Sall v. George

• Decision Date: 11 January 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:20-cv-214-cr
• Parties: Abdullah Saajoh Sall, Plaintiff, v. Sarah Fair George et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Vermont

Abdullah Saajoh Sall, Plaintiff,
v.
Sarah Fair George et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-214-cr

United States District Court, D. Vermont

January 11, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (DOCS. 39, 40)

Kevin J. Doyle., United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Abdullah Saajoh Sall, proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Sarah George, the Chittenden County State's Attorney's Office (CCSAO), Seven Days Newspaper, the Vermont State Police, “Chittenden County Police Departments, ” the City of Burlington, Chittenden County, Local Motion, the Greater Burlington YMCA, and others.^[1] (Doc. 7 at 1-3, 5.) Sall alleges that starting in 2012, he experienced discrimination in Chittenden County, Vermont based on his race, religion, and national origin, causing him chronic trauma, depression, and anxiety. (Id. at 3-5.) Sall claims that “[t]he City of Burlington and Chittenden [County] as a whole . . . is a racist safe h[]aven city with a culture and tradition of subtle racism as the underbelly of the community” (Doc. 7-2 at 37), and that “[t]he residents of Burlington, Chittenden County, and Vermont convey their racial disdain in so many different ways” (id. at 38).

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As a black Muslim man who immigrated to the United States from Africa (id. at 3), Sall alleges that he has been “made to pay the price” in a culture that “sees black m[e]n as offenders, aggressive, or violent criminals” (id. at 38). Sall seeks $300 million dollars in restitution, to “help [account for] all the injustices [he] was made to endure.” (Doc. 7 at 5.)

This Report and Recommendation addresses Defendant Seven Days' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 39), and its Special Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint under 12 V.S.A. § 1041 (Doc. 40).^[2] For the reasons discussed below, I recommend GRANTING the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 39), without leave to amend, and DENYING the Special Motion to Strike (Doc. 40) as moot given the recommended ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.

Relevant Facts and Procedure

Sall initially filed this action in the District of Massachusetts on November 12, 2020. (Doc. 1.) Approximately one month later, the case was transferred to this District. (Docs. 3, 5.) On January 19, 2021, Sall filed the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 7.) Sall attaches two documents to his Amended Complaint: (1) a “Final Determination” of the Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC), dated June 25, 2020, finding that the “Department of State's Attorneys and Sheriffs [and] the Chittenden County State's Attorneys' Office . . . illegally discriminated against . . . Sall . . . on the basis of national origin, race, and skin color, in violation of Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act” (Doc. 7-1 at 2); and (2) a document titled “Amended Complaint Abdullah Sall Self-[I]ntro, ” which provides the primary factual basis for Sall's allegations in this case (Doc. 7-2).

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The first document, referred to in this Report and Recommendation as the HRC Report, ^[3]states that Sall is Muslim and “of African descent” (Doc. 39-1 at 2), and describes in detail the facts underlying Sall's allegations against Defendants Sarah George and the CCSAO (see Id. at 2-55). Specifically, the HRC Report states that sometime between February 2016 and January 2017, then-Chittenden County State's Attorney TJ Donovan hired Sall as a receptionist for the CCSAO. (Id. at 2.) Soon afterwards, Donovan became the Attorney General of Vermont, and the Governor appointed Sarah George the Chittenden County State's Attorney.^[4] (Id.) Eight days later, George terminated Sall, prompting him to file a charge with the HRC “alleging discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, and place of birth.” (Id.) In connection with the HRC investigation, the CCSAO claimed Sall's termination resulted from his inability “to perform even the basic duties to which he was assigned, ” which “compromised the functioning of the office.” (Id.)

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In Sall's “Self-[I]ntro” document, which this Report and Recommendation refers to as the Amended Complaint, ^[5] Sall states that he ran for Burlington City Council in the March 3, 2017 election. (Doc. 7-2 at 3.) Sall claims that over the course of the campaign and election, Seven Days made two statements and published one article defaming his character. (Id. at 11, 14, 15.) First, Sall alleges that at some point prior to and around the time of the election, a Seven Days reporter asked him the following question regarding his candidacy for City Council: “[I]f you cannot keep a job[, ] how can the public trust you with a job?” (Id. at 11.) Second, Sall claims that on February 28, 2017, Seven Days “wrote/published an article that disparaged and defamed [his] character, ” “sen[ding] out a message to the community of a general consent from the State Attorney's Office that it was acceptable to scorn, ridicule[], bull[y], intimidate, vilify, harass[], abuse[], insult[], and shun [him].” (Id. at 14.) According to Sall, the Seven Days article “stir[red] up hatred” and “abusively and maliciously damaged [his] character” to the few people who did not believe he was a “sexist, ” a “misogynist, ” a “terrorist, ” and a “pedophile” because he was “a Muslim male.” (Id. at 16-17.) Although the Amended Complaint neither attaches the article nor describes its contents in any detail, Sall extensively quotes from it in his Opposition to Seven Days' Motion to Dismiss/Motion to Strike, stating that “[t]he article was written and published . . . on Tuesday, February 28, 2017, at 7:30 AM.”^[6] (Doc. 79 at 2; see also Id. at 6-7, 8, 10, 13-15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22,

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26.) According to Sall, the third allegedly defamatory communication occurred sometime after the Seven Days article was published and “in the midst of President Trump's [Muslim] travel ban.” (Doc. 7-2 at 15.) Sall alleges that when he encountered Seven Days “founder” Paula Routly on a street in Burlington, Routly “turned to her friend and said[, ‘]I can[]not believe they let him back into the Country.[']” (Id.)

Seven Days filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 39) and a Special Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint (Doc. 40). Sall responded to both Motions (Doc. 79), ^[7] and Seven Days filed briefs in reply (Docs. 83, 84).

Analysis

I. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “provide the grounds upon which [its] claim rests, ” ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007), and allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

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liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff need not provide “detailed factual allegations” to support the claims alleged in the complaint, but the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If the plaintiff “ha[s] not nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

In assessing the adequacy of the pleadings, the court must accept all factual assertions as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011). When considering the complaint of a pro se plaintiff, the court must construe the complaint “liberally, ” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), reading it “to raise the strongest arguments . . . suggest[ed], ” Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even pro se litigants, however, “remain subject to the general standard applicable to all civil complaints under the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.” Brickhouse v. City of New York, No. 09 CIV. 9353(NRB), 2010 WL 3341845, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2010); see Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[P]ro se status does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court is not required to credit the complaint's “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, [which are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We are not . . . bound to accept conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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In considering a motion to dismiss, the court is limited to reviewing the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint or incorporated by reference, any documents that are integral to the plaintiff's allegations, even if not explicitly incorporated by reference, and facts of which the court may take judicial notice. See ATSI Commc'ns, 493 F.3d at 98. Courts recognize that there is “particular value” in resolving defamation claims at the pleading stage “so as not to protract litigation through discovery and trial and thereby chill the exercise of constitutionally protected freedoms.” Biro v. Condé Nast, 963 F.Supp.2d 255, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 807 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2015), and aff'd, 622 Fed.Appx. 67 (2d Cir. 2015). “[I]n defamation cases, Rule 12(b)(6) not only protects against the costs of meritless litigation, but provides assurance to those exercising their...