Salahuddin v. Jones

• Decision Date: 30 April 1993
• Docket Number: D,No. 1179,1179
• Citation: 992 F.2d 447
• Parties: Abdul Y. SALAHUDDIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E.W. JONES, Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Arthur A. Leonardo, Sgt. Rothburn, C.O. Denno, Nora McLaughlin, Head Clerk, William Eisenschmidt, Deputy Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 92-2728.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 447

992 F.2d 447

25 Fed.R.Serv.3d 898

Abdul Y. SALAHUDDIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E.W. JONES, Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional

Facility, Arthur A. Leonardo, Sgt. Rothburn, C.O. Denno,

Nora McLaughlin, Head Clerk, William Eisenschmidt, Deputy

Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1179, Docket 92-2728.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

Submitted April 12, 1993.

Decided April 30, 1993.

Abdullah Y. Salahuddin, pro se.

Martin A. Hotvet, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, NY (Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of N.Y., Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Sol. Gen., Nancy A. Spiegel, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND and WINTER, Circuit Judges, and POLLACK, District Judge. ^*

PER CURIAM:

On September 15, 1980, Abdul Y. Salahuddin, then a prisoner in the Comstock Correctional Facility, initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Some of his claims--e.g., foreign substances in his food and lack of recreational opportunities because of snow piled in the yard--were facially frivolous. Other claims alleged that in 1978 he was falsely accused of disciplinary violations and illegally placed in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). He also claimed that, while in SHU, he was denied his legal mail and access to the law library and was deprived of congregate religious services. On December 18, 1981, appellees answered the complaint. The answer claimed that Salahuddin had failed to state a valid claim for relief and that appellees were protected by qualified immunity.

The action lay dormant for almost nine years. Why it was not dismissed for failure to prosecute is not clear on the record before us, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) (federal courts have inherent power to dismiss cases for failure to prosecute), although it may be difficult to find a case that is more stale and unfit for trial in this circuit. Nevertheless, on October 4, 1991, counsel was appointed for appellant, and the action was thereafter referred by consent to Magistrate Judge Hurd.

Appellees moved for summary judgment. With regard to the claim that appellant was illegally confined, they argued that these were barred by res judicata because they had been adjudicated in Murph a/k/a Salahuddin v. Lynch and Denno, 79-CV-21 (hereafter "Salahuddin I ") (dismissing appellant's charge that his 1978 confinement was illegal). Appellees also moved for dismissal, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), of the claims that appellant was denied access to the courts and congregate religious services.

Magistrate Judge Hurd held that appellees had waived the defense of res judicata by failing to raise it in the pleadings. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c); Allen v. Men's World Outlet Inc., 679 F.Supp. 360, 365 (S.D.N.Y.1988). Nevertheless, citing the need to avoid unnecessary relitigation, he dismissed the illegal confinement claims on res judicata grounds. He dismissed the remainder of the complaint for failure to state a claim.

On appeal, Salahuddin concedes that his claims of illegal confinement were adjudicated in Salahuddin I. However, he claims that the district court lacked power to dismiss these claims. We disagree.

The failure of a defendant to raise res judicata in answer does not deprive a court of the power to dismiss a claim on that ground. While that or similar defenses are "ordinarily" not to be recognized when not raised in the answer, Davis v. Bryan, 810 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir.1987) (district court ordinarily should not raise statute of limitations sua sponte ), no absolute bar to the consideration of such claims exists. See Carbonell v. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 772 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir.1985) (court may dismiss sua sponte on res judicata grounds provided it either has before it "all relevant data and legal records" or is in same district in which the original action was filed).

Dismissal of appellant's recycled claims was not only appropriate but virtually mandatory in this case, whether or not the appellees raised res judicata in their answer. First, appellant expressly admits in...