Salley v. Myers

• Decision Date: 10 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-6374,19-6374
• Citation: 971 F.3d 308
• Parties: Robert SALLEY, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. Officer Paul MYERS, Defendant – Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

971 F.3d 308

Robert SALLEY, Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.Officer Paul MYERS, Defendant – Appellee.

No. 19-6374

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 8, 2020

Decided: August 10, 2020

Christopher P. Kenney, RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Daniel C. Plyler, Brandon M. Briggs, DAVIDSON, WREN & PLYLER, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded* by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz joined. Judge Agee wrote a dissenting opinion.

GREGORY, Chief Judge:

Robert Salley appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Paul Myers on Salley's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. In 2014, Myers arrested Salley and charged him with congregating on the sidewalk in violation of the City Code of Columbia, South Carolina. More than three years later, Myers voluntarily dropped the charge. Salley then filed the instant suit against Myers, asserting that Myers arrested him without probable cause and ultimately dismissed the case because Salley was innocent. The district court, however, found that Salley could not maintain an action for malicious prosecution because the criminal proceedings against him did not terminate in his favor. The court therefore granted summary judgment for Myers.

Salley now argues that the district court misapplied the summary judgment standard. As explained below, we agree with Salley and vacate the summary judgment award for Myers.

I.

A.

On January 15, 2014, Salley, an honorably discharged Marine, ran a few errands before stopping outside of the Baptist Hospital in Columbia to call his sister, who had been in the emergency room the night before. Upon learning that his sister had already returned home, Salley walked to catch a bus on the corner of Sumter and Laurel Streets. Because that street corner was known for criminal activity, Myers and another officer were patrolling the area when Salley approached. Salley and Myers provide starkly different versions of what happened next.

According to Salley, he was walking on Sumter Street near the bus stop when Myers and the other officer approached him and told him he was blocking the sidewalk. At first, Salley thought "it was just a joke" and tried to walk between the officers, but they "grabbed" him. J.A. 99, 110. Confused, Salley pointed out a man drinking a beer nearby, but Myers responded, "no, I want you." J.A. 112. Myers told Salley that he was "making a statement" twice during their encounter. Id. Myers handcuffed Salley, injuring Salley's shoulder in the process, and searched Salley's pocket. When Salley asked what he was doing, Myers responded that he was "looking for drugs," which he did not find. Id. Myers briefly returned to his vehicle, and Salley overheard him discussing possible charges for "blocking the sidewalk." Id. Salley, however, maintains that he "stopped no place but in front of the Baptist Hospital to call [his] sister. No other time."¹ J.A. 107.

By contrast, Myers testified that he observed Salley and another individual standing on the sidewalk for approximately seven to ten minutes, causing a few people to walk around them into the road. When Myers approached to ask them to move along, the other individual walked away, but Salley became "very hostile." J.A. 63. When Myers calmly explained the sidewalk ordinance, Salley responded by cursing loudly at Myers. Myers then handcuffed Salley and patted him down for weapons because he did not want Salley "to be able to hurt [him]." J.A. 65.

Myers eventually released Salley and issued a summons charging him with congregating on the sidewalk in violation of Columbia City Code § 22-72. Salley immediately walked to City Hall to file a complaint about his arrest with the city manager. Upon learning the manager was not in the office, Salley proceeded to the Columbia Police Department ("CPD") headquarters and filed a complaint with the internal affairs department. That same day, Salley went to the municipal court and requested a jury trial on the congregating charge. While his case remained pending, Salley contacted the CPD to follow up regarding his complaint and to check the status of his jury trial. He was informed that his case remained on the jury docket, but no information could be found on his internal affairs complaint. In fact, for reasons the CPD could not explain, Salley's complaint was never investigated.

Finally, more than three and a half years after his arrest, Salley was summoned to appear for a roster meeting on July 25, 2017. He again demanded a jury trial, which was set for August 7, 2017. At that point, however, Myers informed Salley that he nolle prossed the charge, meaning he declined to prosecute it.² According to Myers, Salley responded that the nolle prosse "was fine with him." J.A. 77. But when Salley was later asked if dismissal was his desired result, Salley replied, "No. I wanted to go into court." J.A. 53. Salley also testified that during their conversation, Myers indicated that he arrested Salley because he "thought [Salley] had drugs," which he did not. J.A. 52. Myers, however, explained in his deposition that he nolle prossed the charge to "cut [Salley] a break" because he "was an older man," and the case had been pending for several years. J.A. 77.

B.

On November 17, 2017, Salley filed a lawsuit against Myers in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, raising § 1983 claims for false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Myers removed the case to federal court and later moved for summary judgment. After Salley agreed to dismiss his claim for false arrest and imprisonment, a magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district court grant Myers’ summary judgment motion ("Report"). The Report concluded that Salley failed to produce evidence that criminal proceedings terminated in his favor, an essential element of his malicious prosecution claim. To satisfy this element, Salley needed to demonstrate that the charge against him was nolle prossed for a reason indicating his innocence. The Report determined that the only evidence of Myers’ reasoning for the nolle prosse was Myers’ testimony that he wanted to give Salley a break due to his age and the length of time since the arrest. Salley contended that Myers’ testimony was false, but the Report found "no evidence in the record that would support such speculation." J.A. 147.

Salley filed three objections to the Report. First, he argued that the Report gave no weight to his testimony, which evidenced his innocence. The district court disagreed, finding that even if the court accepted all of Salley's testimony as true, he still had not shown that the charge was nolle prossed for a reason implying his innocence.

Second, Salley pointed to McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Company , a case in which a malicious prosecution plaintiff wrote a check to a drug store and the check was returned due to insufficient funds. 304 S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887, 887 (1991). The return, however, was due to a bank error, and the bank quickly notified the drug store of its error. Id. Nevertheless, the drug store swore out a fraudulent check warrant against the plaintiff. Id. Salley asserted that there was evidence in his case, as in McKenney , to show he did not commit the crime and therefore the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. The district court disagreed, finding McKenney distinguishable because that case involved actual evidence that the drug store knew about the bank error and still proceeded with the prosecution. In Salley's case, on the other hand, the record contained no actual evidence of his innocence.

Third, Salley argued that the Report credited Myers’ word over Salley's, and on summary judgment, a court must leave questions of weight and credibility to the jury. The district court rejected this contention, determining instead that Salley failed to carry his burden of pointing to any evidence that contradicted Myers’ testimony.

Additionally, Salley filed as supplemental authority this Court's opinion in Williamson v. Stirling , 912 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2018). Salley asserted that Williamson vacated a grant of summary judgment due to errors similar to those committed in the Report in his case—namely, applying an improper legal standard to credit Myers’ testimony and ignoring Salley's. See id. at 178–79 (finding the district court erred by accepting the defendants’ testimony without viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). But the district court decided that even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Salley, Salley failed to show the criminal case terminated in his favor.

Accordingly, the district court rejected each of Salley's objections, adopted the Report, and granted summary judgment for Myers. Salley timely noticed this appeal.

II.

We review de novo a district court's decision to grant summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co. , 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The essence of this inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court "cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations" on summary judgment. Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC , 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016).

III.

A.

This case began when Myers arrested Salley and charged him with congregating on the sidewalk in violation of § 22-72 of the Columbia City Code. That section provides,

All persons are

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