5) newly discovered evidence of innocence; (6) criminal complaint and warrant violated the Fourth Amendment; (7) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (8) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of theevidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010)(quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

"[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court emphasized "that even astrong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court...

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