Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 18515.

• Decision Date: 27 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. 18515.,18515.
• Citation: 32 A.3d 318,303 Conn. 276
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Ghassan SALEH v. RIBEIRO TRUCKING, LLC, et al.

303 Conn. 276

32 A.3d 318

Ghassan SALEH

v.RIBEIRO TRUCKING, LLC, et al.

No. 18515.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 7, 2011.Decided Dec. 27, 2011.

Michael Feldman, with whom was Kasey Procko Burchman, Farmington, for the appellant (named defendant).

Stephanie S. Baier, with whom, on the brief, was Richard C. Mahoney, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.

McLACHLAN, J.

In this certified appeal, we must examine the delicate balance between two of the most basic principles of our law: the constitutional right of litigants to have the jury determine the amount of damages awarded; and the trial court's broad authority to supervise the trial process. The defendant Ribeiro Trucking, LLC,¹ appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court,² which reversed the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant's motion for remittitur pursuant to General Statutes § 52–216a.³ Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 117 Conn.App. 821, 829, 982 A.2d 178 (2009). The defendant argues that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the remittitur. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Because we discuss the evidence in considerable detail later in this opinion, our initial summary of the factual background is brief. On the morning of March 28, 2003, the plaintiff, Ghassan Saleh, was driving on Interstate 91 in Hartford, when his Nissan Altima was rear-ended by a van that had been rear-ended by a tractor trailer truck owned by the defendant. The plaintiff, who complained of neck, back and shoulder pain at the scene of the accident, was brought to Hartford Hospital by ambulance. He subsequently has been treated by numerous physicians, each of whom has assigned a permanency rating, assessing various percentages of permanent impairment to each injured body part. At the time of trial five years later, the plaintiff testified that he still experienced pain in connection with his injuries from the accident. The parties “stipulated [at trial] that the plaintiff's life expectancy is 15.8 years. The defendant admitted liability for the accident. The jury returned with a verdict of $12,132.31 in economic damages and $687,868 in noneconomic damages for a total of $700,000.31 in damages.” Id., at 824, 982 A.2d 178.

The defendant subsequently filed posttrial motions seeking a new trial, an order setting aside the verdict and an order of remittitur as to the noneconomic damages. Following a hearing on the defendant's motions, the court issued a memorandum of decision, finding that the noneconomic damages awarded were excessive and ordering a remittitur of $508,608.⁴ The court found that the jury reasonably could have awarded the plaintiff $74,260 for permanent injury, and $110,000 for pain and suffering from the date of the accident on March 28, 2003 until October 2, 2006, when the plaintiff was given his permanency rating. The total award, after remittitur, was $191,392.31. Pursuant to § 52–216a, the court further ordered that if the plaintiff failed to remit the amount ordered by the court, the court would set aside the verdict and order a new trial.⁵ After the plaintiff refused to accept the remittitur, the court set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court “improperly ordered the remittitur in the absence of any reason to determine that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, shocked the sense of justice or was based on partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.” ⁶ Id., at 822, 982 A.2d 178. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the remittitur. That court concluded that the trial court improperly “attempted to attach a mathematical formula to what should have been awarded” and “refus[ed] to allow the plaintiff any compensation for his pain and suffering that occurred after he was given a permanency rating and for his future life expectancy.” Id., at 828, 982 A.2d 178. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that the Appellate Court did not accord proper deference to the trial court's determination that exceptional circumstances justified the remittitur. Specifically, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court, by failing to employ every reasonable presumption in favor of affirming the decision of the trial court, did not properly apply the abuse of discretion standard. The plaintiff responds that the Appellate Court properly “examin[ed] the evidential basis of the verdict itself” to determine whether the trial court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We agree with the plaintiff.

Our review of the trial court's grant of remittitur is dictated by, on the one hand, the high bar that must be met before a trial judge may set aside a jury verdict, and, on the other hand, the necessarily broad authority that the trial judge has to oversee the trial process. “The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin, characterized by Blackstone as the glory of the English law and the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935). We repeatedly have stated that the award of damages, in particular, “is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., 284 Conn. 645, 661, 935 A.2d 1004 (2007). For that reason, we consistently have held that a court should exercise its authority to order a remittitur rarely—only in the most exceptional of circumstances. See, e.g., Waters v. Bristol, 26 Conn. 398, 405 (1857) (declining to set aside verdict on basis of excessive damages, despite this court's view that “[t]he damages assessed are considerable, we are rather inclined to think too large”); Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495, 509 (1850) (observing that, although damages were higher than this court would have awarded, verdict should not be disturbed and court's authority to order remittitur should be exercised rarely).

In determining whether to order remittitur, the trial court is required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Wochek v. Foley, 193 Conn. 582, 587, 477 A.2d 1015 (1984). Upon completing that review, “the court should not interfere with the jury's determination except when the verdict is plainly excessive or exorbitant.... The ultimate test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether the jury's award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury [was] influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.... The court's broad power to order a remittitur should be exercised only when it is manifest that the jury [has] included items of damage which are contrary to law, not supported by proof, or contrary to the court's explicit and unchallenged instructions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., supra, 284 Conn. at 661–62, 935 A.2d 1004.

“Furthermore, [t]he decision whether to reduce a jury verdict because it is excessive as a matter of law [within the meaning of § 52–216a] rests solely within the discretion of the trial court....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 662, 935 A.2d 1004. We have explained the reason underlying the great breadth of the trial court's discretion over such matters: “There are, to be sure, sometimes, verdicts of this kind, when the trial judge is required by the interests of justice to set them aside. That such verdicts are infrequent is a tribute to the general intelligence, fairness and integrity of juries. This power of supervision and correction which the judge has over the verdict is an essential part of the jury system. It tends to make jurors more careful in reaching their conclusions, and gives confidence to all suitors that the finding of a jury will not be affected by any improper motives. Trial by jury, in the primary and usual sense of the term at the common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a trial by a jury of twelve [persons] before an officer vested with authority to cause them to be summoned and empanelled, to administer oaths to them and to the constable in charge, and to enter judgment and issue execution on their verdict; but it is a trial by a jury of twelve [persons], in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Howe v. Raymond, 74 Conn. 68, 71–72, 49 A. 854 (1901). Although Howe involved a trial court's decision to set aside a verdict as against the evidence, the same general principles apply to a trial court's decision to order a remittitur. “[Consequently], the proper standard of review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to set aside a verdict as excessive as a matter of law is that of an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., supra, 284 Conn. at 662, 935 A.2d 1004. Accordingly, “the ruling of the trial court on the motion to set aside the verdict as excessive is entitled to great weight and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We acknowledge that the “shocks the sense of justice” standard provides vague guidance at best—due, in part, to the uncertain limits of...