Salgado v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
| Decision Date | 29 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-6293,86-6293 |
| Citation | 823 F.2d 1322 |
| Parties | 48 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 546, 43 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,270, 4 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1240 Eduardo SALGADO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY; Arco Seed Company, Inc.; Anthony "Tony" Edmondson; Miguel "Mike" Yslava; W.H. "Bud" Sands; and Does I Through XX, Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Ann M. Smith, San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Lawrence A. Michaels, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
Before ANDERSON, SKOPIL, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.
Eduardo Salgado ("Salgado") appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment on his age discrimination claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA" or "The Act") and his state common law causes of action in this employment discrimination case. The district court held that the state common law causes of action were preempted by the Act and the age discrimination claim was barred by the Act's one-year time limit. We reverse and remand.
This is an action for wrongful termination based on violations of state and federal age discrimination laws and other state common law theories brought by Salgado against his former employer, Arco Seed Company; its parent corporation, Atlantic Richfield Company; his former supervisors; and others (hereinafter collectively "the Company").
October 13, 1983 Salgado filed a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleging
harassment. The EEOC automatically
filed the complaint with
the California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing ("the
Department") under the agencies
"work sharing" agreement
October 24, 1983 The Department issued a "right-to-sue"
letter indicating that "(a)ny
court action must be taken within
one year of the date of this notice."
Cal. Gov't Code Sec. 12965(b) (West
1987). The letter also stated that
the EEOC would be responsible for
the investigation and evaluation of
the merits of his complaint and that
the Department was closing its case
on the basis of "processing waived
to another agency."
November 7, 1983 Salgado filed a letter with the EEOC
alleging continued harassment and
retaliation for filing his original
complaint
November 30, 1983 Salgado advised the EEOC, by letter
of his indefinite suspension without
pay effective November 28, 1983
December 2, 1983 Salgado was terminated. This was
reported to the EEOC
January 16, 1984 EEOC conducted a fact finding
conference on Salgado's charge. The
Company was present.
January 31, 1984 The Company provided the EEOC
with documents in defense of its
position.
May 9, 1984 An EEOC representative conducted
an on-site inspection of the Company's
facility in its investigation of
Salgado's complaint.
July 31, 1984 The EEOC issued its "right-to-sue"
letter.
November 30, 1984 Salgado filed a civil action in Imperial
County Superior Court for age
discrimination. In his complaint,
Salgado also alleged five state common
law causes of action: wrongful
and retaliatory termination, breach
of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. This action was filed
one year and thirty-seven days after
the issuance of the California
Department of Fair Employment and
Housing's right-to-sue letter.
January 16, 1985 The Company removed the action to
federal district court on the basis
that Salgado charged a violation of
the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. The district court
exercised pendent jurisdiction over
Salgado's state common law claims
and state age discrimination claim.
April 29, 1986 The Company filed a Notice of Motion
and Motion for Summary Judgment
on each of Salgado's state
causes of action.
May 2, 1986 Salgado filed a Notice of Motion and
Motion for Leave to Voluntarily Dismiss
his federal age discrimination
claims with prejudice (Fed.R.Civ.P.
41(a)(2)) and for remand of his
pendent state claims.
June 9, 1986 A district court order was entered
granting the Company's motion for
summary judgment on each of Salgado's
state causes of action. Salgado
withdrew his motion for leave to
voluntarily dismiss his federal
claims.
June 26, 1986 Salgado applied to the district court
for reconsideration of his motions,
asking the district court to rescind
its order granting the Company summary
judgment on his state law
causes of action; to grant him leave
to voluntarily dismiss his federal
claims; and to remand the state law
causes of action.
July 14, 1986 The court denied Salgado's application
for reconsideration. Salgado
moved to dismiss his federal age
discrimination claims with prejudice.
The Company orally stipulated to the
dismissal which the court granted.
July 25, 1986 The court entered its final judgment
dismissing Salgado's federal age
discrimination claims with prejudice
and delaring his five state common
law causes of action were preemped
by the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act and his state age
discrimination claim was barred by
the Act's one-year time limit.
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1986) (citing Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir.1983)).
Initially, the issue to be addressed is whether California Government Code Sec. 12965(b)'s 1 one-year time limit for filing a civil action is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling. If this one-year time period is a statute of limitations, noncompliance may be excused by the "equitable tolling" doctrine. Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.1986), amended by 815 F.2d 570 (9th Cir.1987). If, on the other hand, the time period is a jurisdictional prerequisite, this equitable doctrine does not apply and noncompliance will divest the court of jurisdiction to hear the case. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392, 398, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1131, 1135, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); Valenzuela, 801 F.2d at 1172. There is no direct authority construing this particular state statute's one-year time period. However, there is a trend toward finding time limits placed on filing court actions or other similar filing periods to be statutes of limitations rather than jurisdictional prerequisites. See, e.g., Zipes, 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. at 1127 (); Valenzuela, 801 F.2d at 1174 (); Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support, 785 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.1986) (). We find the analysis and reasoning in these cases persuasive. Therefore, we hold the one-year filing period from the issuance of a right-to-sue letter by the Department to be a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling.
Salgado clearly filed his civil action more than one year after the Department issued him a right-to-sue letter. We must, therefore, determine whether the facts in this case support the application of equitable tolling to Sec. 12965(b)'s one-year statute of limitations. "To determine whether equitable tolling is available in a particular case we examine 'whether congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations in given circumstances.' " Valenzuela, 801 F.2d at 1174 (quoting Burnett v. New York Central Railroad, 380 U.S. 424, 427, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 1054, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965)). We conclude that the EEOC's investigation of Salgado's claims, under the work sharing agreement with the Department, tolled the running of the one-year time period. This statute of limitation was tolled until July 31, 1984 when the EEOC completed its investigation and issued its right-to-sue letter.
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