Saldana-Fountain v. United States
| Decision Date | 16 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | EP-15-CV-39-KC |
| Parties | MARIA SALDANA-FOUNTAIN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
On this day, the Court considered the following six motions: Defendants Enrique Chavez, Jr., Chavez Law Firm, and Chavez Law, P.C.'s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction ("Chavez Defendants' Motion to Dismiss"), ECF No. 16; United States' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment ("United States' Motion to Dismiss"), ECF No. 18; Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment against Enrique Chavez, Jr., Chavez Law Firm, and Chavez Law, P.C. ("Motion for Entry of Judgment against the Chavez Defendants"), ECF No. 22; Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment against the United States, John M. McHugh, and William Beaumont Army Medical Center ("Motion for Entry of Judgment against the United States"), ECF No. 23; Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against Enrique Chavez, Jr., Chavez Law Firm, and Chavez Law, P.C. ("Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against the Chavez Defendants"), ECF No. 25; and Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against the United States, John M. McHugh, and William Beaumont Army Medical Center ("Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against the United States"), ECF No. 35.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Chavez Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the United States' Motion to Dismiss, and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment against the Chavez Defendants, Motion for Entry of Judgment against the United States, Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against the Chavez Defendants, and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against the United States. The case is DISMISSED.
On January 8, 2007, William Beaumont Army Medical Center ("WBAMC") hired Plaintiff as a medical technician. See United States' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1 ("EEOC Decision"),1 at 1, ECF No. 18-3.2 After Plaintiff began working at WBAMC, Plaintiff allegedly endured discriminatory remarks from a co-worker, including "racial remarks of 'stupid bitch', 'dumb bitch', 'fuck you' and 'all fucked up' explicitly being made to Plaintiff on a regular basis." See Am. Compl. 3, ECF No. 5. Plaintiff alleges that she brought these concerns to the Equal Employment Opportunity office at Fort Bliss on June 12, 2007. See Resp. to United States' Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF No. 53. Plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Complaint on September 6, 2007,3 prior to being fired on September 20, 2007.4 Seeid. Plaintiff then retained an attorney, see id., and filed a second EEOC Complaint on October 17, 2007. See EEOC Decision 1.
On April 28, 2009, the administrative judge held a hearing on Plaintiff's second EEOC Complaint and, on April 30, 2009, the administrative judge issued a bench decision, "finding no discrimination." Id. at 2. Plaintiff then appealed this decision, and the EEOC affirmed the decision on October 5, 2010. See id. at 4-5. In the October 5, 2010, EEOC Decision, the EEOC notified Plaintiff that she had "the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that [she] receive[d] this decision." Id. at 5. Plaintiff received a copy of this EEOC Decision sometime in October 2010. See Resp. to United States' Mot. to Dismiss 2.
On November 23, 2010, Plaintiff met with Enrique Chavez ("Chavez") of Chavez Law Firm about representing her in a federal lawsuit regarding the discrimination that she allegedly endured during her time at WBAMC. See Am. Compl. 4. Plaintiff alleges that "Chavez agreed to represent Plaintiff," see id., and that, "[o]n January 3, 2011, Chavez confirmed to Plaintiff that [her WBAMC] case had been timely filed in federal court," see Resp. to United States' Mot. to Dismiss 12.5 However, Plaintiff alleges that "[o]n or about March 25, 2011 Plaintiff received Chavez's backdated letter of rejection dated November 24, 2010 in a March 24, 2011 postmarked envelope," see id. at 13, in which Chavez informed Plaintiff that his law office would not represent Plaintiff, see Am. Compl., Ex. 20, ECF No. 5-15. Plaintiff further allegesthat, "[b]ased on Chavez's confirmation that [her] claims [against WBAMC] had been filed in federal court on January 3, 2011, Plaintiff acted diligently [o]n March 31, 2011 in attempting to retrieve [the] Cause Number in [her WBAMC case] in order to retain another attorney to take over her current federal case." Id. Upon attempting to retrieve the cause number on March 31, 2011, Plaintiff learned that Chavez had not filed a case in federal district court on her behalf. Id.
In February 2015,6 Plaintiff filed the instant case in federal district court. See Orig. Compl., ECF No. 1. In this case, Plaintiff brings five types of federal claims against the United States based on the discrimination that she allegedly endured at WBAMC: (1) a discrimination claim arising under Title VII, (2) a discrimination claim arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act, (3) a claim under the Whistleblower Protection Act, (4) a claim under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, and (5) a claim under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. See id. at 1; Am. Compl. 3. In addition, Plaintiff brings state law claims against Enrique Chavez, Jr., Chavez Law Firm, and Chavez Law, P.C. (collectively, "Chavez Defendants"), including claims of "fraudulent concealment, breach of fiduciary duty, embezzlement, and other nefarious conduct and activity in the legal representation of Plaintiff's case against [the United States] and missing deadline [sic] in filing her case." See Am. Compl. 1; Orig. Compl. 3-4. Plaintiff bases her claims against the Chavez Defendants on Chavez's misrepresentations to Plaintiff when he allegedly agreed to represent her, and on Chavez's failure to file Plaintiff's federal suit. See Am. Compl. 1; Orig. Compl. 3-4.
Plaintiff filed her Original Complaint with this Court in February 2015. See Orig. Compl. On June 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl.
The Chavez Defendants were served with the Amended Complaint on June 29, 2015. See Summons of Chavez Defs. 3, ECF No. 14. The Chavez Defendants then filed their Motion to Dismiss on July 20, 2015. See Chavez Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss. However, through an inadvertent error, the Chavez Defendants failed to serve Plaintiff with this Motion until September 9, 2015. See Chavez Defs.' Resp. in Opp'n to Pl.'s to Mot. to Enter J. ¶ 7, ECF No. 21; Pl.'s Mot. for Ext. to Resp. to Chavez Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 29.
The United States was served with the Amended Complaint on June 29, 2015. See Summons of U.S. 4, ECF No. 12. The Unites States filed its Motion to Dismiss on August 28, 2015. See United States' Mot. to Dismiss.
On August 31, 2015—having not yet been served with the Chavez Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or the United States' Motion to Dismiss—Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment against the Chavez Defendants, see Mot. for Entry of J. against Chavez Defs., and a Motion for Entry of Judgment against the United States, see Mot. for Entry of J. against United States.
Subsequently, on September 3, 2015, Plaintiff was served with the United States' Motion to Dismiss. See Pl.'s Mot. for Ext. to Resp. to United States' Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 26. On September 9, 2015, Plaintiff was served with the Chavez Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. See Pl.'s Mot. for Ext. to Resp. to Chavez Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 1. On September 14, 2015, Plaintiff requested an extension of time to respond to the United States' Motion to Dismiss, see Pl.'s Mot. for Ext. to Resp. to United States' Mot. to Dismiss, and the Court granted this request. See Sept. 18, 2015, Text Order. On September 17, 2015, Plaintiff requested an extension of timeto respond to the Chavez Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, see Pl.'s Mot. for Ext. to Resp. to Chavez Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, and the Court granted this request as well. See Sept. 22, 2015, Text Order.
Meanwhile, on September 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against the Chavez Defendants, see Mot. for Entry of Default J. against Chavez Defs., and a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against the United States, see Mot. for Entry of Default J. against United States.
On September 18, 2015, the United States filed an Opposed Motion to Stay, requesting that the Court stay the proceedings pending the Court's resolution of the United States' Motion to Dismiss. See United States' Mot. to Stay 1, ECF No. 27. On September 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings, requesting that the Court stay the proceedings due to her involvement in an automobile accident. See Pl.'s Mot. to Stay 1, ECF No. 30. On September 30, 3015, the Court stayed the proceedings, except to allow the parties to file responses to currently pending motions. Sept. 30, 2015, Order, ECF No. 34.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); People's Nat'l Bank v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the U.S., 362 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2004). Without jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, federal courts lack the power to adjudicate claims. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 552; People's Nat'l Bank, 362 F.3d at 336. A party may challenge a district court's subject matter jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A federal court must consider a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule12(b)(1) before any other challenge because a court must have subject matter jurisdiction before determining the...
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