Salmon v. Wynn

• Decision Date: 13 June 1907
• Citation: Salmon v. Wynn, 153 Ala. 538, 45 So. 133 (Ala. 1907)
• Parties: SALMON v. WYNN ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

45 So. 133

153 Ala. 538

SALMON v. WYNN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 13, 1907

Rehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1907.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Tallapoosa County; W. W. Whiteside Chancellor.

Bill by R. V. Salmon, as administrator, etc., against W. H. Wynn, as administrator, etc., and others, to have the chancery court assume jurisdiction of the further administration of the estate of a decedent and to require the administratrix of the deceased executor of decedent's estate to file her accounts and make a final settlement of the deceased executor's acts as executor of decedent's estate. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Lackey & Bridges, for appellant.

James W. Strothers, for appellees.

DENSON J.

In 1880 James Vaughan died in Tallapoosa county, leaving a last will and testament in which Frederick A. Vaughan is named as executor thereof. The will was duly probated in the probate court on the 16th day of December, 1880, and on that day Frederick A. Vaughan was appointed and duly qualified as the executor of the will and entered upon the administration of the estate as such executor. The testator left surviving him as legatees and distributees of his estate under his will his widow, Sarah Vaughan, three daughters, Julia Greer, Emily Wright, and Sarah P. Turner, two sons, Samuel C. and Frederick A. Vaughan, and the children of another son Madison Vaughan; Madison having died before the death of the testator occurred. Frederick A. Vaughan died intestate in July, 1902, without making a final settlement in the probate court of the estate of James Vaughan; and V. Cooper Vaughan was duly appointed administrator of the estate of Frederick A. Vaughan, deceased.

This bill was filed on the 3d day of March, 1903, by Julia Greer, Sarah Harrison, Julia Guthrie, and James M. Vaughan; the three latter being heirs at law of Madison Vaughan, deceased. The respondents in the bill are V. Cooper Vaughan, as administratrix of the estate of Frederick A. Vaughan, deceased, and the other heirs of James Vaughan, deceased. The purpose of the bill is to have the chancery court assume jurisdiction of the further administration of the estate of James Vaughan, deceased, and to require the administratrix of Frederick A. Vaughan's estate to file her accounts and make in the chancery court a final settlement of Frederick A. Vaughan's acts and doings as executor of the estate of James Vaughan. Pending the suit in the chancery court V. Cooper Vaughan died and W. H. Wynn was appointed administrator de bonis non of the estate of Frederick A. Vaughan, and the suit was revived against him as such administrator.

The defenses made to the bill are based on the doctrine of presumption of settlement and payment after the lapse of 20 years, staleness of demand and laches on the part of the complainants, and an actual settlement with the several claimants. On the final hearing the chancellor rendered a decree denying the relief prayed, and in his opinion is found this paragraph: "It is the opinion of the court that the slumbering on her rights on the part of the complainant, the lapse of time and the death of parties, the uncertainty as to whether or not the life estate of Sarah Vaughan in the property willed to her has fallen in, the meager proof offered in this cause, and other circumstances disclosed by the evidence, bring this case within the principles of Rives v. Morris, 108 Ala. 527, 18 So. 743, and preclude complainant's right to have a settlement of said estate by the administrator of the deceased executor." It is noticeable that the chancellor treats the cause as though there is only one complainant in the bill. This manner of treatment arose from the fact that the uncontradicted proof shows a full settlement by the executor with Mrs. Julia Greer's co-complainants many years before the death of the executor. Not only that, but the documentary evidence without conflict shows that settlement had been made, many years before the executor's death, with all persons entitled to any interest in the estate except Mrs. Julia Greer. As to her there is no documentary evidence of settlement; but there is evidence in the record (which seems to have been considered by the chancellor) tending to prove that large payments were made to Mrs. Greer long before the executor's death, and about the same time that settlements were being made with the other distributees of the estate. So that Mrs. Greer is the only real litigant, except the administrator of the estate of Frederick A. Vaughan.

It must be conceded that more than 20 years elapsed from 18 months after the granting of the letters to Frederick A. Vaughan as executor to the time the bill was filed; but it was, on demurrer to the bill, held by the chancellor that the averments of the bill are sufficient to show a recognition of the administration, or executorship, as a continuing and undischarged trust by the executor within 20 years before the filing of the bill; so that, on the face of the bill, it did not appear that the doctrine of prescription could be applied-at least, the bill in this respect was saved from successful attack by demurrer. But it is unnecessary to discuss this doctrine of prescription, as the record shows that it was not 20 years from the date when the executor filed a statement of his accounts for a partial settlement of the estate; and whether the statement was filed under protest or not makes no difference, as by it it clearly appears that at the time of the filing thereof (1885) the executor recognized the trust as continuing, and this saves the cause of the complainant from the ban of the doctrine of prescription in consequence of the lapse of 20 years.

While this is true, the defense of staleness in the demand is not necessarily affected or disposed of by it, nor by it is the complainant relieved of the imputation of laches. It is, and always has been, the practice of courts of equity to remain inactive where a party seeking their interference has been guilty of unreasonable laches in making his application; and this, irrespective of any statute of limitations. Story's Eq. Jur. § 1520. The principle is stated with great force and clearness by Lord Camden in Smith v. Clay, Amb. 645 (3 Bro. Ch. 640, note): "Nothing can call forth this court in activity, but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. Where these are wanting, the court is passive and does nothing. Laches and neglect are discountenanced, and therefore from the beginning of this court there was always a limitation to suits in this court." The doctrine was stated by Taney, C.J., delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How. 168, 11 L.Ed. 86, in this language: "We do not found our judgment upon the presumption of payment; for it is not merely on presumption of payment, or in analogy to the statute of limitations, that a court of chancery refuses to lend its aid to stale demands. There must be conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence to call into action the powers of the court. In matters of account, where they are not barred by the act of limitations, courts of equity refuse to interfere after a considerable lapse of time, from considerations of public policy, and from the difficulty of doing entire justice, when the original transactions have become obscure by the lapse of time and the evidence may be lost." The principal foundations of the doctrine are acquiescence and lapse of time. But other circumstances will be taken into consideration. Thus it is a material circumstance that the claim is not made until after the death of him...