Salmon v. Salmon

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DUCKWORTH
• Citation: Salmon v. Salmon, 153 S.E.2d 719, 223 Ga. 129 (Ga. 1967)
• Decision Date: 23 February 1967
• Docket Number: No. 23900,23900
• Parties: Edith Moody SALMON v. William David SALMON.

Page 719

153 S.E.2d 719

223 Ga. 129

Edith Moody SALMON v. William David SALMON.

No. 23900.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 23, 1967.

Clower & Royal, E. J. Clower, Rome, for appellant.

Hugh J. Martin, Rome, Cook & Palmour, A. Cecil Palmour, Summerville, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice.

1. The granting or refusing of a motion for mistrial is necessarily a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and unless it is apparent that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial, the exercise of the judge's discretion will not be interfered with. Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121(7), 155 S.E. 11; Georgia Power Co. v. Puckett, 181 Ga. 386, 182 S.E. 384; Hicks v. State, 196 Ga. 671, 27 S.E.2d 307. The two incidents here involving two separate motions for mistrial resulted from a witness testifying that he took out a peace warrant because he 'didn't know what a mean damn woman like that would do,' and because the appellee while on the stand as a witness in his behalf injected, not in answer to any question, the exclamation, 'she had lied about this payment.' In both instances the witnesses were rebuked and reprimanded by the court, and this court can not say, as a matter of law, that a mistrial should have been granted to preserve a fair trial. Indeed, the expressions of the witnesses, as to them, were apparently believed to be the truth. Neither of the enumerations of error complaining of the failure to grant the motion is meritorious.

2. The wife alleged cruel treatment as ground for divorce, and the husband also charged her with cruel treatment as the basis for his prayer for divorce. By these allegations the question of who was cruel to whom, and the credibility of each was put squarely on the line. In this situation, the freedom with which the appellant-wife had employed similar allegations in a divorce proceeding against a former spouse became relevant as to the honesty and credibility of such charges. The wife on cross examination was compellable to answer any relevant questions touching her credibility. When counsel asked her if in a suit against a former husband she charged in Paragraph 4 of the petition, 'exactly and precisely the same allegations,' she replied, 'That is a lie.' The objection to the introduction of Paragraph 4 of the former suit was that: 'We submit that has nothing to do with the issues in this case, as to what was involved in another case, and we object on that ground and move to exclude any evidence with reference to it.' This objection is insufficient to present any question for decision. Middleton v. Waters, 205 Ga. 847, 55 S.E.2d 359; The Greyhound Corporation v. Clough, ...