Saleem v. Corporate Transp. Grp., Ltd.

Decision Date16 September 2014
Docket NumberNo. 12–CV–8450 JMF.,12–CV–8450 JMF.
PartiesMazhar SALEEM et al., Plaintiffs, v. CORPORATE TRANSPORTATION GROUP, LTD. et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

52 F.Supp.3d 526

Mazhar SALEEM et al., Plaintiffs
v.
CORPORATE TRANSPORTATION GROUP, LTD. et al., Defendants.

No. 12–CV–8450 JMF.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed Sept. 16, 2014.


52 F.Supp.3d 527

Adam T. Klein, Justin Mitchell Swartz, Lewis M. Steel, Michael Noah Litrownik, Michael Joseph Scimone, Rachel Megan Bien, Lewis M. Steel, Outten & Golden, LLP, Stephen H. Kahn, Kahn Opton LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Evan J. Spelfogel, Margaret Casey Thering, Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., New York, NY, Kenneth R. Tuch, Roberta Cohen Pike, Pike & Pike, P.C., Bellmore, NY, for Defendants.

52 F.Supp.3d 528

OPINION AND ORDER

JESSE M. FURMAN, District Judge:

Together, the Defendants in this action operate a “black car” business that provides ground transportation services around New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Plaintiffs are drivers who work, or have worked, for Defendants. Plaintiffs allege violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the New York State Labor Law (“NYLL”), N.Y. Lab. Law § 650 et seq., claiming, inter alia, unpaid overtime. The Court previously conditionally certified the case as a collective action under the FLSA, but denied class certification of Plaintiffs' state law claims under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Now pending are two motions. First, Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that the twelve named Plaintiffs are “employees” for purposes of the FLSA (but not the NYLL), and that Eduard Slinin, president of the corporate Defendants, is individually liable under the FLSA as Plaintiffs' employer. (Docket No. 480; Mem. Law Supp. Pls.' Mot. Partial Summ. J. (Docket No. 481) (“Pls.' Mem.”) 1 & n. 7). Second, Defendants also move for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims on the ground that they are “independent contractors” for purposes of both the FLSA and the NYLL. (Docket No. 464). In the alternative, Defendants request that the Court de-certify the FLSA collective, hold that the named Plaintiffs are independent contractors, strike certain opt-in Plaintiffs, and dismiss the claims against three Defendants. (Id.; Mem. Law Supp. Defs.' Mots.: (i) Summ. J. Dismissing Pls.' FLSA & NYLL Claims; (ii) Decertify Collective Action Pursuant to Section 216(b) FLSA; (iii) Strike Plaintiffs Jose Pinto, Ismael Mejia, John M. Hidalgo & Nick Wijesinghe Or Point To Point Car & Limo Inc. (Docket No. 482) (“Defs.' Mem.”) 38).

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that all Plaintiffs in this suit—both named Plaintiffs and opt-in Plaintiffs—are independent contractors for purposes of the FLSA and the NYLL. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is granted, and the case is dismissed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts, drawn from the admissible materials submitted by the parties, are undisputed except where noted. See Vermont Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1–800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir.2004).

A. Defendants

Defendants in this lawsuit operate a “black car” business that provides ground transportation services, primarily to corporate clients in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.1 (Defs.' Counter 56.1 Statement Pls.' Statement Undisputed Material Facts Under Local Civil Rule 56.1 (Docket No. 503) (“Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement”) ¶¶ 1, 2–8; First Supplemental Decl. Michael J. Scimone Supp. Pls.' Mot. Partial Summ. J. (Docket No. 491) (“First Scimone Decl.”), Ex. A (“Civello Dep.”) 27:3–11). The business is divided into two types of corporate entities that serve distinct functions. The first group—the “CTG Defendants”—includes Corporate Transportation Group,

52 F.Supp.3d 529

Ltd. (“CTG”); Corporate Transportation Group International (“CTG International”); and Corporate Transportation Group Worldwide, Inc. (“CTG Worldwide”). The second group—the “Franchisor Defendants”—includes NYC 2 Way International, Ltd. (“NYC2Way”); AllState Private Car & Limousine, Inc. (“AllState”); Aristacar & Limousine, Ltd. (“Aristacar”); TWR Car and Limo, Ltd. (“TWR”); Excelsior Car and Limo, Inc. (“Excelsior”); and Hybrid Limo Express, Inc. (“Hybrid”).

The six Franchisor Defendants each own what is known as a “base license,” which authorizes the operation of a black car service in New York City, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (the “TLC”). (First Scimone Decl., Ex. C (“Slinin Dep.”) 12:9–13:2; see also 35 N.Y.C.R.R. § 59B). The CTG Defendants, by contrast, provide administrative support for the Franchisor Defendants by, among other things, processing drivers' payments and coordinating requests for rides between customers and drivers. (Pls.' Counter–Statement Material Facts Pursuant Local Rule 56.1(b) (Docket No. 502) (“Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement”) ¶¶ 11–13; Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 10–12; Slinin Aff. ¶¶ 6–9; Civello Dep. 37:4–39:13). Eduard Slinin is president of all corporate Defendants. (Slinin Aff. ¶ 2). He is also the sole owner of CTG, a part owner of CTG Worldwide, and at least a part owner of all Franchisor Defendants. (Slinin Dep. 7:7–11:19). His wife, Galina Slinin, is a part owner of Aristacar, TWR, Excelsior, and possibly Hybrid; the Chief Executive Officer and Principal Executive Officer of CTG Worldwide; and the Chief Executive Officer of Excelsior and Hybrid. (Slinin Dep. 9:20–11:23; Aff. Galina Slinin (Docket No. 476) ¶¶ 6–7). The only other individual with an ownership stake in any of the corporate Defendants is Eduard's brother, Mark Slinin. (Slinin Dep. 11:24–12:2).

The Franchisor Defendants establish accounts with corporate clients, enabling customers with access to an account to request a car from one of the Franchisor Defendants. (Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 49; Civello Dep. 38:13–15). They do so by telephone, a website, or a smartphone application. (Slinin Aff. ¶ 49; Civello Dep. 163:19–166:17). The accounts are solicited by salespeople who work at CTG—and, on occasion, by Eduard Slinin himself—although negotiations are conducted on behalf of the individual Franchisor Defendants. (Civello Dep. 67:12–68:22; Slinin Dep. 200:25–201:5; First Scimone Decl., Ex. B, Request Nos. 26–27).

B. The Franchisees and the Drivers

1. Franchise Agreements and Franchises

As noted, Plaintiffs are drivers for the Defendants. (For purposes of the FLSA collective, the Court authorized notice to “drivers who worked for [the Defendants] at any time since November 19, 2009.” (Docket No. 67, at 8).) The drivers are engaged by Defendants through franchising agreements. Under those agreements, the Franchisor Defendants sell or lease franchises to individuals and corporate entities (“Franchisees”); in turn, the Franchisor Defendants grant a Franchisee the right to receive fare referrals through a dispatch system (which is described in detail below). (Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 23; First Scimone Decl., Ex. E (“Kumar Dep.”) 11:24–13:8; 14:11–15; 35:24–36:5; see also id., Exs. F–W (Franchise Agreements for NYC2Way, Aristacar, and TWR); Decl. Margaret C. Thering (Docket No. 477) (“Thering Decl.”), Exs. 24–29 (excerpts of Franchise Agreements for Allstate, Aristacar, Excelsior, Hybrid,

52 F.Supp.3d 530

NYC2Way, and TWR)). Franchisees can, and often do, become drivers themselves, but they can also retain other drivers to work for them or lease or sell their franchises to others on the secondary market. (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 45–46, 48–49). If a Franchisee wishes to sell his or her franchise, the purchaser of the franchise must pay a transfer fee to the relevant Franchisor Defendant (Civello Dep. 228:1–11), and the sale must be approved, although there is some dispute as to who has authority to approve a transfer (see Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 32; Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 29–32; Pls.' Additional Statement Disputed Material Facts Pursuant Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) (Docket No. 502, at 98) (“Pls.' Statement Additional Facts”) ¶ 31).

The price of a franchise ranges from approximately $20,000 to $60,000, or a franchisor can rent a franchise for $130 to $150 per week, plus a security deposit. (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 45, 53; Slinin Aff. ¶ 22; Thering Decl., Exs. 24–27, 29). Prior to July 2012, franchise agreements ran for renewable terms of three years each; in July 2012, the agreements were amended to run for an unlimited period of time. (Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 26–27). Among the twelve named Plaintiffs in this action, eleven purchased franchises from their respective franchisors, and one (Jagjit Singh) rented his franchise from another driver. (Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 214, 219, 224, 229, 231, 235, 240, 250, 254, 258, 260, 263, 265; Second Supplemental Decl. Michael J. Scimone Supp. Pls.' Mot. Partial Summ. J. (Docket No. 492) (“Second Scimone Decl.”), Ex. WWW (Saleem); id., Ex. III (“Singh Dep.”) 49:21–24; id., Ex. ZZZ (Ali); id., Ex. KKK (“Bautista Dep.”) 24:14–25:8; id., Ex. AAAA (Bhatti); id., Ex. MMM (“Choudhary Dep.”) 17:19–24; id., Ex. NNN (“Chowdhury Dep.”) 76:18–77:4; id., Ex. OOO (“Koura Dep.”) 19:23–20:9; id., Ex....

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Saleem v. Corporate Transp. Grp., Ltd.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • September 16, 2014
    ...52 F.Supp.3d 526Mazhar SALEEM et al., Plaintiffs,v.CORPORATE TRANSPORTATION GROUP, LTD. et al., Defendants.No. 12–CV–8450 (JMF).United States District Court,S.D. New York.Signed Sept. 16, [52 F.Supp.3d 527]Adam T. Klein, Justin Mitchell Swartz, Lewis M. Steel, Michael Noah Litrownik, Michae......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT