Salinas v. State, 04-01-00244-CR.

Decision Date22 May 2002
Docket NumberNo. 04-01-00244-CR.,04-01-00244-CR.
Citation88 S.W.3d 677
PartiesMinnie SALINAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Anne More Burnham, The Law Offices of Anne Burnham, San Antonio, for appellant.

Kevin P. Yeary, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, for appellee.

Sitting: PHIL HARDBERGER, Chief Justice, CATHERINE STONE, Justice and SANDEE BRYAN MARION, Justice.

Opinion by SANDEE BRYANMARION, Justice.

A jury found the defendant, Minnie Salinas, guilty of murder and assessed punishment at fifty years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. In seven issues on appeal, the defendant asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the verdict, the State used improper identification methods, evidence regarding her alibi should have been suppressed, and her sentence was determined in violation of the United States and Texas constitutions. We overrule all issues on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In her fourth and fifth issues on appeal, the defendant asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support her conviction. The defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to show that she was the person who shot and killed Velia Guevara, and that her conviction was the result of impermissible stacking of inference upon inference.

When considering a legal sufficiency challenge, this court must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found all of the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim.App.1999). We evaluate all the evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, whether admissible or inadmissible. Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. In our review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence and we will set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). We must defer to the factfinder, and may find the evidence factually insufficient only where necessary to prevent manifest injustice. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407. In both sufficiency reviews, the trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences and is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to give their testimony. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The standard of review is the same in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

In a prosecution based on circumstantial evidence, it is not required that every fact point directly and independently to the guilt of the accused; the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances may be sufficient. Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex.Crim. App.1994). However, when conducting a legal sufficiency review, a vital fact may not be established by stacking inference upon inference. Richardson v. State, 834 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh'g). A jury's inference of intent is afforded more deference than the evidence supporting proof of conduct. Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Circumstantial evidence of a defendant's guilty knowledge need not meet the same rigorous criteria for sufficiency as circumstantial proof of other offensive elements. Id. This court is not required to find the defendant's intent to its own satisfaction. Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 476 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). It is enough for us to find that "any" rational jury could have so found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Velia Guevara was murdered on May 26, 1993; the murder weapon, a nine millimeter gun, was never found. The defendant and Velia's husband, Jim Guevara, had begun an affair three days before Jim married Velia. The affair lasted throughout the Guevaras' marriage. Eventually, defendant grew weary of waiting for Jim to leave his wife, as he had promised on several occasions. Defendant gave him an ultimatum: chose her or Velia by June or July 1993.

The Guevaras lived in the Contour Place Apartments, apartment number 424. Allen Galloway had an office in a building across from the Guevaras' apartment. On the day before Velia's murder, Galloway's housekeeper told him about a car that had been sitting outside on Contour Street. When he went outside to investigate, the car drove off as he walked toward it. The car was white and had an Enterprise Rent-A-Car logo with the letter "E" on its bumper. Galloway identified the defendant as the driver. He said the defendant seemed to be looking intently at building number four of the apartments. After the defendant drove away, Galloway went to his own car, and as he walked to his car, he saw defendant drive back to the same spot he first saw her car. He noticed the car go back and forth for about an hour.

The records kept by Enterprise Rent-A-Car indicate the defendant rented three cars. The first car was a white Ford Tempo, rented on May 20, 1993. On the day of the murder, the defendant traded the Tempo for a white Ford Escort. Later that same day, she traded the Escort for a red Chevrolet Baretta. The defendant had reported her car as stolen, but when the police recovered her car it showed no damage from a forced entry.

On the day of the murder, Jim played golf with a former co-worker. He was away from the apartment from early in the morning until about 4:00 p.m., when he returned to the apartment to find his wife dead.

Kathleen Cadena, property manager at the Guevaras' apartment complex, arrived at work at about 8:00 a.m. on the day of the murder. At about 8:45 a.m., a woman later identified as the defendant came to the office door, stood outside the door, and then left. Sometime before 9:00 a.m., Cadena received a call from the answering service, which reported that a male caller had said a black Mazda in the back parking lot had its lights on. The caller said the car belonged to the resident in apartment 424. At 9:15 a.m., Cadena received a call from a female caller, who said a black car in the back parking lot had its lights on.

Shelley Georgiu, the leasing agent, arrived at the apartment offices around 9:30 a.m. About five minutes after she arrived, she answered a call from a woman who said a black Mazda in the back parking lot had its lights on. George Garza, the maintenance supervisor, told Georgiu that Velia had a black Mazda, so Georgiu left a message for Velia on the Guevaras' answering machine. Velia returned the call almost immediately to say she had been in the shower, but she would check her car.

In the meantime, the defendant returned to the apartment offices to ask if she could use a telephone. She was offered a telephone in the offices, but she declined because she wanted to use a pay phone. The defendant walked out the backdoor, towards a pay phone. Shortly after the defendant left, Velia arrived in the office to say her car lights were not on. She thanked the people in the office and left through the backdoor. At around 9:30 a.m., Galloway saw Velia walking her dog. Both Galloway and Garza later saw the dog, who was always kept on its leash, wandering about on its own.

Jim Guevara found his wife's body at about 4:00 p.m. The police did not begin a burglary investigation because there was no sign of forced entry into the apartment, the apartment was relatively neat, and several items of value were still in the apartment. The medical examiner estimated Velia died from three gunshot wounds to the abdomen sometime between 10 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. The time of death was not released until after the autopsy.

The investigation uncovered a box of fifty-nine millimeter shell casings, one casing on the apartment couch, and three nine millimeter bullets (one from Velia's body) in the apartment. Three nine millimeter casings were found in Jim's car. Ballistics evidence showed the casing from the apartment couch, two casings from Jim's car, and thirty of the casings in the box of fifty were all fired from the same gun.

On the day before the murder and the day of the murder, the electronic entrance system at USAA, the defendant's employer, showed that the defendant twice used her access card to gain entry to the building, but the system did not show her exiting the building between the two entries. On the day of the murder, the electronic system showed defendant entering the USAA building at 6:41 a.m. and again at 10:42 a.m., the first "exit" shown on the system was at 12:16 p.m.

Following the murder, the defendant spoke to two friends, both of whom testified at trial about the conversations. The defendant admitted to both friends she was not at work when Velia was shot. However, she asked Perla Ostos to tell the police that she (Ostos) had called the defendant at work. The defendant told both women she had Jim's nine millimeter gun. Conversations with both friends indicated the defendant knew when Velia had been murdered, although that information had not yet been released to the public.

A few years after the murder, defendant attempted to alter her medical records to show she had been at the doctor's office when Velia was murdered.

We conclude that the above evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the verdict, and we overrule defendant's fourth and fifth issues.

DEFENDANT'S SENTENCING

In her first, second, and third issues, the defendant asserts her punishment was assessed in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, sections 6 and 7 of the Texas Constitution.

Defendant...

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  • Green v. State, No. 09-07-00568-CR (Tex. App. 4/1/2009), 09-07-00568-CR.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 1, 2009
    ...from the evidence and is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and of the weight to give to their testimony. Salinas v. State, 88 S.W.3d 677, 680 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (citing Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 647-49). The reviewing court "must be cognizant of the fact that a......
  • Guevara v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • January 28, 2009
    ...middle name, "Bronte," was pregnant with Guevara's child. Salinas was later charged and found guilty of murdering Velia. See Salinas v. State, 88 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 2002, no pet.). She was sentenced to fifty years of imprisonment and assessed a $10,000 fine. Id. Guevara......
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    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 27, 2008
    ...that." We conclude defendant waived any error by acquiescing to the court's assurance Ginn's testimony would be limited. See Salinas v. State, 88 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (any error waived by defense counsel's acquiescence in court's decision). Thus, the issue w......
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    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 26, 2018
    ...to preserve error. We disagree. "Almost every right, constitutional or statutory, may be waived by a failure to object." Salinas v. State, 88 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (citing Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). Moreover, the Court of Cri......
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