Salt Lake City Corp. v. Kunz
| Decision Date | 16 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20190010-CA,20190010-CA |
| Citation | 476 P.3d 989 |
| Parties | SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, Salt Lake City Department of Airports, and Tooele Valley Airport, Appellants and Cross-appellees, v. Dick D. KUNZ, Dick Darwin Kunz, Barbara Jean Kunz, and Neil Norris Kunz, Appellees and Cross-appellants. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Jody K. Burnett and Robert C. Keller, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellants and Cross-appellees
Robert E. Mansfield and Megan E. Garrett, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellees and Cross-appellants
Opinion
¶1 This case offers a feast of legal issues—ranging from procedural to constitutional—but its main course is a cautionary tale to government entities: they must follow the exact statutory requirements for bringing a condemnation action under Utah Code section 78B-6-504(2)(c). Salt Lake City (the City) attempted to exercise its eminent domain power to obtain the air rights of Appellees (Owners), in the form of an avigation easement,1 connected with a runway on the south side of one of its airports, namely, the Tooele Valley Airport (TVA). After years of litigation, the district court dismissed the City's condemnation action because the City indisputably had failed to strictly comply with the requirements of Utah Code section 78B-6-504(2)(c). The City contends that the court erred in dismissing the action because (1) Owners made a binding admission that the City had complied with the statutory notice provision, (2) substantial compliance with the statutory requirements should have rescued the City from dismissal, and (3) the court should have allowed the City to amend its complaint. Owners dispute the merits of these contentions. They also raise their own contentions on cross-appeal, arguing that (1) the City has no power to condemn property situated outside its boundaries, (2) the City failed to negotiate as required by statute, (3) the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law to the City on valuation of the air rights, and (4) the district court erred in denying Owners an award of attorney fees and litigation costs.
¶2 In short, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this case based on the City's violation of the requirements of Utah Code section 78B-6-504(2)(c) —requirements we conclude demand strict compliance and for which prejudice need not be demonstrated. Because we do so, we decline to address Owners’ contentions regarding negotiation and valuation as they may or may not be presented in any new proceeding. We do explain, however, why Owners’ response to a statement of fact in an earlier partial summary judgment motion did not constitute an admission that was binding beyond the context of the then-pending motion, why the City was required to strictly follow the terms of the statute, and why the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the City's request to amend its complaint. We also address why Owners are not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs, and we answer an associated question of whether the City had extraterritorial eminent domain power in this case.
¶3 The City acquired TVA—an airport located in Tooele County—in 1991. Owners2 own the land directly south of TVA. In 2004, the City put together a plan to allow for an aircraft approach from the south using runway 35. As a condition of federal funding on this project, the City was required to assure the protection of open airspace on a defined slope extending downward to the runway, compatible with normal airport operations, including aircraft landing and takeoff. The necessary open airspace extended over property to the south of the runway. The City identified Owners as the property holders of that land.
¶4 Thereafter, the City entered into negotiations with Owners and prepared appraisals of the air rights in an effort to acquire an avigation easement from them. But Owners did not accept the City's offer. So, the City submitted a proposed condemnation resolution to the city council for a vote on March 6, 2007. Before the meeting, the City provided written notice to Owners on February 16, 2007. Owners attended the meeting and spoke in opposition to the condemnation, though their time was limited to three minutes. The city council delayed a vote on the resolution until March 13, 2007. Those in attendance were orally notified that the motion would be deferred to the March 13, 2007 meeting. Owners did not, however, receive written notice related to this second meeting.
¶5 Owners attended this subsequent meeting and again spoke in opposition to condemnation. Again, they were only allowed two to three minutes each to speak to the city council. And again, the vote was postponed. The City then negotiated with Owners to acquire the property in fee simple absolute, rather than an easement. Because the parties were unable to come to an agreement, a third city council meeting was held on May 22, 2007. The City sent written notice of this third meeting to Owners three business days before the meeting was held. Owners attended the meeting, but they were not allowed to speak, despite specifically requesting that opportunity. The city council thereafter voted in favor of adopting the resolution authorizing formal condemnation proceedings. After the meeting, the City again attempted to purchase Owners’ property, but Owners still refused to sell. Therefore, the City initiated this action to obtain the avigation easement by condemnation.
¶6 The parties proceeded to litigate. Early on, Owners moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the City did not have authority to condemn the air rights because the property was located outside the City's geographical boundaries. The City opposed the motion and filed its own motion for partial summary judgment on this issue. In its motion, the City stated the reason for the motion: "This motion is based on the grounds that the City owns and operates [TVA] ... [and] has been granted the authority to condemn the air rights in question pursuant to several statutes including without limitation Utah Code Ann. §§ 72-10-413, 72-10-203 through 205, 10-8-2, and related statutes." The City further asserted, The City also maintained that the airspace condemnation was part of a broader expansion and improvement of both TVA and the Salt Lake International Airport, and that the new runway at TVA would make TVA "more safe, functional and efficient so that it could relieve certain demands on the SLC [Airport]." In its motion, the City set forth several statements of fact, supported by an affidavit, that outlined the City's ownership interest of TVA, the plan and potential federal funding to improve TVA, and the history of negotiations with Owners, and stated, in relevant part:
Owners responded and stated that all statements of fact, other than statement ten, were "undisputed for purposes of the current motions before this Court." (Emphasis added.)
¶7 In May 2009, after briefing and oral argument, the district court denied Owners’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the City's partial summary judgment motion. The court identified the sole issue in dispute as whether the City had extraterritorial jurisdiction to condemn Owners’ airspace. The court specifically explained that Owners did "not address the express authorization or distinguish the language allowing for municipal condemnation in" various sections of the Utah Code. The court ultimately concluded that various statutory provisions supplied the extraterritorial authority for the City to condemn Owners’ air rights. Because Owners did not contest the matter for purposes of the motion, the court did not expressly rule whether conditions precedent to taking the property—notice and an opportunity to be heard—had been satisfied.
¶8 Years of litigation followed. In 2010, the court granted the City's motion for an order of immediate occupancy, allowing the City to occupy Owners’ airspace, and ordered the City to submit an advance occupancy deposit. Owners never requested to withdraw the funds. That same year, the City amended its complaint. Owners in turn filed an amended answer and therein asserted an affirmative defense that the City's "claims [were] barred in that it failed to give the requisite notices required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501, et seq." Several years later, the City propounded a discovery request that Owners produce all documents "that relate in any way to the claims and affirmative defenses at issue in this proceeding." Along the way, the case was reassigned in the normal course to a different district judge.
¶9 In 2018, "on the eve of trial," the district court granted the City's motion in limine to exclude Owners’ only designated appraisal expert. The City then moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of valuation due to the lack of competing evidence. This prompted Owners to oppose the City's motion with their own motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that...
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