Sallier v. Brooks
| Decision Date | 18 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-1269.,01-1269. |
| Citation | 343 F.3d 868 |
| Parties | Blaine SALLIER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deborah BROOKS and Christine Ramsey, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Daniel E. Manville (argued and briefed), Ferndale, MI, for Appellee.
Patrick J. Wright (briefed), Kevin R. Himebaugh (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Div., Lansing, MI, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before SILER, DAUGHTREY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiff, Blaine Sallier, filed this action as a Michigan state prisoner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging that the defendants, two prison mailroom clerks, had violated his civil rights by unlawfully "opening, censoring, and interfer[ing with his] legal mail" and seeking declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief. The district court declined to rule on the defendants' claim of qualified immunity before trial and instead instructed the jury to determine whether certain correspondence was in fact legal mail and whether that correspondence had been improperly opened outside of Sallier's presence. The jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff's favor on 13 of the claims, assessing damages at $13,000.
The defendants now appeal the district court's ruling on qualified immunity, as well as the district court's failure to grant a new trial based on a number of evidentiary decisions and what they contend were erroneous jury instructions. We conclude that the question of what constitutes "legal mail" is a question of law and, therefore, that the district court erred in submitting the issue to the jury. For the reasons set out below, we further conclude that the correspondence in 11 of the 20 claims did not implicate constitutionally-protected legal mail rights, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on six of the remaining nine claims, and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on the final three claims. We reverse the judgment below as to the claims that either did not involve legal mail rights or for which there was qualified immunity, and we affirm the judgment below as to the three claims involving protected legal mail rights for which there was no qualified immunity. We also reduce the damages awarded by the jury accordingly. Finally, we find no merit in the defendants' remaining evidentiary claims and affirm the district court's rulings on those issues.
In this pro se § 1983 action, the plaintiff claims that two prison mailroom clerks, Deborah Brooks and Christine Ramsey, violated his federal constitutional rights by opening his "legal mail" outside his presence, after he had filed a written request to have such mail opened only in his presence. The written request was dated May 4, 1994, and was entered into the mailroom records on May 5, 1994. The 20 items of mail at issue were sent from various sources over a two-year period as follows:
A. State Court Administrator — March 30, 1994
B. Court of Appeals — April 1, 1994
C. Judicial Tenure Commission — April 15, 1994
D. Attorney Grievance Commission — April 29, 1994
E. Michigan Appellate Assigned Counsel System — May 5, 1994
F. American Bar Association — May 10, 1995
G. Macomb County Clerk — May 19, 1995
H. Macomb County Clerk — June 27, 1995
I. State Appellate Defender Office — July 26, 1995
J. Macomb County Clerk — August 16, 1995
K. State Appellate Defender Office — August 29, 1995
L. Teola P. Hunter, Wayne County Clerk — September 9, 1995
M. Law Office of Kitch, Drutchas, Wagner & Keeney — November 7, 1995
N. Lynn Allen, Oakland County Clerk — December 20, 1995
O. United States District Court — December 22, 1995
P. Michigan Court of Appeals — December 22, 1995
Q. United States District Court — December 23, 1995
R. United States District Court — December 27, 1995
S. Sixth Judicial Circuit — January 22, 1996
T. United States District Court — February 5, 1996
Sallier did not allege that any of the mail was actually read by prison employees, only that it was delivered to him already opened.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. They argued that Sallier had failed to establish a constitutional violation and that, even if he had, they were protected from suit by qualified immunity. The district court denied the defendants' motion and appointed counsel for Sallier. After Sallier's appointed counsel amended the complaint, the defendants again moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity. The court denied the motion, finding that
the jury must make ... factual determinations before the Court has sufficient information to decide the qualified immunity issue. The jury must, for example, decide whether each of the pieces of correspondence referenced in the Complaint constituted "legal mail," and whether any letters determined to be "legal mail" were opened outside of Mr. Sallier's presence. The jury's findings of fact are thus key to the Court's determination of qualified immunity, as the court must then decide, as a matter of law, whether the defendants would have reasonably understood that opening the specific pieces of mail referenced in the complaint violated Mr. Sallier's rights. The jury must make credibility determinations and must determine what legal mail, if any, was opened outside of Mr. Sallier's presence after the defendants knew, or should have known, that such actions were prohibited.
Before and during the trial, the district court also issued a series of in limine rulings, including one that granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude admission of his prior convictions and another that denied the defendants' motion to require introduction into evidence of the original envelopes in which the letters in question were received. The court allowed Sallier to introduce as exhibits photocopies of some of the allegedly opened envelopes that included his handwritten notes.
The jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff's favor on 13 of the 20 claims, awarding compensatory damages of $750 and punitive damages of $250 for each claim, totaling $13,000 in damages. After the jury verdict, the defendants moved for a new trial based on alleged evidentiary errors or, in the alternative, for remittitur or judgment as a matter of law. The district court denied the motion. The defendants appeal the district court's denial of their motion for a new trial or remittitur and its failure to grant them qualified immunity on all claims.
As a threshhold matter, we note that the district court erred in reserving a ruling on the defendants' qualified immunity defense until the jury made a factual determination as to whether each piece of correspondence constituted protected mail. The determination of whether particular kinds of correspondence qualify for the constitutional protection accorded a prisoner's "legal mail" is a question of law properly decided by the court, not one of fact that can be submitted to a jury. See Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 580 (6th Cir.2000)( that courts determine questions of law, juries determine questions of fact). Had the court found certain correspondence to be constitutionally protected legal mail, it should then have granted qualified immunity on any claims involving those items of correspondence that the defendants could have opened without violating constitutional rights that were clearly established at the time and of which a reasonable person would have known. See Christophel v. Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d 479, 484 (6th Cir.1995). After dismissing the claims for all correspondence that was either not legal mail or for which the defendants had qualified immunity, the court should have submitted the remaining claims to the jury for a verdict on the factual dispute of whether such correspondence was actually opened outside of Sallier's presence.
A prisoner's right to receive mail is protected by the First Amendment, but prison officials may impose restrictions that are reasonably related to security or other legitimate penological objectives. See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1012 (6th Cir.1992). As we have noted, "prison officials may open prisoners' incoming mail pursuant to a uniform and evenly applied policy with an eye to maintaining prison security." Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 607 (6th Cir.1993). However, prison officials who open and read incoming mail in an arbitrary and capricious fashion violate a prisoner's First Amendment rights. See Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir.1986).
Moreover, when the incoming mail is "legal mail," we have heightened concern with allowing prison officials unfettered discretion to open and read an inmate's mail because a prison's security needs do not automatically trump a prisoner's First Amendment right to receive mail, especially correspondence that impacts upon or has import for the prisoner's legal rights, the attorney-client privilege, or the right of access to the courts. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 174 (6th Cir.1996) (); see also Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir.2003) ().
In an attempt to accommodate both the prison's needs and the prisoner's rights, courts have approved prison policies that allow prison officials to open "legal mail" and...
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