Sales v. Maupin

• Decision Date: 15 March 1915
• Docket Number: 3730
• Parties: FRED SALES, Plaintiff and respondent, v. CHARLES A. MAUPIN and Fred Haenen, Defendants, and C. R. Reynolds, Defendant and appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

35 S.D. 176, 151 N.W. 427 (1915)

FRED SALES,

Plaintiff and respondent,

v. CHARLES A. MAUPIN and Fred Haenen,

Defendants,

and C. R. Reynolds,

Defendant and appellant.

South Dakota Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dewey County, SD

Hon. Raymond R. Dillman, Judge

#3730--Affirmed

P. C. Hvistendahl

Attorney for Appellant.

J. E. Truesdale

Attorney for Respondent.

Opinion filed March 15, 1915

POLLEY, J.

This action is brought to recover damages for the conversion of a horse. Respondent had a verdict for $156.65, and appellant's motion for a new trial is based upon the sole ground of alleged misconduct of the jury in arriving at said verdict.

It is claimed by appellant: That the verdict is what is known as a "quotient" verdict, and, in support of his motion, he read the affidavits of three members of the jury, to the effect that, in arriving at their verdict, each juror secretly set down the amount he considered said horse to be worth. That said amounts were then added together and the sum divided by 12. That the quotient so found was to be the value of the horse, and the amount of damages to which respondent was entitled for the conversion thereof. That it was agreed and understood by each juror, before he set down said amount, that one-twelfth of the sum of said amounts was to be the value of said horse, and that affiants were thereby induced to assent to said amount. These affidavits are, in substance, similar to the affidavit set out in Long v. Collins, 12 S.D. 621, 82 N.W. 95. In that case the affidavit was undisputed and was held to state sufficient cause for a new trial, and, if the statements contained in the affidavits under consideration were unchallenged by respondent we should feel constrained to uphold appellant's contention; but, in speaking of this method of arriving at a verdict, the court, in that case, said:

"Had the method been adopted merely to ascertain what each juror considered reasonable, and each juror reserved to himself the right to afterwards object, should he think it unreasonable, an honest expression of opinion free from hazard, chance, or lot might afterwards be obtained, and in such a case the verdict should stand. But a verdict reached pursuant to an agreement of all the jurors, made prior to aggregating the several amounts, and dividing the same by 12, is the result of chance and self-imposed coercion, foreclosing deliberation and interchange of views."

From this it appears that it is not the mere fact that the verdict is the result of a compromise, or that it was arrived at by taking the average of each juror's estimate of the amount of damages that should be awarded, that constitutes the misconduct on the part of a jury, but it is the agreement and the understanding that was had by the jurors before the average was ascertained that the amount so ascertained should be the final verdict of the jury. If an...