Salomon v. Pfeister & Vogel Leather Co.

• Decision Date: 29 March 1895
• Parties: SALOMON v. PFEISTER & VOGEL LEATHER CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

31 A. 602

SALOMON

v. PFEISTER & VOGEL LEATHER CO.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 29, 1895.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to supreme court.

Action by the Pfeister & Vogel Leather Company against Rudolph G. Salomon, on a note. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Coult & Howell, for plaintiff in error.

Woodruff & Meeker, for defendant in error.

VAN SYCKEL, J. The only question which it is deemed necessary to discuss in this case is whether a notice of protest must contain an express statement that the holder of the protested note will look to the indorser for payment This question was before our supreme court in Burgess v. Vreeland, 24 N. J. Law, 71, in which case there was a failure to state in the notice that the holder looked to the indorser for payment. The chief justice in deciding the case said: "The object of the notice is to apprise the Indorser that the note is dishonored, and that he is looked to for payment it is not necessary to state, in terms, that the holder looks to the indorser for indemnity. It is enough if that fact appears by just and natural implication. The modern cases agree that the fact of giving notice to the indorser that the note is dishonored for nonpayment is in itself a sufficient notice that the indorser is looked to for payment" Many authorities supporting this rule are cited in the opinion. In the later case of Howland v. Adrain, 30 N. J. Law, 41, the rule recognized was that the notice must be sufficient to inform the party, either in express terms or by necessary implication, that the bill or note had been dishonored, and that he was looked to for payment. In the case in hand the notice mailed to the indorser stated that payment of the note had been duly demanded of the maker, that payment was refused, and that the note was protested for nonpayment The only inference which the indorser could reasonably have drawn from such a notice was that the holder of the note intended to look to him for payment. The liability of the maker to the holder was fixed without presentment and protest, and therefore the only purpose which the holder could have had in sending such notice was to charge the indorser. The notice in this case was, in my opinion, sufficient, and the judgment below should be affirmed.