Salisbury v. Stone

• Decision Date: 23 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-66-A.,84-66-A.
• Citation: 518 A.2d 1355
• Parties: Dennis J. SALISBURY v. Walter E. STONE et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

518 A.2d 1355

Dennis J. SALISBURY v. Walter E. STONE et al.

No. 84-66-A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

December 23, 1986.

Edward J. Mulligan, Pawtucket, Vincent C. Fay, Cranston, for plaintiff.

Stephen J. Reid, Jr. (Powers and McAndrew, Inc.), Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case comes before us on appeal from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court against the plaintiff in his suit to recover damages from the defendant for the defendant's allegedly unlawful termination of the Plaintiff's employment. We affirm. The facts as revealed in the pleadings, the plaintiff's affidavit, and other designated discovery documents are as follows.

On September 9, 1981, plaintiff, Dennis J. Salisbury, filed a complaint in the Superior or Court against defendant, Walter E. Stone, in his capacity as superintendent of the Division of State Police for the State of Rhode Island.¹ In his complaint, Salisbury stated that he had been hired in March 1979 to serve as supervisor of the Rhode Island Law Enforcement Telecommunication Unit, an unclassified civil service position within the Division of State Police. Salisbury further stated that he served as supervisor of the telecommunication unit until Stone dismissed him from that position on July 25, 1980. Asserting that his dismissal was unlawful, Salisbury sought relief under three counts. In count 1 of the complaint, Salisbury claimed that under applicable law and by virtue of implied contract, he possessed a property interest in and a reasonable expectation of entitlement to continued employment and that in dismissing him, Stone violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and 1988 (the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as amended), the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Rhode Island Constitution. In count 2 of the complaint, Salisbury claimed that his employment contract with the state contained an implied covenant of good faith and that in dismissing him in bad faith, Stone breached the employment contract. Finally, in count 3 of the complaint, Salisbury claimed that he was not informed of the reasons for his dismissal or given a pre- or postdismissal hearing and appeal and that in dismissing him in this manner, Stone violated fundamental principles of public policy and thereby tortiously breached Salisbury's employment contract.

Stone filed an answer, admitting Salisbury's dismissal without a hearing but denying Salisbury's claim to a property interest in continued employment as well as his claim of a bad-faith dismissal without just cause or without explanation and opportunity to respond. Ultimately, Stone moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing in his memorandum that as an unclassified state employee serving at the pleasure of his appointing authority, Salisbury failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.²

Salisbury opposed Stone's motion, arguing in his memorandum that he was a permanent employee with a property interest in continued employment, that in justifying his dismissal for the "good of the service" Stone was required but failed to establish a valid legal cause, and that in dismissing him in bad faith without a hearing and in a manner injurious to his reputation, Stone violated state and federal laws.³ To support his arguments, Salisbury stated in an affidavit filed with his memorandum that his acceptance of the State Police position was induced by promises of permanent employment for the duration of the telecommunication program. It was his understanding, he further stated, that he could be dismissed only for cause. Maintaining that one month prior to his dismissal his immediate superior praised his work, Salisbury asserted that his dismissal for the "good of the service" was surprising and raised suspicions, provable only now, that nepotism motivated Stone's act. The affidavit also declared that dismissal for the "good of the service" was a stigma that injured his reputation and deterred subsequent employment. According to Salisbury, he was unable to remove this stigma because Stone refused to provide not only him but also his prospective employers with any clarifying reasons for the dismissal. In addition to this affidavit, Salisbury also filed with his memorandum discovery documents, the significance of which for this appeal lay in their descriptions of Salisbury's position as an unclassified state position.

In light of the extraneous documents filed by Salisbury, the trial justice treated Stone's motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment pursuant to Rules 12(c) and 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Deciding the motion on the basis of the submitted memoranda, the trial justice held that the pleadings, taken together with Salisbury's affidavit and construed in the light most favorable to Salisbury, did not present a genuine issue of material fact. In the absence of a genuine factual dispute, the trial justice further held that Stone was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, the trial justice found that since all members of the State Police serve as unclassified employees by statute and since Salisbury, in his complaint, described his position as an unclassified position within the state system, there was no factual dispute regarding Salisbury's status as an unclassified state employee who, as a matter of law, serves at the pleasure of his appointing authority without a cognizable property interest in continued employment. The trial justice also found that since Salisbury's employment contract did not contain a termination date, there was no factual dispute surrounding Salisbury's employment under an indefinite-term contract, which is terminable, as a matter of law, at any time by either party with or without cause. According to the trial justice, even if Salisbury's reputation was harmed by his dismissal, as alleged, such harm did not create a right to continued employment; nor did Stone's positing Salisbury's dismissal upon the "good of the service" require Stone to justify the dismissal with a valid legal cause. Accordingly, the trial justice held that since Salisbury lacked a property interest in continued employment based in state law and did not allege a denial of equal protection of the law motivated by racial or other suspect class discrimination, he failed to state any grounds supporting his state and federal claims for relief.⁴

Before this court, Salisbury argues that the trial justice erred not only in finding no factual dispute regarding his employment status but also in finding as a matter of law that he could be terminated without cause, without a hearing, and without clarification to prevent injury to his reputation.

We begin this review of the summary judgment entered against Salisbury by noting that our standards of review are the same standards that govern an initial entry of summary judgment. Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219, 1220 (R.I. 1985); Ardente v. Horan, 117 R.I. 254, 257, 366 A.2d 162, 164 (1976). Thus, this court will uphold a summary judgment order only when our examination of the pleadings, affidavits, and other discovery materials, in a light most favorable to the opposing party, reveals no genuine issue of material fact and when our review of the relevant law reveals that the moving party is entitled, as a matter of law, to judgment. Barratt, 492 A.2d at 1220; Ardente, 117 R.I. at 254, 366 A.2d at 164. If the moving party establishes grounds for judgment, the opposing party, who counters that there is a material factual dispute, cannot succeed by merely reasserting the allegations or denials of the pleadings but instead must set forth specific facts that would constitute a genuine issue for resolution at trial. Nedder v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 459 A.2d 960, 962 (R.I. 1983); Ardente, 117 R.I. at 257, 366 A.2d at 164. In setting forth specific grounds to establish a factual dispute, the opposing party must present evidence of a substantial nature predicated on more than mere conclusory statements. Gallo v. National Nursing Homes, Inc., 106 R.I. 485, 489, 261 A.2d 19, 21-22 (1970).

I

Applying these standards of review, we first consider whether Salisbury established the existence of a material factual dispute requiring resolution at trial.

Since state employees are granted by statute termination rights that vary according to their employment within either the classified or the unclassified service system, Salisbury's status within one or the other system is a material fact, over which a genuine dispute would preclude a grant of summary judgment. Salisbury, however, did not dispute that he was employed within the unclassified system. To the contrary, in his complaint, Salisbury described his position as an unclassified civil service position within the Division of State Police. Thus, under the rule that facts admitted in the pleadings are held as true against the pleader, L.T. Huddon, Inc. v. Swarovski America Ltd., 510 A.2d 158, 159 (R.I. 1986); State of Rhode Island v. Piedmont Funding Corp., 119 R.I. 695, 699, 382 A.2d 819, 822 (1978), Salisbury effectively removed his status as an unclassified employee from the area of controversy. That there can be no question of Salisbury's status as an unclassified employee is established not only by Salisbury's admission in the pleadings but by statutory authority as well. Under G.L. 1956 (1984 Reenactment) § 36-4-2(16) all members of the Division of State Police are employed within the state's unclassified service system.

While failing to dispute his unclassified status, Salisbury contends that his statement alleging the existence of preemployment promises of permanent employment continuing for the duration of the telecommunication project creates a factual issue, resolvable only by a factfinder at trial. In advancing this contention,...