Salem Community School Corp. v. Richman

• Decision Date: 17 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. 2-876-A-282,2-876-A-282
• Citation: 406 N.E.2d 269
• Parties: SALEM COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION et al., Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Melvin RICHMAN, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 269

406 N.E.2d 269

SALEM COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION et al., Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Melvin RICHMAN, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 2-876-A-282.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Second District.

June 17, 1980.

Slagle & Shirey, Wayne A. Shirey, Richard A. Dailey, Muncie, Howard J. DeTrude, Jr., Peter G. Tamulonis, Kightlinger, Young, Gray & DeTrude, Indianapolis, for appellants.

Robert W. Rund, Indianapolis, for amicus curiae, Indiana School Boards Ass'n.

William M. Evans, Bose, McKinney & Evans, Indianapolis, Frank C. Massey, Muncie, for appellee.

BUCHANAN, Chief Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a consolidated appeal from an action brought by Melvin Richman (Richman) against the Salem Community School Corporation (School Board) for breach of his employment contract, the School Board claiming adequate notice was given of termination of his employment as Superintendent and Richman claiming damages awarded were inadequate.

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

The trial court found, inter alia, these facts:

1. That plaintiff is now and at all times involved in this litigation has been a permanent-tenure teacher licensed in Social Studies Option I, Health Education and Driver Training, also holding lifetime licenses as principal and superintendent.

2. That plaintiff was first employed as a teacher by defendant school in 1954 and remained with defendant until July 1, 1974 as teacher, assistant principal, high school principal and superintendent.

3. That on July 1, 1971 the parties entered into a contract whereby plaintiff was employed by defendant as Superintendent of its schools for a period of three (3) years at a salary of Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) per year.

4. That at a regular meeting of defendant's Board of Directors, held December 27, 1973, it was determined that plaintiff's contract not be renewed, and a member of the Board so notified plaintiff on said day by telephone as requested by plaintiff.

5. That plaintiff immediately requested an explanation of the Board's decision and it was agreed that an informal meeting of the Board be held in plaintiff's office the following morning; that the meeting was in fact held and some comments exchanged, it being the stated concensus (sic) of the Board that plaintiff had held his position long enough and that a change was in order (and would be for the better).

6. That during the meeting plaintiff was handed a sheet of paper on which two (2) of the board members had made notation of the vote taken at the meeting of December 27, 1973 regarding non-renewal of plaintiff's contract; that plaintiff placed the writing where it would be available to the clerk-secretary for her use in preparing the formal minutes of the December 27, 1973 meeting, this being the general procedure when the clerk-secretary was not in attendance at board meetings.

7. That at the close of the informal meeting of December 28, 1973 plaintiff requested the Board to reconsider its decision and was advised by a board member that the Board would do so.

8. That the Board, however, did not reconsider its decision although on two (2) occasions in 1974 it accepted petitions from school patrons and heard similar requests voiced by school patrons at board meetings, that it reconsider the non-renewal of plaintiff's contract.

9. That on or about August 20, 1974 defendant offered plaintiff a teaching position for the school year 1974-75 at an annual salary of Thirteen Thousand Fifty Dollars ($13,050.00), which offer plaintiff declined.

10. That plaintiff, during 1974-75, sought employment among several school corporations as superintendent, but did not obtain such employment until 1975 for the 1975-76 school year, which employment was for an annual salary of Twenty-one Thousand Dollars ($21,000.00).

In October of 1974 Richman filed his complaint in the Delaware Superior Court claiming breach of his employment contract by the School Board. Judgment was rendered in favor of Richman with the trial court finding that the School Board was in breach of Richman's employment contract but that the damages Richman sought must be reduced because of his failure to mitigate them.

Cross-appeals followed.

ISSUES

The School Board presents two issues for review:

(A) Was Richman given notice of non-renewal of his contract pursuant to Ind.Code 20-6-4-4, or at least in substantial compliance therewith? and

(B) Did Richman waive his right to statutory notice? ¹

Richman presents one issue for review:

(C) Were the damages properly calculated.

DECISION

ISSUE A Was Richman given proper written notice of non-renewal of his contract pursuant to Ind.Code 20-6-4-4, or in substantial compliance thereto.

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS The School Board contends that Richman received adequate written notice of the non-renewal of his contract prior to January 1, 1974, as a result of delivery to him (on December 28, 1973) of the notation of the School Board's vote on December 27, 1973.

Richman replies that he did not receive adequate notice in any form of the non-renewal of his contract and therefore by statute his contract was extended for another twelve months.

CONCLUSION The School Board did not comply with the notice statute and therefore Richman was not properly notified of the non-renewal of his contract as Superintendent.

The controlling statute leaves no room for doubt. Ind.Code 20-6-4-4, ² specifically provides that If, prior to the end of any contractual period, the governing body of the school corporation does not wish to renew the contract of the superintendent, notice shall be given to the superintendent in writing delivered in person or by registered mail on or before January 1st of the calendar year in which the contract is due to expire. Failure to give such notice shall be construed to be an extension of the contract of the superintendent for a period of twelve (12) months following the end of the current contractual period.

(hereinafter the Statute). (emphasis added).

There was considerable conflict in the evidence as to the events surrounding non-renewal of Richman's contract, but the trial court weighed the evidence and found notice of non-renewal was insufficient:

In the instant case, however, there was no written notice directed to plaintiff and delivered to him, as such. The writing in question was an informal record of a vote taken at the board meeting and was intended for the use of the secretary in her preparation of the formal minutes; nor was the writing delivered to plaintiff by registered mail.

This finding has support in the evidence. We are bound thereby. ³

The sheet of paper handed to Richman was hardly a definitive and unmistakable statement to him that the School Board was not going to renew his contract for the following year. It was a record of the vote taken by the School Board on the issue of renewal of his contract. ⁴ It was not addressed to him, i. e., it was not "notice . . . to the superintendent . . .". It did not state to him in unequivocable terms that the Board would not renew his contract and that this informal record of the vote taken was notice to him of that fact, as required by the Statute. The trial court found that there was no intent on the part of the School Board that the notation should, in fact, serve as notice of non-renewal to Richman inasmuch as the sole purpose for compiling and retaining the notation was for use by the secretary in typing the minutes of the School Board meeting. ⁵

So we conclude, as did the trial court, that under these facts, the mere delivery of a notation of a vote contained in the handwritten minutes of a School Board meeting is not the final, formal, and unequivocal "notice" required by the Statute.

But was there substantial compliance with the Statute? Indiana courts have held that if legal notice is required by statute, there may be compliance if the action intended to provide notice substantially satisfies the requirements of the statute. Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis (1970), 253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225; Tepe v. Greubel (1968), 143 Ind.App. 7, 237 N.E.2d 265. If the notice which the party receives achieves the purpose for which the statute was intended the courts will find substantial compliance with the statute. Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, supra; Tepe v. Greubel, supra.

The purposes which the Statute seeks to attain are apparent:

1. To provide seasonable notice of non-renewal, and

2. To obviate potential controversies which may arise if notice of non-renewal had not been formally, officially and conclusively given.

The Indiana Supreme Court in State ex rel. Sights v. Edwards (1949), 228 Ind. 13, 88 N.E.2d 763, 89 N.E.2d 443 (opinion on rehearing), dealt with a similar statute providing for notice of non-renewal in teaching contracts. The facts were somewhat different in that the teacher in Sights was personally delivered a letter of contract non-renewal which she refused to accept or read. But the court indicated the notice must be positive and unequivocal:

The language used in the notice presented to relator clearly and unmistakably indicated the purpose of the trustee not to renew relator's contract for the succeeding year. It is susceptible of no different meaning, and we hold it was sufficient to make known to relator that her teaching contract would not be renewed, and that she is not entitled to reinstatement.

288 Ind. at 20, 88 N.E.2d at 765.

The trial court recognized the purposes of the Statute in stating in its judgment that:

If the Legislature intended only that a superintendent be informed before a date certain of the Board's decision not to renew his contract, it would be simple enough to say so and the specific requirements (of the Statute) could be forgotten. It is the opinion of this Court that the Legislature provided the means of notification precisely to avoid the kind of situation which is now before us, in which both parties, acting in good faith...