Salter v. Neb. Tel. Co., No. 14,674.

• Court: Supreme Court of Nebraska
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 112 N.W. 600,79 Neb. 373
• Docket Number: No. 14,674.
• Decision Date: 22 June 1907
• Parties: SALTER ET AL. v. NEBRASKA TELEPHONE CO.

79 Neb. 373
112 N.W. 600

SALTER ET AL.
v.
NEBRASKA TELEPHONE CO.

No. 14,674.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

June 22, 1907.

Syllabus by the Court.

[112 N.W. 600]

When a serious injury requiring immediate medical or surgical services is incurred by the employé of a company engaged in a business dangerous to its employés, and the injury is received at a place distant from the home of the injured party, any general officer of the company then present may engage such medical or surgical treatment and care as the case requires, and bind the company for the reasonable value thereof, without any proof on the part of the party furnishing such treatment and care that such general officer of the company had special

[112 N.W. 601]

authority to make such contract, or that such action on his part came within the general scope of his power and duties.

In case of serious injury to an employé under the circumstances above set out, if no general officer of the company is present, the highest officer or person highest in authority then present may bind the company for such services as the emergency may demand.

While not attempting to formulate any general rule to determine what constitutes emergency treatment for which a company will be liable under employment made by an officer or agent of known limited authority, it ought generally to extend for a time sufficient for the party employed to communicate with the company, and, if it decline to be further responsible, for notice to the proper poor authorities, if the injured party is entitled to public care.

Commissioners' Opinion. Department No. 2. Appeal from District Court, Madison County; Boyd, Judge.

Action by P. H. Salter and others against the Nebraska Telephone Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Allen & Reed and W. W. Morsman, for appellant.

Mapes & Hazen and John R. Hays, for appellees.

DUFFIE, C.

January 1, 1904, Bert Crumb, an employé of the Nebraska Telephone Company, fell from the top of a telephone pole to the frozen earth, fracturing his arm at the elbow to such an extent that the ends of the broken bones protruded through his coat into the earth. He was taken to Hubbard, some 4 1/2 miles distant, and the next morning put on the train and taken to Norfolk, where he was placed in a hospital operated by the plaintiffs. One O. E. Dugan, the foreman in charge of the working gang of which Crumb was a member, was in Norfolk at the time, and made arrangements with the plaintiffs for the reception and treatment of Crumb. The evidence discloses that Crumb had received a compound fracture of the elbow joint; that in drawing back the protruding bones previous to his reception by the plaintiffs, some 19 hours after the accident, dirt and other foreign matter, which had been taken into the wound caused by the protruding bones, infected the arm, and this infection spread over the entire system, necessitating a number of operations, among others the removal of the elbow joint, which operation was performed by the plaintiffs on January 16th. It further appears that Crumb's condition was such as to require the constant attendance of a nurse and the services of both the plaintiffs to dress his arm, which was necessary from two to three times a day for some time after his reception. There is evidence tending to show that at no time previous to his leaving could Crumb have been moved from the hospital without great danger to his life. Crumb was received by the plaintiffs on January 2, 1904, and discharged on July 28, 1904. This action was commenced against the defendant and appellant to recover the value of the professional services rendered and for board and hospital services; the amount claimed being $918. The answer admits that Crumb was an employé of defendant corporation and was injured so as to become in need of immediate medical and surgical treatment; avers that Dugan employed the plaintiffs to render such services on January 2, 1904, but that he then informed plaintiffs that defendant would not be responsible or pay plaintiffs for more than the first surgical treatment, and that neither he (Dugan) nor any other employé of defendant had authority to employ plaintiffs and to obligate the defendant for more than the first treatment given Crumb. The answer further offered to let plaintiffs take judgment for the value of the first treatment of said Crumb as specified in the petition, to wit, setting arm $25, with the costs to date of filing the answer. On the trial the defendant interposed numerous objections to evidence offered by the plaintiffs, which objections were overruled and exceptions duly entered. The defendant offered evidence to show that Dugan had no authority to make any contract on behalf of the company for services rendered to an employé of the company, except for the first treatment given such injured employé; also, that Dugan informed one of the plaintiffs on January 3, 1904, that the defendant would not be responsible for any services other than the first treatment of Burt Crumb; that at a later date another employé of the company informed one of the plaintiffs, when interrogated about...