Salome del Socorro Fuentes-De Canjura v. McAleenan
| Decision Date | 26 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | EP-19-CV-00149-DCG |
| Parties | SALOME DEL SOCORRO FUENTES-DE CANJURA, Petitioner, v. KEVIN McALEENAN, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; MATTHEW T. ALBENCE, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; ADRIAN P. MACIAS, Field Office Director of the El Paso Processing Center; FRANCES M. JACKSON, Assistant Field Office Director at the El Paso Processing Center, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Presently before the Court is Respondents Kevin McAleenan, Matthew Albence, Adrian P. Macias, Frances M. Jackson's "Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment" ("Motion") (ECF No. 11) filed on July 22, 2019. Therein, Respondents ask the Court to dismiss Petitioner Salome Del Socorro Fuentes-De Canjura's ("Petitioner") "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241" ("Petition") (ECF No. 1) on the grounds that none of them are proper respondents and Petitioner's constitutional claims are meritless. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Respondents' Motion.
Petitioner is a citizen of El Salvador who is currently being detained by Respondents in El Paso, Texas.1 McAleenan is the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security("DHS").2 Albence is the Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").3 Macias is the Former Director of the El Paso Field Office Director for ICE.4 Jackson is the Assistant Director of the El Paso Field Office Director for ICE.5
Petitioner originally entered the United States on February 15, 2006, was ordered removed in absentia by an Immigration Judge ("IJ") on July 17, 2006, and was removed to El Salvador on March 17, 2017.6 Petitioner reentered the United States on October 31, 2017 and was convicted for illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.7 After she was released from prison for time served, ICE reinstated the prior removal order on November 1, 2017, and took custody over Petitioner on December 20, 2017.8
While in custody, Petitioner expressed fear of returning to El Salvador and was interviewed by an asylum officer pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.31.9 The asylum officer determined that Petitioner had established a reasonable fear of prosecution or torture, and referred the case to an IJ for withholding-only proceedings on January 30, 2018.10 On April 2, 2018, DHS issued a Decision to Continue Detention stating that Petitioner would remain in custody pending herwithholding-only hearing before the immigration court because of her prior removal from the United States.11 DHS issued another Decision to Continue Detention on June 19, 2018, based on the same grounds.12 On July 12, 2018, Petitioner's hearing before the IJ on the merits was continued because her application for relief did not contain the required declaration from the Petitioner.13 On July 25, 2018, the IJ denied Petitioner's application for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), as well as her application for withholding or deferral under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT").14
Petitioner appealed.15 On September 24, 2018, and January 7, 2019, DHS issued two more Decisions to Continue Detention stating that Petitioner would remain in ICE custody pending a Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") ruling on her case.16 On February 27, 2019, the BIA reversed the IJ's finding that Petitioner did not suffer past persecution, and remanded the case back to the IJ to determine whether DHS carried its burden of proof in rebutting the regulatory presumption that Petitioner's life or freedom would be threatened on the basis of the original claim.17 The BIA declined to address the IJ's denial of protection under CAT.18
On March 15, 2019, Petitioner submitted a request to the IJ for a bond hearing—which the IJ denied on April 2, 2019, reasoning that he lacked jurisdiction over her request for bond because her case was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231.19 On April 26, 2019, the IJ issued his Decision and Order of the Court Following Remand, denying once again Petitioner's application for withholding of removal and protestation under CAT.20 Petitioner again appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA in May 17, 2019.21 To date, the appeal remains pending before the BIA, and thus, the reinstated removal order has not yet been executed.22 On June 10, 2019, the Deportation Officer generated Petitioner's 450-day post-custody review ("POCR") and forwarded it to the Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer for review before submission to Headquarters POCR Unit for revision and decision.23 That same day, Petitioner filed the instant Petition.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A genuine dispute of fact exists when evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party, and a fact is material if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit.'" Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986))). In deciding whether a genuine dispute as toany material fact exists, a trial court considers all of the evidence in the record and "draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party" but "refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the court "only 'give[s] credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant [and] that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'" Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016) () (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000)).
Procedurally, the party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." E.E.O.C. v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy this responsibility by "point[ing] out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case." Latimer v. Smithkline & French Labs., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 544-45 (5th Cir. 2005).
If the moving party succeeds, "the onus shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 694 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the nonmoving party "cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions,or only a scintilla of evidence." Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 497 n.20 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that it has proper jurisdiction to consider this matter. Aliens subject to a removal order may file a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when they wish to challenge their post-removal-period detention on constitutional grounds. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001). On May 11, 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, stripping district courts of jurisdiction over § 2241 petitions attacking removal orders. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (B)(ii). Nevertheless, district courts may exercise habeas jurisdiction to review challenges to post-removal-period detentions that do not attack removal orders. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13 (2001); Baez v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enf't, 150 F. App'x 311, 312 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ().
Further, § 2241 grants district courts "the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus 'within their respective jurisdictions.'" See Lee v. Wetzel, 244 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241). Hence, a district court has jurisdiction to entertain an alien's habeas petition under § 2241 if that alien is detained within that court's district. Id. at 374-75. Petitioner is currently detained at the El Paso Processing Center, within the Western District of Texas, and she is challenging her post-removal-detention on constitutional grounds via § 2241. Therefore, the Court may exercise its habeas jurisdiction over her petition.
Respondents move to dismiss McAleenan, Albence, Macias, and Jackson on the basis that they are improper parties under Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). Mot. at 8.
Generally, a writ of habeas corpus "shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Thus, the Supreme Court in Padilla explained, the "default rule" is that the proper respondent is the party in charge of the facility where the petitioner is being detained, "not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official." Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435. But the Court declined to resolve the question of whether the default rule applied to "a habeas petition filed by an alien detained pending deportation." Id. at 435 n.8.
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