La Salle Nat. Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 24 March 1955
• Docket Number: No. 33382,33382
• Citation: 5 Ill.2d 344,125 N.E.2d 609
• Parties: LA SALLE NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Trustee, et al., Appellees, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 609

125 N.E.2d 609

5 Ill.2d 344

LA SALLE NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Trustee, et al., Appellees, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant.

No. 33382.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 24, 1955.

John J. Mortimer, Corp. Counsel, Chicago (L. Louis Karton and Sidney R. Drebin, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Herbert E. Ruben and Lederer, Livingston, Kahn & Adsit, Chicago, for appellees.

KLINGBIEL, Justice.

The city of Chicago appeals from a declaratory judgment of the circuit court of Cook County holding an amendatory zoning ordinance adopted in 1942 unconstitutional and void insofar as it affects certain property owned by plaintiffs, La Salle National Bank of Chicago, as trustee, and Benjamin I. Simpson and Isak Gustafson as beneficiaries.

The property consists of a vacant lot situated at the southwest corner of Sixty-seventh Street and Oglesby Avenue in the city of Chicago, having a frontage of 245 feet along Sixty-seventh Street and a depth of 150 feet along Oglesby Avenue. Plaintiffs desire to erect a ten-story apartment building thereon. Sixty-Seventh Street runs east and west and is the southern boundary of Jackson Park immediately north of plaintiffs' lot. One block east of plaintiffs' property is South Shore Drive, on the east side of which are the grounds, buildings and golf course of the South Shore Country Club, extending from Sixty-seventh Street southward to Seventy-first Street and eastward to the shores of Lake Michigan.

In 1923 the city of Chicago adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance dividing the city into four use districts and five volume districts. Under its provisions the area bounded by Sixty-seventh Street on the north, South Shore Drive on the east, Seventy-first Street on the south and Clyde Avenue on the west was placed in a '2nd Volume' apartment district except for three strips of land: One strip fronting on South Shore Drive overlooking the country club and Lake Michigan was zoned as a '3rd Volume' apartment district; a second strip (including plaintiffs' lot) fronting on Sixty-seventh Street overlooking Jackson Park was also zoned as a '3rd Volume' apartment district; and a row of lots fronting on Seventy-first Street overlooking an Illinois Central Railroad right of way was zoned for commercial use. In a '3rd Volume' apartment district the maximum permissible height for a building was 198 feet and the maximum ground coverage for a corner lot was 90 per cent, such limits permitting a more intensive development than those applying in '2nd Volume' apartment districts. The amendatory ordinance passed in 1942 changed the volume definitions, and rezoned the strips of land fronting on South Shore Drive and on Sixty-seventh Street into a '2nd Volume' district. In a '2nd Volume' district under the amendatory ordinance the maximum permissible height for a building is 45 feet and the maximum ground coverage for a corner lot is 45 per cent. In the judgment from which this appeal is taken the circuit court found that between 1923 and 1942 there had been no change in the area surrounding plaintiffs' property which would warrant such additional restrictions thereon, and that, on the contrary, the change that did occur was of a nature as to warrant a further intensification of the use of plaintiffs' property. The amendatory ordinance was accordingly declared unreasonable and void as to the lot in question.

The evidence shows that both Sixty-seventh Street and South Shore Drive are major traffic arteries in the city, and that each is serviced by buses of the Chicago Transit Authority. In the block immediately to the east of plaintiffs' property fronting on Sixty-seventh Street there is a store building containing a restaurant. In the square block in which plaintiffs' property is located, bounded by Sixty-seventh Street on the north, Sixty-eighth Street on the south, Oglesby Avenue on the east, and Crandon Avenue on the west, there is an eight-story building erected in 1927, and a number of three-story buildings, two-flat buildings and single-family residences. Immediately to the west of the subject property there is another vacant lot, having a 135-foot frontage on Sixty-seventh Street. On the southwest corner of Sixty-seventh Street and Crandon Avenue, less than one-half block from plaintiffs' property, there is located a 16-story building known as 6700 Crandon Apartments; and immediately west of that building is another 16-story apartment building. The remaining structures in the block are either three-story apartments or one-story residences. The square block to the south of that in which the subject lot is situated has a five-story building containing about fifty apartments. This building was erected in 1950. The next square block to the east-bounded by Oglesby Avenue on the west, South Shore Drive on the east, Sixty-eighth Street on the north and Sixty-ninth Street on the south-contains the Hyde Park Station of the city water works, which is a distance of about one block from the plaintiffs' lot, and some three-story apartment buildings. In the area bounded by Sixty-ninth Street on the north, Seventy-first Street on the south, South Shore Drive on the east and Crandon Avenue on the west there are eight additional buildings ranging from seven to sixteen stories in height.

Since the passage of the 1942 amendatory ordinance two multistory apartment buildings were erected on South Shore Drive, neither of which comply with the ordinance. In the remaining area three buildings were erected since 1942, two of which are multistory apartment buildings not complying with the amendatory ordinance, and the third of which is a singlefamily residence.

Plaintiffs introduced expert testimony that the highest and best use of the subject property was as a multistory building; that it would be worth approximately fifty per cent more if improved with a multistory elevator building than if limited to a three-story building; that property fronting on parks and the lake is particularly appropriate for multistory apartment buildings; and that other multistory buildings in the area have enhanced the value of neighboring properties. Defendant produced three residents of the neighborhood, who testified, on the other hand, that the proposed apartment building would create more traffic and parking problems than would a three-story building; that the small apartments in the proposed building would attract tenants of a different type than those now occupying the larger and more expensive apartments of the existing three-story buildings and duplexes; that the surrounding two-flat and three-story buildings would become less desirable for residential purposes; and that the proposed structure would decrease their value. One of the witnesses, the owner of a three-story apartment building, testified that if three-story buildings were erected on the lot they would bring as much or more rent than the contemplated ten-story building. In addition, an expert formerly employed by the Chicago Plan Commission testified that traffic and parking problems would be increased if the proposed building were erected; that light and air available to the present residents of the area would be decreased; and that population density would be increased to the detriment of the area.

Defendant contends the evidence fails to show that the 1942 amendatory ordinance, as applied to the subject property, is arbitrary and unrelated to the public health, safety and general welfare. The rules of law applicable in the determination of such issues are well established, and were recently reviewed in detail in Trust Company of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 96 N.E.2d 499. The statutory authority for the ordinance in question is found in section 73-1 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chapter 24, par. 73-1,) which provides in part as follows: 'To the end that adequate light, pure air, and safety from fire and other dangers may be secured; that the taxable value of land and buildings throughout the municipality may be conserved, that congestion in the public streets may be lessened or avoided, and that the public health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare may otherwise be promoted, the corporate authorities in each...