Salt Creek Transp. Co. v. Public Service Commission

• Decision Date: 31 January 1928
• Docket Number: 1474
• Parties: SALT CREEK TRANSP. CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION [*]
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

263 P. 621

37 Wyo. 488

SALT CREEK TRANSP. CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ^[*]

No. 1474

Supreme Court of Wyoming

January 31, 1928

RESERVED case from District Court, Laramie County; WILLIAM A RINER, Judge.

Proceeding by the Salt Creek Transportation Company against the Public Service Commission of Wyoming. On reserved questions from the District Court. Questions answered in part.

Curran & Cobb, for plaintiff.

The questions are submitted to test the validity of Chap. 98 Laws 1927; the State has power to regulate public utilities Pond on Pub. Util. (3rd ed.) Secs. 705-711; denial of certificate is proper unless necessity be shown, Pond Pub. Util. Secs. 780-783; plaintiff's rights vested under a former statute, Chap. 351 C. S. 1921, its repeal did not abrogate his rights, Co. v. Kennedy, Ann. Cas. 1915-D p. 56; necessity does not mean indispensability, Chicago Ry. Co. v. State, 258 P. 874; Chap. 98 Laws 1927 is unconstitutional as to all operators; its regulatory provisions cannot be separated, Goldsworthy v. Comm., (Md.) 119 A. 693; West v. Dairy, (Md.) 135 A. 136; Purple Truck Co. v. Campbell, 250 P. 213; 36 Cyc. 1155. The rule that construction placed upon the same statute by a sister state is subject to many exceptions, C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Krauss, 16 F.2d 82; Coulan v. Doull, 133 U.S. 193; 250 P. 214; Comm. v. Duke, 69 L.Ed. 207. Property used exclusively for private business cannot be converted into a public utility, Frost v. R. R. Comm'n., 70 L.Ed. 1101; the statute is inoperative against this plaintiff.

W. O. Wilson, Attorney General, James A. Greenwood, Deputy Attorney General, and F. Chatterton, for defendant.

The purpose of statutes of this class is for the protection of the public, the utility itself, and the upkeep of roads; the construction of Chap. 98, Laws 1920, as amended by Chap. 150, Laws 1925, should be considered in connection therewith, the new Act referring to the old; 36 Cyc. 1137; a statute intended to provide for the safety of a community should be sustained, City v. West, (N. Y.) 53 L.R.A. 548; City v. Cutberlett, L.R.A. 1915-D 209. The Act relates to intrastate business and is a reasonable regulation, Clark v. Poor, 47 S.Ct. 702; 36 A. L. R. 1110; Co. v. Derr, 228 P. 624; Vandalia v. McNeely, (U.S.) 71 L.Ed. 863. The statute is a police regulation, Stickney v. Co., 200 U.S. 527; it is a general law, McGarvey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120; it is similar to the regulation of the use of water in the interests of the public, Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110; Ryan v. State, 13 Wyo. 122; Hamp v. State, 19 Wyo. 377; Land Co. v. Canal Co., 218 U.S. 371; plaintiff has no indefeasible right to maintain its business on a public highway, Ex Parte Dicky, 85 S.E. 781; Com. v. Kinsbury, 199 Mass. 542; highways are within the control of the state, Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657; Memphis Co. v. Co., (Tenn.) L.R.A. 1916-B 1143; LeBlanc v. New Orleans, 138 La. 243; Clark v. Poor, 47 S. C. R. 702; Morris v. Duby, 47 S.Ct. 548; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160. The title of the Act is sufficient, In Re Judicial Dist., 4 Wyo. 133; In Re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 329; Comm'rs. v. State, 7 Wyo. 280; Co. v. Carpenter, supra; Koppals v. State, 15 Wyo. 398. The license fee is in exercise of police regulation, Standard Co. v. Troy, L.R.A. 1918-C 522, and cases cited; innumerable minor portions may be included under a general title, State v. Co., 156 P. 837; the police power of the state is supreme, Art. X, Sec. 2 Const.; it embraces regulations to promote public convenience, welfare and prosperity, R. R. Co. v. Transbarger, 238 U.S. 67; C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Com., 200 U.S. 561; the enforcement of uncompensated obedience to laws established under police power is not unconstitutional, C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226; Bank v. Haskel, 219 U.S. 104; Ex parte Tindall, (Okla.) 229 P. 125; License Cases, 5 How. 583. It is not a tax statute, regulation being its prime purpose, Cooley on Taxation, Sec. 1784; Brewster v. Ross, 166 P. 505; Davis v. Hailey, 143 Tenn. 247; State v. Foster, 50 L.R.A. 339; Ex parte Holt, 178 P. 260; City v. French, 169 Ky. 174. It is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Scovel v. Detroit, 146 Mich. 93; R. R. Co. v. Schoenfeldt, (Wash.) 213 P. 26; Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140; Producers Co. v. R. R. Com., 251 U.S. 228; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389; Marcus Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610. The Fifth Amendment does not apply to powers of the state, State v. Co., 156 P. 837; it is not a violation of the due process law, Bass v. City, 28 Wyo. 387; State v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500; Comm. v. Co., 104 So. 538; Ohio Co. v. Borough, 253 U.S. 287; the Commission has authority to fix rates, Co. v. Nebraska, 41 L.R.A. 481; State v. Comm., 272 S.W. 971; Thompson Corporations (2nd ed.) Vol. 3, Sec. 2954; Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. 314; Law v. R. R. Com., (Calif.) 195 P. 423. The state may require carriers to protect their patrons by insurance, Nashville Co. v. Ala., 128 U.S. 96; Western Union v. Jones, 162 U.S. 650; People v. Pittsburg R. R. Co., 244 Ill. 166; Siegal Co. v. Colby, 176 Ill. 210. The Oregon case of Purple Truck Co. v. Campbell, cited by defendant is not in point. Private carriers are subject to regulation, LeBlanc v. New Orleans, 138 La. 243; Davis v. People, (Colo.) 247 P. 801; State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169. Contract rights from the state may be modified under police power, R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548; Co. v. Corp., 248 U.S. 372; Levy Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242; that some of the contracts were entered into before the statute was adopted is not material, Producers Co. v. R. R. Co., 40 S.Ct. 131, nor does the contract clause of the Constitution limit the state's police power, R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155; R. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467.

BLUME, Chief Justice. KIMBALL and RINER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

BLUME, Chief Justice.

This cause was submitted to the lower court upon an agreed statement of facts, with a request that certain constitutional questions be submitted to this court for answer. The record discloses the following facts: The plaintiff, Salt Creek Transportation Company, is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Wyoming and is authorized to engage, as a common carrier, in the business of transporting persons and property by means of motor vehicles for compensation over the public highways of this state, between the City of Casper and the City of Sheridan, via Salt Creek. Plaintiff has been engaged in such business for a period of approximately six years. On March 29, 1923, the Public Service Commission of this State issued to plaintiff a certificate of convenience and necessity, amended on June 23, 1926, and again amended on March 15, 1927, authorizing plaintiff, in substance, to operate and maintain a private car line consisting of automobile busses for the transportation of passengers and property between the cities aforesaid and along the line of its route. During the session of the legislature in 1927 an act was passed, known as Chapter 98 of the Session Laws of Wyoming 1927, entitled: "An Act to Supervise and Regulate the Transportation of Persons and Property for Compensation." Plaintiff is a transportation company within the meaning of that Act, but has failed and refused to comply with the provisions thereof or the regulations of the Public Service Commission thereunder, and it has been cited to appear before such Commission to show cause why it should not comply therewith.

The constitutional questions submitted to this court for decision are as follows:

"1. Is Chapter 98 of the Session Laws of 1927, or any section, subsection, clause or phrase thereof unconstitutional or in any way in violation of any of the provisions of either the constitution of the State of Wyoming or of the constitution of the United States, and if so, in what respect?

"2. If the answer to the foregoing question is in the negative, then is the plaintiff required, in order to lawfully engage in and operate its said business, to comply with each and every or any of the provisions and requirements of said Chapter 98?"

It will be noted that the questions submitted to us are broad and sweeping, without pointing out a single constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated by Chapter 98 aforesaid. It is held that a statute will not be declared void unless its invalidity is distinctly pointed out and clearly shown, and that accordingly one who alleges that a statute is unconstitutional must point out the specific constitutional provision that is violated by it. 12 C. J. 285. That rule is applicable here, and we might well return this case to the trial court without answering either of the questions submitted. Waiving that point, however, without letting such waiver serve as a precedent in the future, we must in any event limit our answers to the questions submitted to the points which have been specifically and fully argued. Constitutional questions are too important to be answered by this court at random, and they should not be answered unless fully presented. Only two claims are made and argued in plaintiff's brief, viz: 1. That the certificate of convenience and necessity issued to it prior to the enactment of Chapter 98 of the Session Laws of 1927, is in the nature of a contract which cannot be modified by a subsequent enactment of the legislature. 2. That Chapter 98 above mentioned is unconstitutional as to private carriers and is therefore also unconstitutional as to the plaintiff, a common carrier.

1. It must be clear that the first point above mentioned is without merit. Section 1 of Article X of the State Constitution provides that all laws relating to corporations may be...