Salt's Textile Mfg. Co. v. Ghent

• Decision Date: 06 January 1928
• Citation: 139 A. 694,107 Conn. 211
• Parties: SALT'S TEXTILE MFG. CO. v. GHENT ET AL.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

139 A. 694

107 Conn. 211

SALT'S TEXTILE MFG. CO. v. GHENT ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 6, 1928

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County; Frederick W Huxford, Judge.

Action for damages to plaintiff's automobile brought by Salt's Textile Manufacturing Company against John Ghent and another, co-partners doing business under the name of the Woodland Transportation Company, tried to the court. Findings and judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendants appeal. No error.

Thomas R. Robinson and Daniel L. O'Neil, both of New Haven, for appellants.

Raymond E. Baldwin, of Bridgeport, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

BANKS J.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether or not the plaintiff's truck was being operated by an unlicensed person, so as to deprive the plaintiff of its right to recover damages resulting from its collision with a truck owned by the defendants. The plaintiff's truck was being operated by one Doerr, who had an operator's license which was issued to him by the commissioner of motor vehicles on April 7, 1924. Doerr was born June 17, 1906, and became 18 years of age on June 17, 1924. The collision occurred on September 19, 1924. Doerr was therefore less than 18 years old when he received his license, although he was over 18 at the time of the accident.

Section 15 of the Motor Vehicles Act then in force (chapter 400 of the Public Acts of 1921) provided:

" No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of this state until he shall have obtained from the commissioner a license for such purpose. * * * No such license shall be issued until the applicant therefor has signed and filed with the commissioner an application under oath, * * * stating such information as the commissioner shall require; nor shall such license be issued until the commissioner is satisfied that the applicant is over eighteen years of age and is a proper person to receive such license."

Section 18 of the act provided:

" Any motor vehicle registration certificate or operator's license issued upon an application containing any material false statement of fact shall be void from the date of its issue."

Section 61 of the act provided:

" No recovery shall be had in the courts of this state by the owner of a motor vehicle * * * if such motor vehicle be legally registered but was being operated by an unlicensed person in violation of any provision of sections fifteen twenty or twenty-one of this act."

It is the contention of the defendant that since Doerr, the operator of plaintiff's truck, was not yet 18 when he received his operator's license, the license was void and plaintiff's truck was being operated by an unlicensed person, which would bar a recovery in this action. Doerr was the holder of an operator's license which, so far as appears, had not been suspended, revoked, or surrendered, and he was therefore a licensed person and the plaintiff's car was not being operated by an unlicensed person in violation of section 15 unless for some reason the license which he held was void. The statute nowhere provides that a license issued to a person under 18 years of age shall be ipso facto void. That is natural enough since it is not within the contemplation of the statute that a license should be issued to such a person, section 15 providing that no license shall be issued until the commissioner is satisfied that the applicant is 18 years of age. Doubtless, if it appeared that the commissioner had issued a license to a person under 18, that fact would constitute good ground for its revocation and surrender. Until it had been revoked or surrendered, its possession would entitle the holder to operate a motor vehicle as a licensed person.

But the defendant contends that Doerr was an unlicensed driver by virtue...