Sam's Club v. Bair
| Decision Date | 23 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-3994,95-3994 |
| Citation | 678 So.2d 902 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1927 SAM'S CLUB and Claims Management, Inc., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Cross-Appellees, v. Annette BAIR, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
William H. Rogner of Hurley & Rogner, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Mark N. Tipton of Daniel Hightower, P.A., Ocala, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
In this appeal and cross-appeal of an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) awarding temporary total disability benefits to claimant, Annette Bair, we affirm, in the main appeal, those portions of the order finding Bair's back injury compensable and awarding costs of transportation for medical treatment under section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). As to the cross-appeal, we reverse that portion declining to determine whether the treatment Dr. Ross Dumbadse provided was reasonable and necessary.
Considering first the appeal lodged by the employer/carrier (E/C), there is competent, substantial evidence supporting the JCC's finding that claimant's compensable accident was the major contributing cause of her need for treatment for her back injury.
We affirm as well the award of medical mileage. In 1964, the supreme court held that section 440.13, Florida Statutes, which requires the employer to furnish the claimant with "remedial treatment, care, and attendance" for as long as the injury requires, included costs of transportation for medical treatment. Mobley v. Jack & Son Plumbing, 170 So.2d 41 (Fla.1964). Because the language in Mobley is so clear and emphatic, we quote it in full:
There can be no doubt that the Legislature intended that an injured employee be given medical treatment at the expense of the employer-carrier and without expense to himself. This legislative intent would not be fully accomplished if the employee were required to pay his own travel expenses necessarily incurred in obtaining medical treatment.
We doubt that anyone would question payment of an ambulance charge for transporting an injured employee to or from his home when necessary in the course of his treatment. Yet, technically, such a charge is not for "remedial treatment, care and attendance." Again, if a claimant were to be offered treatment by the employer at one of the out of state clinics, failure of the employer to also furnish travel expenses would make the offer of treatment an empty gesture. These two illustrations may be said to be unusual, but, as we view the question, the difference in the cited situations and travel by a claimant from his home to a doctor or hospital is one only in degree, not in kind.
Considering the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the benefits to be given injured employees by its terms, we conclude that travel expenses necessarily incurred in enjoying the medical benefits provided by the Act are an incident of medical care and treatment. Therefore, the employer-carrier must either furnish such transportation or pay claimant the reasonable actual cost thereof.
In 1977, the legislature added a provision to section 440.13 expressly authorizing such medical mileage. Ch. 77-290, § 3, at 1287, Laws of Fla. When the legislature amended section 440.13 in 1993, it deleted this provision. 1 Ch. 93-415, § 17, at 98-111, Laws of Fla. We conclude that this omission did not abrogate the judicial construction in Mobley and its progeny that section 440.13(2)(a) implicitly authorizes such costs.
Certainly, by enacting a material amendment to a statute, the legislature is presumed to have intended to alter the law unless the contrary is made clear. Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla.1977). On the other hand, once a court has construed a statutory provision, subsequent reenactment of that provision may be considered legislative approval of the judicial interpretation. Seddon v. Harpster, 403 So.2d 409 (Fla.1981). The existence of these competing rules of statutory construction renders the legislature's omission of the provision ambiguous. Although it might be reasonable to...
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