Sam v. Sam

• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Maes
• Citation: Sam v. Sam, 2006 NMSC 22, 134 P.3d 761, 2006 NMSC 22, 139 N.M. 474 (N.M. 2006)
• Decision Date: 24 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 28,426.,28,426.
• Parties: Lajusta SAM, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Tyler Dexter Sam, deceased, and as next friend of Bronte Kieran S., Cory Deyoung S., and Britney Lynn S., minor children, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. The Estate of Benny SAM, Jr., and Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc., an Arizona non-profit corporation, Defendants-Petitioners.

134 P.3d 761

2006 NMSC 022

Lajusta SAM, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Tyler Dexter Sam, deceased, and as next friend of Bronte Kieran S., Cory Deyoung S., and Britney Lynn S., minor children, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. The Estate of Benny SAM, Jr., and Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc., an Arizona non-profit corporation, Defendants-Petitioners.

No. 28,426.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 24, 2006.

Briones Law Firm, P.A., Kyle Michael Finch, Farmington, NM, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., Eileen Dennis Gilbride, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioners.

Keleher & McLeod, P.A., David W. Peterson, Albuquerque, NM, Ascione, Heideman & McKay, L.L.C., Patrick J. Ascione, Justin D. Heideman, Provo, UT, for Respondents.

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} This case arises from an accident that occurred in New Mexico and involved an Arizona government employee. As a matter of first impression, we must determine whether a New Mexico district court should, as a matter of comity, recognize the sovereign immunity of a sister state, Arizona. Petitioners urge us to reverse the Court of Appeals' findings that neither New Mexico's nor Arizona's limits on waiver of sovereign immunity apply to Respondents' claim and that the claim is not barred by either state's statute of limitations. Both Arizona and New Mexico have waived sovereign immunity through their respective Tort Claims Acts. See NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 to -27 (1976, as amended through 2004); ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. §§ 12-820 to -823 (1984, as amended through 2002). However, the waiver of sovereign immunity in both states is restrained by strict statutes of limitations that bar suits filed a certain amount of time after the alleged tort. Section 41-4-15(A); ARIZ.REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821. We hold that, in the interests of comity, New Mexico should extend the Tort Claims Act statute of limitations to states with similar tort claims acts when they are sued in New Mexico district courts. We reverse the Court of Appeals' decision in this case and affirm, with modification, the district court's ruling that Respondents' claim was not timely filed.

BACKGROUND

{2} The tragic accident that gave rise to this case occurred in Gallup, New Mexico. Mr. Benny Sam, Jr. ("Sam") ran over and killed his four-year-old son while backing out of his driveway. The truck Sam was driving belonged to his employer, the Window Rock Unified School District, an Arizona governmental entity. Sam was authorized to drive the truck home for the weekend, and was moving it out of his driveway to work on his personal vehicle when the accident occurred. Throughout the course of the litigation both sides have assumed that Sam was acting in the course and scope of his employment.

{3} Sam later passed away. Subsequently, his wife, both individually and as personal representative of her son's estate ("Respondents"), sued Sam's estate ("the Estate") and the Arizona School Retention Trust, Inc. ("the Trust") in the New Mexico District Court of McKinley County. The suit was filed one day prior to exactly three years after the accident occurred. Thus, Respondents' suit was timely filed if New Mexico's three-year statute of limitations for general tort actions applied, see NMSA 1978, § 37-1-8 (1976), but the New Mexico Tort Claims Act's two-year statute of limitations for actions against New Mexico governmental entities would bar the suit if applied to the case. See § 41-4-15(A).

{4} The two original defendants, the Trust and the Estate (collectively, "Petitioners"), each filed separate motions for summary judgment based on different rationales. In two separate rulings the district court judge granted the motions. First, the judge dismissed the suit against the Trust because Respondents failed to comply with Arizona's notice of claim under ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. § 12-821.01(A) (requiring persons with a claim against an Arizona governmental entity or employee to give notice to the entity within one hundred and eighty days after the cause of action accrues). Second, the judge granted summary judgment against Respondents for failing to file the complaint within either the one-year statute of limitations period of the Arizona Tort Claims Act, see ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. § 12-821, or the two-year statute of limitations period of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. See § 41-4-15(A).

{5} The district judge concluded that Respondents' action was barred by "the statute of limitations of both Arizona and New Mexico." This conclusion was based on his legal findings that: (1) the public policy behind both states' tort claims acts is the same; (2) a "public employee in either state in the same situation would only be subject to a one [sic] or two-year statute" of limitations; and (3) to "allow this suit to go forward ... would undermine the policies and laws of both Arizona and New Mexico."

{6} Respondents appealed both rulings to the Court of Appeals. The Court first upheld the district court's determination that Respondents failed to timely appeal the judge's order of dismissal against the Trust. Sam v. Estate of Sam, 2004-NMCA-018, ¶ 1, 135 N.M. 101, 84 P.3d 1066. Respondents did not challenge this ruling on appeal and it is deemed abandoned. See Deaton v. Gutierrez, 2004-NMCA-043, ¶ 26, 135 N.M. 423, 89 P.3d 672. Second, under a de novo standard of review, the Court reversed the district court's determination that either Arizona's or New Mexico's tort claims act statute of limitations applied to this case. Sam, 2004-NMCA-018, ¶¶ 1, 12, 135 N.M. 101, 84 P.3d 1066. It first determined that the Arizona Tort Claims Act was inapplicable because New Mexico courts are "not required to recognize Arizona's statute of limitations ... or the sovereign immunity granted to its public employees." Id. ¶ 13. Second, it held that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act was inapplicable because Sam was not employed by New Mexico and was therefore not covered by New Mexico's Tort Claims Act. Id. ¶ 14. The Court decided that the correct statute of limitations was New Mexico's general three-year statute of limitations governing tort actions. Id. ¶ 15; see § 37-1-8. The Court determined that because New Mexico generally applies the law of the place where the wrong or tort occurred, the general three-year statute of limitations was appropriate in this case. Sam, 2004-NMCA-018, ¶ 15, 135 N.M. 101, 84 P.3d 1066 (citing Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 613, 894 P.2d 386, 390 (1995)).

DISCUSSION

{7} Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied the general rule that the law of the place of the wrong controls. They claim that the Court of Appeals should have instead performed a comity analysis to determine whether New Mexico should recognize and apply the Arizona one-year statute of limitations or apply the New Mexico Tort Claims Act two-year statute of limitations to Arizona governmental entities sued in New Mexico. Conversely, Respondents urge us to uphold the Court of Appeals decision. Their principal policy arguments in favor of applying the three-year statute of limitations are that New Mexico's Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act (NMMFRA) evinces a strong state interest in compensating victims of negligent acts and that a three-year statute of limitations would make the determination easy and promote predictability and uniformity. Additionally, they argue that a comity analysis is not warranted in this case, but assert that even if we decide to engage in a comity analysis, public policy would dictate that New Mexico's general three-year statute of limitations applies.

{8} Whether a district court should extend immunity to a sister state as a matter of comity is an issue of first impression in New Mexico. Comity is a principle whereby a sovereign forum state recognizes and applies the laws of another state sued in the forum state's courts. The sovereign forum state has discretion whether or not to apply the laws of the other state. In order to fully explore this topic, we will discuss the principles behind comity and what factors a New Mexico court should consider to determine if comity should be extended.

{9} The parties disagree about the preliminary matter of what standard of review an appellate court should apply to this issue. Generally, when the facts of a case are not in dispute, we review the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. See Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582 (reviewing summary judgment). This includes whether a governmental entity has immunity. See Godwin v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-033, ¶ 23, 130 N.M. 434, 25 P.3d 273 (reviewing the New Mexico Tort Claims Act). Respondents urge us to adopt this standard of review for this case. Petitioners argue that we should adopt a dual standard of review for cases involving a district court's decision to extend comity. They argue that we should review the district court's decision to use a comity analysis de novo, and then review a district court's application of comity for abuse of discretion. They argue that an abuse of discretion standard is appropriate because the analysis is fact-sensitive. See, e.g., Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1075 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). This two-tiered standard of review is based on analyses from other state courts and federal circuit courts. See Lee v. Miller County, Arkansas, 800 F.2d 1372, 1376 (5th Cir.1986); Levert v. Univ. of Ill. at Urbana/Champaign, 857 So.2d 611, 618 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.2003); Univ. of Ia. Press v. Urrea, 211 Ga.App. 564, 440 S.E.2d 203, 204 (1993). We agree with Petitioners and adopt this two-tiered standard of review. Therefore, we must first determine whether the district court used a comity analysis to arrive at the proper standard of review.

{10} The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case are brief. Although it appears that Petitioners' Estate did say the word "comity" at the...