Salkil v. Mount Sterling Township Police Dept., 05-3051.

Citation458 F.3d 520
Decision Date15 August 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-3051.,05-3051.
PartiesJeffrey Alan SALKIL, Plaintiff, Kimberly M. Skaggs; Equal Justice Foundation, Appellants, v. MOUNT STERLING TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants, Village of Mt. Sterling, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

ARGUED: Richard S. Walinski, Cooper & Walinski, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellants. Tabitha D. Justice, Subashi, Wildermuth & Ballato, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Richard S. Walinski, Cooper & Walinski, Toledo, Ohio, Kimberly M. Skaggs, Equal Justice Foundation, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. Tabitha D. Justice, Lynnette P. Ballato, Subashi, Wildermuth & Ballato, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: RYAN, CLAY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GILMAN, J., joined.

RYAN, J. (pp. 532-36), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Kimberly Skaggs ("Skaggs") and Equal Justice Foundation ("EJF"), appeal an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, sanctioning them pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and awarding Defendant, Village of Mt. Sterling ("the Village"), attorneys' fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The district court imposed sanctions and attorneys' fees on Skaggs and the EJF for Skaggs' conduct as an attorney for Jeffrey Alan Salkil in his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because we find the district court rendered its decision under a clear misapprehension of Skaggs' conduct, as well as with the benefit of hindsight, we hold that the district court abused its discretion and REVERSE the order of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Salkil's Arrest and Incarceration

The events in this case arise out of Plaintiff Jeffrey Alan Salkil's ("Salkil") arrest and subsequent 53 day incarceration in Mt. Sterling, Ohio. On October 1, 2000, Patrolman M. Stone of the Mt. Sterling Township Police Department arrested Salkil for operating a motor vehicle under the influence ("OMVI"), improper backing, leaving the scene of an accident, and a seat belt violation. Stone placed Salkil in the Madison County jail, where Salkil allegedly refused to submit to a urinalysis test. Because of Salkil's alleged refusal to submit to testing, his driver's license was suspended pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 4511.191.

Salkil was arraigned the next day. At the arraignment, Salkil completed an affidavit of indigency and requested that the court appoint him counsel. The court denied Salkil's request for appointment of counsel, however, finding that Salkil was not indigent because of his employment with a sports equipment company. Salkil then informed the court that because of the arrest and incarceration, he no longer had a job. The judge thus instructed Salkil to file a new affidavit of indigency, stating that he had no income.

After the arraignment, Salkil was returned to the Madison County jail. Although the court had set bail at $1350, Salkil was unable to post the requisite bail bond. The municipal court would not accept Salkil's debit card, and no local bail bondsman would assist Salkil because he was not an Ohio resident. Consequently, Salkil was forced to remain in jail.

Salkil remained in jail without access to counsel for a full month and a half. According to Salkil, he was unable to timely file a new affidavit of indigency as instructed by the court because the jail guards refused to give him the proper forms, despite his repeated requests. On November 1, 2000, Salkil completed and filed an affidavit of indigency and the court appointed Shirley Hangsen as his counsel. Hangsen met with Salkil for the first time midway through November. Finally, on November 22, 2000, after Salkil had spent 53 days in prison, he was released on his own recognizance.

Thereafter, Hangsen negotiated a plea agreement with the Village of Mt. Sterling's prosecutor, Mark Pistick. Pistick agreed to drop all charges against Salkil in exchange for Salkil's agreement to release the Village from all liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to Salkil, Hangsen informed him that the Village would not agree to any plea unless Salkil released the Village from liability and that the release was standard practice. Against Hangsen's advice, Salkil refused to agree to the release.

Despite Salkil's refusal to agree to the release, Hangsen sent a joint order of dismissal signed by Pistick to the court. On January 22, 2001, the municipal court entered an order dismissing all charges against Salkil. The order contained a finding, agreed upon during the plea negotiations, that no probable cause existed for the OMVI. That finding was necessary to terminate the suspension on Salkil's license. Ohio Rev.Code § 4511.191(H)(1)(a). For reasons unclear from the record, however, the suspension on Salkil's license was never terminated.

Sometime after the order was entered, Pistick learned that Salkil had not agreed to the release. Nonetheless, Pistick did not reinstate the charges. Salkil claims that he did not learn of the dismissal until December of 2001, and that prior to that time, he assumed that plea negotiations were ongoing because he would not agree to the release. Consequently, Salkil remained without a valid driver's license.

B. Salkil's § 1983 Action

On January 31, 2002, Salkil filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court alleging false arrest, abuse of process, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, legal malpractice, and various constitutional claims. Salkil named the following parties as defendants: (1) Mt. Sterling Township Police Department and patrolman Stone; (2) Madison County Municipal Court and municipal court judge David R. Pickens; (3) Madison County Sheriff's Department and officers Lilly, Creamer, Liska, and Cochran; (4) Madison County Jail and corrections officer Lawrence; (5) Mt. Sterling Village Solicitor's Officer and prosecutor Mark J. Pistick; (6) the law firm of Tanner, Matthewson and Hangsen, and its partner Shirley Hangsen; and (7) the State of Ohio. Discovery and numerous motions to dismiss ensued.

On March 4, 2003, approximately one year after the commencement of the action, Skaggs, Executive Director of the EJF, entered her first appearance on behalf of Salkil. That same day, Skaggs moved to amend Salkil's complaint and eliminate Salkil's claims against all but two Defendants: the Village of Mt. Sterling and the Mt. Sterling Township Police Department. The district court initially denied the motion to amend the complaint, but shortly thereafter, sua sponte requested that Skaggs file a statement setting forth Salkil's remaining claims and their respective legal justification. In accordance with the district court's request, Skaggs filed a statement of Salkil's remaining claims. The statement included a claim against the Village entitled "release of liability," based on the Village's attempt to enter into a release-dismissal agreement with Salkil. The statement also set forth the factual background that formed the basis for this claim, including Salkil's refusal to sign the release-dismissal agreement, and the Village's decision not to reinstate the charges against Salkil despite his refusal to sign the agreement.

Over the Village's objections, the district court granted Salkil leave to file an amended complaint. The district court expressly held that the Village's objections to the claims were more appropriately addressed in a motion to dismiss rather than in a denial of leave to amend. Pursuant to the district court's order, Skaggs filed an amended complaint on behalf of Salkil. The amended complaint contained four claims: (1) a Sixth Amendment claim premised on Salkil's inability to access counsel while incarcerated; (2) a Fourth Amendment claim premised on Salikil's 53 day incarceration; (3) a Fourteenth Amendment claim premised on Defendants' failure to accept Salkil's bond payment; and (4) a First Amendment claim, under the Petitions Clause, premised on the Village's attempt to force Salkil to sign a release-dismissal agreement waiving his right to sue. The First Amendment claim was Salkil's sole claim against the Village.

C. The Village's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

On July 1, 2003, the Village simultaneously served Skaggs with a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a letter requesting that Salkil withdraw his First Amendment claim against the Village pursuant to Rule 11. The letter stated that the First Amendment claim was frivolous for the reasons stated in the motion for judgment on the pleadings and warned that the Village would seek sanctions if the First Amendment claim was not withdrawn. The motion for judgment on the pleadings included a two page memorandum, which argued that Salkil's "[First Amendment] claim fail[ed] to present a cognizable action" based on existing case law. The Village reasoned as follows:

The Coughlen case, a copy of which is attached to this motion for the Court's convenience, holds that plea agreements releasing the village, police officers, and prosecutors from misconduct do not support meritorious civil rights claims unless it can be demonstrated that the criminal charges are filed frivolously in an attempt to protect those committing misconduct from having to face potential civil liability. In this case, given that Plaintiff has already admitted the underlying charges were viable, but simply disagrees with the idea of a criminal plea agreement including a waiver of civil liability, [Plaintiff] does not present a viable civil rights claim. In fact, the United States Supreme Court in Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 1187, 94 L.Ed.2d 405 (1987) declared such plea bargain releases are not against public policy and do not impose coercive situations upon criminal defendants. Id. at 392-94, 107 S.Ct. 1187. For these reasons, Plaintiff's...

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